POLITICAL TSUNAMI

Analysis of the Events in Northern Africa and the Middle East

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This monograph represents the results of collective research carried out by a team of analysts under the guidance of Sergey Kurginyan. The socio-economic, political and conceptual roots of the unprecedented wave of “revolutionary excesses” of 2011 in Northern Africa and the Middle East, as well as external influence on the process are dealt with on the basis of a wide range of factual evidence and in a broad historical context.

An analysis of internal and external “fault lines” and other latent “driving forces” of these “revolutionary excesses” is provided, as well as an assessment of the possible impact of developing processes on specific countries, the region as a whole and the future world order.
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PART I. PROJECTS, OR ANALYSIS OF THE INTENTIONS NOW BEING REALIZED IN NORTHERN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Chapter 1. Chronology of Major Mass Demonstrations in Northern Africa and the Middle East in Early 2011

The demonstrations in Algeria and Tunisia provided the initial impetus for the giant wave of protests in Northern Africa and the Middle East.

Unrest in Algeria, as in Tunisia, had already begun in December 2010 in connection with the rise in food prices and it continued with varying intensity over the course of January and February 2011.

However, it was not the Algerian demonstrations that played the role of a trigger for the region at large, but rather the political outburst in Tunisia in mid-January that occurred against their background.

Tunisia. Jasmine Revolution

An event in the small Tunisian city of Sidi Bou Zid served as a cue for the start of major unrest in the country. On December 17, 2010, a graduate of a law faculty forced to work as a street vendor committed self-immolation in the Tunisian city. After this, a crowd dissatisfied with the economic policy of President Ben Ali, which had led to massive unemployment and falling living standards, took to the city streets.

On December 18, 2010, demonstrations by the unemployed began in other Tunisian cities. They were joined by lawyers and labor unions.

Meanwhile, the majority of experts and reputable mass media agree that an important role in launching the revolution in Tunisia was played by
secret materials with data about the ruling elite of the country, which was posted on the website WikiLeaks. Thus, Foreign Policy magazine called the shift in power that occurred in Tunisia the “first WikiLeaks revolution”.

Thus, from January 10th, 2011, mass demonstrations in the Tunisian capital began, growing into clashes with the police.

On January 12th, Tunisian universities closed and a general strike began.

On January 14th, the military took up positions by the presidential palace, key ministries, and the international airport. Emergency rule was implemented throughout the entire territory of Tunisia. The police began a crackdown on demonstrators with the use of tear gas.

On the same day, it was announced that the rebels had blockaded the presidential palace and government buildings. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali announced the resignation of the government and fled to Saudi Arabia.

On January 15th, the Constitutional Council of Tunisia stripped Ben Ali of his presidential powers. The speaker of the parliament was appointed interim president.

In Tunisia, the main railway station was burned down by marauders and stores, cafes, shopping centers, and the houses of wealthy citizens were looted.

On January 16th, the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi spoke in a televised address to the Tunisian people. He announced: “You have suffered a tremendous loss. There was no one who was better for Tunisia than Zine.” Gaddafi added that Ben Ali “will always remain the legitimate president of Tunisia in accordance with the constitution.”

In Tunisia, on the same day, the nephew of the deposed president died from stab wounds.
On January 17th, the new composition of the Tunisian government was made public. It included representatives of both the ruling and opposition parties.

On January 18th, four of the opposition ministers of the new government resigned.

Meanwhile, in the country’s big cities demonstrations continued with the demand for the standing-down of all representatives from the former regime.

On January 20th more than 30 relatives of the deposed President Ben Ali were taken into custody. Local TV stations showed confiscated jewels, gold, and credit cards. The accounts of Ben Ali and his close associates were quickly frozen by banks in Germany, France, and Switzerland.

On February 1st, Agence France-Presse reported a death toll of 219 people during the Tunisian riots, citing a UN representative.

Parallel to the events in Tunisia, similar demonstrations began in other countries of the Islamic world, where the mood of protest had been encouraged by the success of the Tunisian revolution.

On January 18th, the opposition in Jordan in conjunction with the trade unions demanded that the government resign. Thousands of protest actions continued in the following days.

On January 21st, large mass demonstrations took place in Jordan and Albania. Protest actions were also held in Saudi Arabia.

On January 22nd, an opposition rally in Algeria was dispersed by the police. During this, several police were wounded, some seriously.

The events in Egypt began after the outbreak of these major political events in the Middle East.

**Egypt. Lotus Revolution**

On January 25th, 2011, mass protests began in Egypt. This day was called the “Day of Anger”.

It is worth noting that later on, this organizational pattern was repeated by a number of Middle Eastern states, where the first stage of unrest also began with a “Day of Anger”.

On January 26th, over 10 thousand people took to the streets in Cairo and several other Egyptian cities, demanding
the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. During clashes with the police in the very first day of mass demonstrations, 3 demonstrators were killed and approximately another 80 people were wounded.

The start of this major Egyptian process served as a supportive backdrop for the following new outbreaks of unrest in countries of the Arab world.

On January 26th, 2011, self-immolation was attempted in one of the cities in southern Yemen. (This is also one of the recurring elements in the pattern of the beginning of demonstrations in different countries, just like staging a “Day of Anger” and the creation of a Facebook and Twitter pages for its preliminary organization).

As early as January 27th, thousands of people took to the streets in the Yemeni capital Sana’a demanding the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

On the same day, a protest march organized through Facebook was held in the Lebanese capital Beirut.

On January 27th, it was announced that up to 800 opposition activists had been detained in Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria. It was learned that the former head of IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, had returned to Egypt as a possible contender for the presidency. The Arab League called on the Egyptian authorities to carry out reforms, and the European Union called on them to renounce violence.

On January 28th, anti-government demonstrations continued in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, El Arish, and Luxor. Crowds of protestors gathered by the presidential palace in Cairo. The police were forced to use water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets. It was reported that members of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood had joined the protesters. Meanwhile in Cairo, army units were called in.

At the same time, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the Egyptian authorities and the opposition to refrain from violence and for President Mubarak to immediately start reforms.

On the same day, the British The Daily Telegraph published an article titled “Egypt Protests: secret US
The article describes content of secret dispatches published on WikiLeaks that were sent December 30th, 2008, by the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo Margaret Scooby to the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington.

According to these dispatches, the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo helped a young Egyptian dissident to visit a U.S.-financed summit for activists in New York. After his return to Cairo in December 2008, this activist reported to the American diplomat that an alliance of opposition groups had prepared a plan to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak and to establish a democratic regime in 2011.

The Daily Telegraph also reported that a group of activists had been formed in Facebook, which engaged young, educated participants and used social networking websites to conduct protests.

The aforementioned document published by WikiLeaks also concerned the question of the Egyptian elite’s accounts, which were recommended for use as a bargaining chip. The document said: “xxxxxxxxxx described how he tried to convince his Washington interlocutors USG should pressure the GOE to implement significant reforms by threatening to reveal CAIRO 00002572 002 OF 002 information about GOE officials’ alleged “illegal” off-shore bank accounts. He hoped that the US and the international community would freeze these bank accounts, like the accounts of Zimbabwean President Mugabe’s confidantes.”

At the same time, on January 28th there were many thousands of people at the “Day of Anger” in Jordanian cities. At a rally in the country’s capital Amman, the leader of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood Sheikh Hammam Said called for the creation of a “national salvation government”, which “will listen to the voice of the masses.”

On January 29th, a protest rally in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) began; however, it was stopped by security forces 15 minutes after it began. It should be noted that Saudi Arabia was practically the only country in the Arab world that quickly and sharply condemned the events in Egypt, as well as the West’s clear support for the Egyptian demonstrations. The Arab press reported later that the Saudi king Abdullah was outraged by
the “betrayal” by Washington with regard to Hosni Mubarak. The position of the Saudi king in the days that followed gave rise to a wave of rumors. For example, in the beginning of February, the Embassy of Saudi Arabia to Morocco, where King Abdullah was undergoing treatment, was forced to refute false information about his death, which had allegedly followed a heated telephone conversation with Barack Obama about the events in Egypt.

On January 29th, Mubarak announced in a televised address that he had dissolved the government and he promised to begin reforms. At that time, thousands-strong mass rallies demanding the resignation of the President continued. The police opened fire on demonstrators in Cairo and Alexandria, and the first data about victims appeared – 74 people were killed and many more wounded.

Tens of thousands of people remained on the streets day and night.

On January 30th, it became known that a significant number of prisoners had escaped from prison; 34 of them were members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, including detainees from after the beginning of the unrest. Another 8 escaped convicts were members of the Palestinian movement HAMAS.

On February 1st, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces Adm. Mike Mullen praised the conduct of the Egyptian military, who, he said “handled themselves extremely well” in the crisis and did not attempt to suppress anti-government demonstrations.

At the same time in Egypt, Mohammed ElBaradei called upon Mubarak on behalf of the opposition to resign to prevent further bloodshed. ElBaradei said that Mubarak had until February 4th to announce his resignation and to leave the country.

On February 2nd, counter-demonstrations were begun by Mubarak’s supporters.

On February 3rd, thousands of demonstrators continued protests on Tahrir Square in Cairo. It was reported that the protesters were fired upon, however information about the shooters proved contradictory. There were clashes on the streets between opponents and supporters of the president,
who pelted each other with stones. The police and military tried to separate the warring parties. 

On February 4th, the protests and demonstrations continued. The military prevented the advancement of Mubarak’s supporters onto Tahrir Square, which was occupied by the opposition.

According to the TV channel Al-Jazeera, over a million people had gathered on Tahrir Square with the intention of storming the presidential palace. However, many hours of standing on the square did not end in the storming of the palace. Mubarak’s supporters were not allowed onto the square, so approximately 2 thousand of them held a demonstration on Mustafa Mahmoud Square.

On that day, several sheikhs from the Al-Azhar Mosque and madrassah joined the protestors. In Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei described the events in Tunisia and Egypt as an “Islamic awakening” and spoke of them as a continuation of the Iranian revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood denounced the position of the Iranian spiritual leader, describing them as fallacious in a statement released the very same evening.

On February 5th, U.S. President Barack Obama called upon Hosni Mubarak to resign as president of Egypt. Obama said: “The transition... must begin now.... It should lead to elections that are free and fair. And it should result in a government that's not only grounded in democratic principles, but is also responsive to the aspirations of the Egyptian people.”

The same day, the leadership of the Egyptian ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) resigned.

According to UN figures, the total number of victims in Egypt at that point from the beginning of the unrest exceeded 300 people.

At the same time, it became known that the Muslim Brotherhood movement had begun talks with the Egyptian authorities “to establish to what extent the authorities are prepared to meet the demands of the people.” The Vice-President Omar Suleiman participated in the talks beginning on February 5th.

On February 8th, the Egyptian Google manager Wael Ghonim – a symbolic figure of the “Twitter Revolution” – was released
after a 12-day arrest for organizing the riots. Before the start of demonstrations in Egypt, Ghonim created a Facebook page which called for Egyptians to take to the streets. Once freed from arrest, Ghonim immediately gave a television interview, which served as a stimulus for new mass demonstrations.

On February 9th, a new wave of anti-government demonstrations rolled through Egypt. A hundred Thousand people went to Tahrir Square. Wael Ghonim joined the protestors on Tahrir Square and was met with a hero’s welcome.

A column of people marched to the Parliament building, bypassing military armored vehicles, which did not interfere. Soldiers treated children in the protest march to candy.

It is reported that Thousands of prisoners had already escaped from Egyptian prisons.

On February 11th, it was learned that H. Mubarak had transferred some of his powers to Vice-President O. Sulieman. The military announced that they would support a peaceful transition of power.

After Friday prayers, huge masses of people took to the street demanding the immediate resignation of Mubarak. In the afternoon, it was learned that H. Mubarak had resigned as president of Egypt, and all his powers had been transferred to the Supreme Council of the country’s armed forces.

At the same time, the Swiss Federal Council decided to freeze the accounts of the former president of Egypt. The council ordered banks to not only search for the funds of Mubarak, but those of his associates, and to freeze assets in the event of their discovery.

Also on February 11th, B. Obama spoke on the events in Egypt: “The people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same. By stepping down, President Mubarak responded to the Egyptian people’s hunger for change. But this is not the end of Egypt’s transition. It’s a beginning.” In addition, Obama compared Mubarak’s resignation with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

These days were a turning point for Egypt, and new protest demonstrations in the Arab world joined the hot spots already raging.
Large demonstrations in Yemen were held again on the evening of February 11th. People chanted: “Yesterday Tunisia, today Egypt, and tomorrow Yemen will open the prison.”

On February 12th, rallies in support of the success of Egypt’s “Lotus Revolution” took place in Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, and the Palestinian Authority. Representatives of Hezbollah in Lebanon congratulated Egypt on its “historic victory”. The head of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Salehi gave a similar congratulation.

In Algeria on the same day, clashes between demonstrators and the police took place. Protest demonstrations also continued there in the days that followed, accompanied by calls for the overthrow of President Bouteflika.

The Swiss authorities quickly announced that Mubarak’s accounts (for a sum of 4 billion dollars) had been blocked.

At the same time, on February 12th, in Egypt the Supreme Military Council forbade 43 former and current members of the government from leaving the territory of Egypt without permission.

On February 13th in Cairo, the clearing of tents in Tahrir Court began. The Supreme Council of the armed forces called on the police to return to their positions.

Later, the military council dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, and established a period of 6 months for preparation of elections, during the course of which a transitional government would operate in the country.

On February 14th, after meeting with the military, Google manager Wael Ghonim and blogger Amr Salama reported that the Supreme Military Council was planning on finishing the writing of a new constitution for the country within ten days.

Meanwhile, premature reports that were already appearing about Mubarak fleeing the country were not confirmed. It turned out that Hosni Mubarak was in Egypt, in Sharm el-Sheikh.

Also at that time, it became known that Egyptian authorities had appealed to the U.S., Britain, and France with a request to freeze accounts of former Mubarak administration officials.
At the same time, the website of the Muslim Brotherhood reported that after the lifting of the ban on political activities, the movement would form a new party.

In addition to the aforementioned, this day was marked by social unrest in a number of other countries in the Middle East.

For example, in Yemen on February 14th demonstrations took place accompanied by clashes with the police and supporters of the Yemeni president.

Over the course of the same day, anti-government demonstrations began in Bahrain, where 1 person was killed and 25 were wounded. (In the days that followed, riots in Bahrain intensified, and police and army forces were employed for their suppression).

The same day, the government of the Palestinian Authority resigned.

And finally, at the same time, numerous opposition demonstrations took place in the Iranian capital. In Tehran, the demonstrations began as an expression of solidarity with the Egyptians and escalated into anti-government protests. Characteristically, the evening of the same day Hillary Clinton spoke in support of the Iranian demonstrations, saying: “Let me very clearly and directly support the aspirations of people who are in the streets in Iran today.”

Immediately after the Egyptian revolution, the role of the key hotspot of instability in the Arab world transitioned to Libya.

**Libya. Odyssey Dawn**

The date for the beginning of mass protests in Libya is considered to be February 15th, 2011, when demonstrations in the country’s largest cities (Benghazi, Al-Baida) began, demanding the resignation of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

As early February 16th, the protesters’ demonstrations lead to clashes between supporters and opponents of the regime. In Tripoli and Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown, demonstrations in support of him took place.

There were also protests and clashes in other countries of the Arab world in parallel with these.
For example, on February 17th in Bahrain’s capital Manama, police and military with armored vehicles destroyed the protestor’s tent city on Pearl Square in the predawn hours. This measure did not stop the wave of protests, so that around mid-March approximately a thousand troops from Saudi Arabia and 500 police from UAE were sent to Bahrain to restore order.

In Jordan on February 18th, clashes broke out between opponents and supporters of the regime.

On February 18th, there was a “Day of Anger” in five Libyan cities, including Tripoli.

On the next day, February 19th, information appeared that as a result of the crackdown on rallies in Libya, 84 people had already died. Tanks were sent into Benghazi, and Muammar Gaddafi declared his intention of harshly suppressing any attempts at revolution.

On February 20th, the clashes in Benghazi continued.

At the same time on February 19th - 20th, demonstrations began in Morocco after the same familiar appeals in Facebook, later growing into mass riots in other parts of the country.

On February 21st, the eldest son of Muammar Gaddafi – Saif al-Islam Gaddafi – spoke in a televised address of the possibility for reforms in the country and the granting of freedom of speech, but only on the condition that the current government be maintained. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in his televised speech called upon the people to fight with the rebels.

On February 22nd, the television channels Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera reported that in Libyan population centers protestors were shot at from machine guns and military aircraft bombed residential areas in Tripoli.

A fatwa against Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi was announced by the International Union of Muslims Scholars, which said that the tyrant Muammar Gaddafi must be punished for killing his people through bomb attacks.

On February 23rd, the UN demanded that Gaddafi cease military action against his own people. The country’s defense
minister resigned in Libya, and the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs defected to the opposition.

On February 23rd, the cities of Zuwarah and Tobruk passed into the hands of the opposition. Riots broke out in the city of Ras Lanuf. Gaddafi announced that the protestors in Libya serve the interests of Bin Laden.

On February 25th, it became known that Switzerland was freezing the bank accounts of Gaddafi and his associates. At the same time, the Attorney General of Libya and the Ambassador to France abandoned their posts.

On February 26th, it was reported that the accounts of the Gaddafi family had been frozen in the U.S.A.. The U.S. President Obama announced that Gaddafi presents “an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy or the United States.”

In the Arab world, this news, familiar from Tunisia and Egypt, was accompanied by new outbreaks of unrest.

On February 25th, thousands took part in protest actions in the Iraqi capital Baghdad. A demand was put forward for the resignation of the Prime Minister. The protests were accompanied by clashes and resulted in casualties.

On February 26th - 28th, protest actions occurred in Oman and also led to casualties. The sultan of Oman provided a number of concessions to the protestors.

However, the Libyan process did not progress along the Tunisian and Egyptian path.

On February 27th, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya. Arms shipments to the country were banned, and travel abroad was forbidden for the family of Muammar Gaddafi and his inner circle.

The government of Gaddafi reported that the rebels were looting arms depots on a massive scale. Gaddafi ordered military depots to be opened and weapons to be distributed to his supporters. Rebels seized the suburb of Tripoli Az-Zawiya. The television channel Al-Jazeera reported that a transitional government had been formed in Benghazi – the National Council.
On March 1st, troops loyal to Gaddafi launched an unsuccessful assault on Az-Zawiya. Muammar Gaddafi said in an interview that he would not leave Libya.

The U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise, participating in a mission to combat maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, sets a course for Libya.

On March 2nd, the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that in connection with the deteriorating situation around Libya, Washington had sent additional ships to the Mediterranean region.

International mass media reported that fights had taken place in Libya for the city of Brega, where an oil port and a military airfield are located.

On March 3rd, the International Criminal Court at Hague announced a list of individuals suspected in the punitive measures and attacks on civilians in Libya. Gaddafi and a number of high-ranking representatives of the country appeared on the list.

The same day, Barack Obama announced at a press conference in the White House that Muammar Gaddafi had “lost the legitimacy to lead and he must leave”.

On March 4th, a fierce battle began in the largest oil port of Libya, Ras Lanuf.

On March 5th, battles involving tanks continued in Ez-Zawiya.

The self-proclaimed National Council of Libya, created by the opposition, declared itself the sole legitimate representative of the country and its people. The Council was headed by former Justice Minister Abdul Jalil.

In the following days, military actions in the provinces of Libya continued and became particularly intense in Ez-Zawiya and on the outskirts of Tripoli.

Against this backdrop, the opposition issued Gaddafi an ultimatum demanding he give up power within 72 hours in exchange for avoiding prosecution.

The first five days in March 2011 were a period of intense pressure on the government for Yemen as well. Over the course of these days, virtually incessant mass demonstrations continued, demanding the resignation of the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
demonstrations in Yemen continued to the end of March with varying intensity. Moreover, the president, while not objecting to the transfer of power in the future to “safe hands” by constitutional means, invariably refused the demand to hand over power before the end of his term.

Clashes between protestors and the police took place in a number of Iranian cities in the first week of March.

In Saudi Arabia in the same days, after a few poorly-attended demonstrations of low intensity, a ban on all protest actions was introduced on March 5th. At the same time, security forces numbering up to 10 thousand were transferred to the east of the country. It is significant that the “Day of Anger” planned in the kingdom for March 11th did not take place.

But we return to Libya.

On March 9th, the battles for Ez-Zawiya and Ras Lanuf continued in Libya.

In this period, there were widespread allegations by witnesses and experts that television scenes and photos depicting the bombing of residential areas by Gaddafi’s air force were not authentic.

On March 10th, French President Sarkozy met with representatives of the Transitional National Council of Libya and announced that the EU should begin talks with them. France’s position was supported by Italy, Portugal, and Germany.

At the same time, the Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) announced that it considers the current regime in Libya to be illegal and affirmed the need to maintain links to the opposition National Council.

In Libya, Gaddafi’s troops occupied Ras Lanuf.

On March 11th, the Libyan army occupied Ez-Zawiya.

On March 12th, it became known that Gaddafi’s forces were approaching Benghazi.

On March 13th, the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Arab League states addressed the UN Security Council with a request to close Libya’s air space.

On March 15th, the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of G-8 countries called on the UN Security Council to increase the pressure on Gaddafi’s regime.
On March 16th, Muammar Gaddafi’s son Saif Al-Islam said in an interview with the Euronews TV channel about the government forces’ offensive in Benghazi: “After 48 hours everything will be over.” He added: “Sarkozy must repay Libya the money he took for his election campaign. We financed his campaign and we have all the details and we are ready to publish them.”

On March 17th, Gaddafi’s supporters announced their readiness to provide a “green corridor” to those willing to surrender.

On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted resolution No 1973 demanding an immediate ceasefire in Libya and the creation of a no-fly zone. Germany, Russia, China, India, and Brazil abstained.

The resolution reads in part: “The Security Council (…) authorizes the Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures (…) to protect the civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form or any part of the Libyan territory.”

On March 19th, France announced that in the next few hours a military operation against Gaddafi could begin.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. would provide a military capability to conduct operations in Libya. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that Germany was prepared to supplement NATO in Afghanistan to make Allied forces available for the operation in Libya.

The evening of the same day, the French Air Force attacked the positions of Gaddafi’s troops. Then, over a hundred Tomahawk missiles were launched from American ships in the Mediterranean. Gaddafi’s government announced that the coalition bombing killed peaceful civilians in the country.

The coalition included the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, Canada, and Spain. Denmark, Norway and Qatar were preparing to join. The military operation that had been launched was given the name Odyssey Dawn.
On March 20th, the Arab League General Secretary Amr Moussa announced in connection with the start of the operation: “What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone. What we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of civilians.”

On March 21st, Gaddafi made a statement: “We are preparing ourselves for a long war in a vast land that you cannot fight on.”

On this day, according to the allegations of Gaddafi’s supporters, more than 100 cruise missiles were launched and 45 heavy bombs dropped. As reported by the US military command, the main objectives became sites of the Libyan air defenses. Libyan state television claimed that residential areas fell under attack and that there were already dozens of casualties.

Pentagon chief Robert Gates said that in the coming days, leadership of the operation would be transferred to the Europeans. According to U.S. State Department representative Mark Toner, the ultimate goal of the coalition was to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi.

Events in Libya were accompanied by new outbreaks of unrest in countries in the Near East and Middle East.

On March 20th, armed clashes took place in Pakistan between the pro-Pashtuns of the National People’s Party and the Mohajirs of the United National Movement. 18 people were killed.

On March 21st, the protests had not abated in Syria and Yemen, as well as in Turkey, where the celebration of Nowruz had been accompanied by demonstrations by Kurds and clashes with the police.

The night of March 22nd, coalition aircraft attacked Tripoli, running 80 sorties. The mass media reported that Italy emphatically demanded the transfer of the operation’s command to NATO.

On the night of March 23rd, Muammar Gaddafi spoke to his supporters from the balcony of one of his residences. He said that “a bunch of fascists” had attacked Libya, and they would ultimately end up “in the dustbin of history.”
On March 23rd, the coalition bombed the positions of Gaddafi’s troops in the district of Misurata. At this moment, 13 countries participated in the Libyan operation.

On March 24th, it was learnt that within one day, coalition aircraft had made 175 sorties, of which 113 were made by American pilots.

On March 25th, riots erupted with renewed force in the Jordanian capital Amman, where a mass fight between opponents and supporters of the regime took place on the square in front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Syria was one of the last to join the marathon of anti-government demonstrations. In this country, the beginning of protest actions had been planned for the first week in February, and as in the majority of cases, it was organized through Facebook. However, the “Day of Anger” did not take place on February 4th, and the demonstrations were postponed by more than a month. Protests in Damascus and Aleppo demanding reforms began March 15th. In the Syrian city of Dera’a, thousands of protestors demonstrated against the ruling Baath Party and demanded political freedoms.

In the days that followed, the protest movement in Syria did not subside and by the end of March it had received the name “Syrian spring”.

An unambiguous assessment of the process moving through the Islamic world was provided by the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, one of the charismatic leaders of modern Islam and a man close to the Muslim Brotherhood. In his Friday prayer on March 25th, Qaradawi announced that the “Arab revolutions are a gift of God.” Moreover, he expressed satisfaction that the “train of revolution has reached Syria.”

On March 26th, the first figures for the dead from clashes with Syrian security forces were reported. According to Amnesty International, at least 55 people were killed in Syrian cities (Damascus, Dera’a, Sanamayn, Homs). According to the UN, 37 people were killed in Dera’a alone.

On March 26th, the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh reiterated his readiness to transfer his power authorization to the Vice-President Major General Abd Rabbi Mansour Hadi and to leave the post within 60 days, subject to guarantees of immunity for himself and his relatives.
Are there prospects for the expansion of the aforementioned zones of political crisis in Northern Africa and the Middle East within the Arab world? There certainly are. For example, in late March Israel’s Minister of Information Yuli Edelstein called upon the developer and founder of the social network Facebook Mark Zuckerberg to immediately remove an Arabic language page with a call for a “third Palestinian Intifada”. It was discovered that the “like” button of the three-week old site had already been clicked by 293 Thousand people. The beginning of the anti-Israel uprising, the “intifada”, is scheduled by the site’s authors for May 15th, 2011.

On March 28th, international media reported that NATO had taken over command of military operations in Libya. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said of the Libyan military operations: “...We will no longer have a significant influence on its course.”

It was reported that the Libyan rebels were approaching Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown, and the front as a whole was shifting to Tripoli.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron in a joint statement called for Gaddafi to leave before “it is too late.”

On March 29th in London, a summit on the situation in Libya began, involving more than 40 foreign ministers and the leaders of key regional organizations. Muammar Gaddafi sent participants to the London summit with a letter with an appeal for “an end to the barbaric attack (of coalition forces) on Libya.” In the letter, Gaddafi compared the forces of the West to the military campaigns of Hitler during the Second World War.

On the same day, Gaddafi’s troops launched an intensive attack and drove the enemy 160 km to the east of the country. The front was shifted 110 km in only 4 hours.

The next day, March 30th, representative of the National Transitional Council of Libya Iman Bogaris said: “We are forced to retreat... Coalition forces should intervene immediately.”

The same day, Obama did not rule out the supply of weapons to Gaddafi’s enemies in an interview with American television channels.
As a backdrop to these events, the statement about Libya by James Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, became known: “elements of Hezbollah and al-Qaeda have been detected amongst the rebels.”

On March 31st, western media reported that Obama signed a decree on the initiation of secret U.S. operations in Libya, aimed at helping Gaddafi’s opponents. At the same time, U.S. officials gave assurances that the U.S.A., unlike France and Qatar, will not hurry with the recognition of the Transitional National Council (TNC) of Libya.

This caution was not surprising against the backdrop of spreading information about the fact that the Libyan rebels carried out the sale of shells with mustard and nerve gas stolen from military depots to Hamas and Hezbollah.

This information is in line with earlier statements by the President of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, according to whom, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has already received many weapons including surface-to-air missiles as a result of looting of Libyan military depots.

On April 1st, the radio station NPR reported that the CIA had sent a group of its officers to the east of Libya.

On April 4th, it was reported that Italy had recognized the National Transitional Council of Libya as the only legitimate authority in the country. Earlier the French ambassador had already arrived in Benghazi.

On April 7th, an exodus of Gaddafi’s opponents began from Ajdabiya, also known as the “the gates of Benghazi”. The situation was compounded by the fact that NATO aircraft mistakenly fired missiles at Gaddafi’s opponents near el-Brega, so that 13 people died, according to one source, and 45 according to another.

On April 11, it became known that Muammar Gaddafi was willing to accept the peace plan proposed by the African Union (the conditions: a ceasefire, dialogue with the opposition, and humanitarian assistance to the opposition). The opposition rejected the plan, protesting against the possibility of Gaddafi retaining power.
On April 13th, it was reported that Muammar Gaddafi was ready to leave in the case of a transfer of power to his son, Saif al-Islam.

On April 15th, 2011, an article by Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron was published in the newspapers The International Herald Tribune, The Times and Le Figaro. In the article, the leaders of the three countries said that Gaddafi should resign unconditionally without returning to this post.

By this time, the processes in Egypt had entered a new phase — the phase of the criminal prosecution of the ousted president and his family.

On April 12th, Hosni Mubarak was taken to a hospital intensive care unit in Sharm el-Sheikh following a heart attack during interrogation at the prosecutor’s office.

On April 13th, the office of Egypt’s attorney general announced that Hosni Mubarak would be detained for 15 days. He was accused on charges of corruption, misappropriation of state funds, and abuse of power. His sons, Alaa Mubarak and Gamal Mubarak, were also arrested. During interrogation of Hosni Mubarak’s sons in Sharm el-Sheikh, a crowd of demonstrators demanded reprisals against them.

Earlier Hosni Mubarak and his sons were served summons with the requirement to appear in court to testify in the case of embezzlement of more than $700 billion of state funds. Mubarak’s wife was advised to return $145 billion to the treasury.

During the course of the same days, April 13th-14th, it became known that charges on 18 counts were being prepared against former President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Among them were the charge of murder and conspiracy against the country’s security forces, as well as in the drug trade. A request for extradition of Ben Ali had previously been sent to Saudi Arabia.

On April 15th, the Egyptian Al-Ahram said with reference to the statement of the chair of Cairo’s Court of Appeals, Zakaria Shalash, that if proven guilty of premeditated murder, Hosni Mubarak could face the death penalty.

On April 16th, it became known that Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court had ruled to liquidate the National Democratic Party of Egypt, the ruling party under Mubarak.
In addition to this storyline, a new development in the April events in the Arab world was manifested by a heightened political standoff in Syria. This confrontation had developed in parallel with the Libyan civil strife.

**Syria. “Bloody Friday” and the Development of the Conflict**

On March 29th, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad accepted the resignation of the government. However, this did not reduce the heat of the confrontation in the country, which had unfolded since mid-March.

On April 1st-2nd, clashes between protesters and Syrian security forces continued. The latest wave of protests at Dera’a began after Friday prayers on April 1st; moreover, the police did not try to disperse demonstrators. However, just a day later human rights activists said there were 10 dead. In a statement by the White House press service, the use of force against the Syrian “peaceful demonstrators” was condemned.

In parallel, a mass rally in support of Bashar al-Assad was held in Damascus.

On April 3rd, the U.S. State Department issued a statement in which it recommended that the families of American diplomats in Syria leave the country.

On April 8th, protest actions continued in Syria and were dispersed by the police.

On April 9th, protestors in Dera’a toppled a statue of the former president from its pedestal. In response, police used truncheons, water cannons, and firearms. Reuters reported 25 killed from the opposition in one day. However, the Syrian authorities claimed that masked gunmen were the first to shoot at the police. Protests involving Kurds took place in the east of Syria.

On April 11th, anti-government demonstrations were held in Damascus under what had become the invariable slogan “Allah, freedom, Syria!” The pivotal group of demonstrators consisted of university students, gathered through Facebook.

A new stage of intense clashes began in Syria at the end of the month.
April 22nd was named “Bloody Friday” in the country. The number of fatalities on that day was approximately 100 people, according to human rights organizations reporting on the massacre of demonstrators in Ezra. From their side, the official Syrian media reported attacks on state institutions and the Baath city committee in the provinces of Homs, Damascus and Idlib, which killed 11 police officers. In Ezra, according to news agency SANA, an “armed gang of extremists who attacked police vehicles and army patrols with Molotov cocktails” took action. The presence of agitators among the protesters was also noted.

According to the Syrian academic Teyiba Teyzini, the crisis in Syria was developing along the Egyptian scenario. Taeynizi said: “The political processes that lead to the formation of new Arab societies have been set in motion.”

Barack Obama expressed condolences to the bereaved families and relatives in Syria.

Against this backdrop, President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen adopted on April 24th a 30-day plan for the transfer of power, developed by the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf states and guaranteeing him immunity.

On April 25th, heavy fighting between the government and rebels continued in Syrian cities of Dera’a and Dzhebla. The army entered the outskirts of Damascus, as well as the cities of Jassem, Maadimiya, Nawa, and Inkhil. Syrian authorities tightened border controls. On the same day a large group of Syrian scientists and artists urged the government to begin a dialogue with the opposition.

On April 29th, a “Day of Wrath” began in the country after Friday prayers. Crowds of protesters from the suburbs of Damascus flocked to the city center, where the police force disbanded them. Organizers of the demonstration took refuge in an ancient mosque located nearby. New clashes that led to casualties took place in Dera’a and Latakia.

On April 30th, unrest and clashes continued. The protesters destroyed banners with pictures of Bashar al-Assad and called for his resignation. Police used force to try to stop the
riots. Large protests were held in Damascus and Baniyas. In Dera’a, a Al-Omri mosque was stormed, a key position for the rebels.

Having described the violent clashes in Syria in late April, we will return to an examination of the events occurring at the same time in Libya.

On April 22nd, Republican Senator John McCain flew to Benghazi, calling the Libyan opposition figures heroes and declaring a need for more active U.S. assistance to overthrow Gaddafi.

On April 23rd, government troops were ordered to leave Misurata, over which there had been fights in recent days. At the same time, the arming of local tribes began.

In the following days, details about the forthcoming EU ground operations in Libya appeared. The newspaper Bild wrote about this. In addition, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, William Hague, stated that within the framework of the NATO operation, Muammar Gaddafi could become a target for elimination, because “People are targets depending on the way they behave.”

On April 28th, another 11 opponents of Gaddafi were killed by fire from NATO in Misurata.

The next day, Misurata was won back by government troops.

On April 29th, a military incident of a new type occurred — a clash between the armies of Libya and Tunisia, onto the territory of which the Libyan rebels had retreated. News agencies reported that the Libyan troops, pursuing the enemy, entered Tunisian territory; moreover, shooting took place along the entire length of the border. The Tunisian army, concentrated at the border, ousted Gaddafi’s supporters from its territory.

On April 30th, Gaddafi gave a televised address in which he stated a willingness to cease hostilities if the opposition laid down their arms and NATO bombing ceased. In response, an air strike demolished a building neighboring the television studio.

On May 1st, it became known that as a result of a missile strike on one of the houses in Tripoli, Saif al-Arab, the younger son of Muammar Gaddafi, and his three grandchildren were killed. Muammar Gaddafi himself, who was nearby, escaped death. NATO announced that they were bombing only military targets.

The fighting at this point moved to the west of Libya, near the border with Tunisia. Gaddafi’s troops had seized control of several border crossings that were previously in rebels’ hands.
Finally, an event of a special nature took place, which had considerable significance for the processes taking place throughout the Arab world and elsewhere.

On May 2nd, all the world’s media reported that American special forces had killed the leader of al-Qaeda, terrorist number one, Osama bin Laden, in a house in a suburb of Islamabad. The operation for the annihilation of bin Laden was personally watched by Barack Obama via live video, who then said: “...this is a good day for America. Our country has kept its commitment to see that justice is done. The world is safer. It is a better place because of the death of Osama bin Laden.”

Many experts, however, pointed out that the authenticity of photographs of the killed terrorist were in doubt. Bin Laden was quickly buried within 24 hours after death. His body was lowered into the waters of the Arabian Sea. Skeptics were also surprised by the speed with which the DNA test that confirmed the identity of the victim was conducted.

However, regardless of the actual content of the U.S. operation, as a result of which bin Laden has been declared killed, it is obvious that we are flipping through the pages of a decade of the West’s relations with the countries of the Islamic world, as well as the U.S.A.’s direct relations with radical Islam. It seems highly probable that after the announcement of the death of bin Laden, the processes in the Middle East and North Africa will enter a new phase.

Signs of these changes became visible in late April-early May 2011. These include, for example, the announcement of reconciliation between the Palestinian organizations Hamas and Fatah. The ceremony of that reconciliation was solemnly marked in Cairo on May 4th.

Chapter 2. The “Greater Middle East” Project

Thus, before our eyes many states of Northern Africa and the Middle East were almost simultaneously seized by turbulent events. Events leading to (and in some countries already resulting in) large-scale changes.

A legitimate question arises: “What is happening?”

Some analysts are now talking about the heating up of the macro-region often called the «Greater Islamic Arc».

We believe that it should be emphasized that we live in an epoch of nation states and that in the 21st century it is already impossible to speak
of the absolute allegiance of a country’s entire population to one or another world religion. Because in any country there are secular people and there are people of different faiths. In Egypt again, which has riveted the world’s attention, there are Muslims and Coptic Christians, and there are also secular people saying: “We are not Christians and we are not Muslims, we are Egyptians”.

Of course, there are states that emphasize their religious character—such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, they are in the minority. But Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria as well as a number of other countries are nation-states.

And if this is so, let us term all these countries as “states in which the majority of the population professes Islam” — a major world religion.

These states constitute a huge, geographically continuous zone stretching from Morocco to Malaysia and Indonesia. This zone includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Gulf States, Syria, Palestine, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

The peoples of Central Asia and Azerbaijan also gravitate to Islam. In Russia, a population oriented towards Islam to varying degrees is predominant in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and in the North Caucasus.

150 million of the Indian population gravitates to Islam. They are concentrated mainly in the north of India on the border with Pakistan, which is insistent about its Islamic, politically-religious national identity.

Look at the map and you’ll see that the term “Greater Islamic Arc” has a right to exist — albeit, with all the reservations we have expressed.

Thus, are we talking about the heating up of the “Greater Islamic Arc”? This hypothesis has a right to exist since it has a precedent. In the 1970s–80s, we already encountered attempts by the U.S.A. (and the West in general) to create an “Islamic arc of crisis”; that is, to destabilize a number of countries in the Middle Eastern region in the hope that “the destabilizing impulse” would affect the Muslim population of the U.S.S.R. and thus their main geopolitical enemy would be weakened.

But perhaps we are now talking about something greater than just the heating up of a region with a predominantly Muslim population — perhaps we are talking about the next stage of the global re-ordering of the world?

As a minimum, we are talking about very acute processes that have already engulfed a significant part of the “Greater Islamic Arc”. And here it is of great importance that the boundaries of the macro-region in which these critical processes are unfolding today essentially coincides
with the boundaries of a macro-region, the radical reconstruction of which the U.S.A. proposed to carry out back in 2003-2004. Then it was called the “reconstruction project of the Greater Middle East”.

We propose recalling what was the core of the project. This will give us an opportunity to better understand the present day events. But before we proceed to examine the “Greater Middle East” project, we will stipulate that in order to discuss the issues of interest to us, it is important that we select the correct terminology.

It seems to us that the only reliable way to discuss the problem is to use the language of analysis.

The question so often heard today: “Does the U.S.A. stand behind the events taking place in the region?” is formulated in the language of conspiracy. Let conspiracy theorists discuss this issue.

The question “Did the U.S.A. have the motivation to get rid of Ben Ali or Mubarak?” is formulated in the language of psychology. Discussion of the motives behind behavior is the domain of psychologists.

In the language of analysis, the basic question can be formulated thus: “Was support on the part of the U.S.A. provided to opposition forces seeking to overthrow the Egyptian, Tunisian, and other state leaders and the dismantling of Egyptian, Tunisian, and other political systems, and so forth?”

Part of the expert community has expressed the strong conviction that the West did not provide the opposition with any support. There was no informal support on the part of private, although influential forces. Moreover, there was no direct governmental support – again from the U.S.A., for example.

And what if there was support?

We will try not to impose value judgments on readers, but will allow them the opportunity to become familiar, above all, with the statements of high-ranking U.S. officials with regard to their plans and views on the Middle Eastern region.

During the Cold War, the Middle East was viewed by the U.S.A. as a region that played a critical role in the “containment of the U.S.S.R.”. According to a number of American strategists, Soviet entry into the region could lead to “dramatic changes in the global balance of power” and the establishment of Soviet control over Middle Eastern oil would cause “a serious blow to the economy of the free world”.

During this period, the West supported “friendly tyrants” in the Middle East. The same course was also continued after the end of the
Cold War, because the “communist enemy” has been replaced by a new enemy – “international terrorism”. For some time, the U.S. administration has maintained a tolerant attitude toward those authoritarian Middle Eastern leaders who have shown loyalty to the U.S.A. in the war on terrorism declared by Bush after the events of September 11, 2001.

In October 2001, the U.S.A. began military action in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime.

By early 2002, the Taliban were defeated and removed from power.

On March 20th, 2003, the military operation in Iraq was launched.

On April 9th, 2003, Baghdad was captured. The American administration announced that a democracy would be established in Iraq, after which the country would become a model for the transformation of all potentially dangerous regimes in the region.

Exactly one month after the fall of Baghdad, on May 9th, 2003, George W. Bush, speaking to the graduates of the University of South Carolina, announced his intention to create “a U.S.-Middle East free trade area within a decade”. This would allow countries of the Arab world to expand “the circle of opportunity” in the sphere of economy and trade. Bush stressed that the U.S.A. desires peace in the region and endeavors to “replace old hatreds with new hopes”. The creation of a free trade zone would allow countries in the Middle East to reduce their dependence on the oil market and would provide an opportunity for further economic growth. “By replacing corruption and self-dealing with free markets and fair laws, the people of the Middle East will grow in prosperity and freedom”, Bush said1.

On November 6th, 2003, Bush gave the keynote address at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) on the “new foreign policy” of the United States of America in the Middle Eastern region – a “global democratic revolution”. It was this speech by Bush that many experts consider the first clearly articulated statement of the American concept of a “Greater Middle East”.

The place Bush chose to speak was no coincidence – the National Endowment for Democracy was created in 1983 by the U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the U.S. Congress “to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through non-governmental efforts.” Perhaps the very fact of Bush’s address in such a symbolic place had a certain influence on how his speech was perceived. In any case, the media was full of comparisons of Bush’s speech with the speech of Ronald
Reagan in June 1982. Back then, Reagan spoke about the countries of Eastern Europe suffering under the heel of communism.

Speaking about the era of the Cold War, Bush said: “We also provided inspiration for oppressed peoples. In prison camps, in banned union meetings, in clandestine churches, men and women knew that the whole world was not sharing their own nightmare. They knew of at least one place — a bright and hopeful land — where freedom was valued and secure. And they prayed that America would not forget them, or forget the mission to promote liberty around the world”.

Strictly speaking, the idea of a special American mission comprised of spreading freedom and democracy around the world is not new. This was emphasized by Bush himself, comparing his Middle East doctrine with the “Fourteen Points” of Woodrow Wilson and the “Four Freedoms” of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

And now the most important thing. Bush declared that Washington “has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East”. The U.S. President expressed confidence that “Iraqi democracy will succeed” and that “the establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution”. Essentially, it was in this speech that Bush first announced a radical change of course with regard to that plotted by the U.S. over the preceding six decades: “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe — because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty”.

The U.S. president expressed criticism of Iran and compared the Syrian government to the regime of Saddam Hussein. Portraying Iran as illegitimate from the standpoint of democratic government, Bush at the same time praised Egypt, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait for “breakthroughs” with regard to democracy.

In addition, Bush expressed the belief that “successful societies privatize their economies, and secure the rights of property”.

On the same day, November 6th, 2003, Condoleezza Rice — the U.S. National Security Advisor — commented on Bush’s speech. According to her, in the past U.S. foreign policy in the Middle Eastern region was driven by the Cold War: the Americans had to close their eyes to what dictators were doing within their own countries, if these dictators held a pro-American position. But now the U.S. President had come to the conclusion that the policy of supporting authoritarian regimes in the
Thus, for the first time the concept of what was subsequently to be called the “Greater Middle East” was announced on Nov. 6th, 2003. Geographically, the “Greater Middle East” was understood as a vast territory of states with a Muslim population: from Morocco to Pakistan inclusive, and from Turkey to Sudan.

The stated objective of the project consisted of spreading democracy and economic freedom — as opposed to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The U.S.A. was willing to provide financial support to countries taking the “correct” path of political and economic reforms.

But in the grand scheme of things, this was about the fact that the military action in Iraq, to put it mildly, had not contributed to the growth of sympathy for the U.S.A. in the Muslim world. Because of that the U.S.A. considered it necessary to “tame” not only Islamic fundamentalists, but macro-region as a whole by means of the establishment of pro-American “friendly” democracies.

In accordance with the project, the Americans and their allies were to stake their hopes on the local “reformist forces” (which in some countries, moreover, still needed to be developed): independent commissions to monitor elections, law firms, human rights groups, and “other independent interest groups”. This also implied assistance to “reformist forces” for the preparation and implementation of “free and fair elections”, the drafting of legislation and training of parliamentarians, and the restructuring of the education system. A special place in the project was given to support of the women’s movement. Great importance was attached to the establishment of new media in the region as the “locomotive of ideas” (accordingly, not belonging to the state or government-related structures).

The project also provided for economic liberalization, the liberation of private initiative for small and medium-sized businesses, reducing government regulation, and so on.

As many analysts have noted, familiarization with the initiative of the “Greater Middle East” leaves the impression that the main provisions of this initiative are patterned on the large-scale reforms in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Most often Condoleezza Rice is referred to as the author of the idea of a “Greater Middle East” — at that time President Bush’s National Security Advisor. However, perhaps it is more accurate to speak of
collective authorship. In various sources, the names of Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Marc Grossman, and other U.S. political scientists and government officials are mentioned in addition to Rice among the authors of the concept of a “Greater Middle East”.

The developers of the project indicated that in analyzing the current situation in the Arab region, they relied on the reports “On human development” and “On human development in the Arab world”, presented by the UN in 2002-2003.

The data contained in these reports indicates that the situation in the region is extremely difficult. The aggregate GDP of all 22 Arab countries ($531.2 billion) is less than the GDP of Spain alone ($595.5 billion). In the past two decades, growth in per capita incomes in the region stood at zero, whereas in other developing countries with comparable economies, it averaged 3%. The share of Arab countries in world trade from 1981 to 2002 fell from 9.6 to 3.2% (this means that the region is poorly integrated into the global economy).

One of the fundamental negative characteristics of the region is extremely uneven distribution of income (from $335 per capita in Mauritania to $30 thousand in Qatar). Other negative characteristics include: a steady decline in foreign investment, reduced productivity, increased unemployment (thanks to which youth have become a potential reserve for the recruitment of terrorists), a low level of education, and the poor development of information communication channels. In addition, this disadvantaged and volatile region is also a powerful demographic time bomb: it is projected that by 2020 there will be 450 million people living there!

In the opinion of the authors of the project, the aggregate of all these negative factors requires urgent action, otherwise extremism, terrorism, international crime, and illegal migration will be even more widespread.

In January 2004, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said at a summit of the economic elite in Davos: «Helping the people of the greater Middle East overcome the freedom deficit is, ultimately, the key to winning the broader war on terror”.

Washington has begun a vigorous campaign to sensitize the leaders of Middle Eastern states and U.S. partners in the G-8 and NATO to its new vision of the future macro-region.

In March 2004, U.S. Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman visited the leading Arab countries and Turkey with this goal and he also met
with EU foreign ministers in Brussels. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell toured many Arab countries.

The reaction of the majority of Arab leaders to the American initiative was negative. Moreover, the major opponents of the project were key U.S. allies in the region — Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The authorities in these countries said that the West had no right to impose their values on them, as this is abhorrent to the Arab mentality; reforms are needed, but the initiative must come from within, not from outside. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad declared that “there can be no development and democracy in war conditions and the existence of political problems, and nobody, not only in Syria but throughout the region believes in the American initiative.”

What were the key complaints of the political elite in Arab countries?

The first complaint was that the “Greater Middle East” project interferes in the internal affairs of the countries in the region.

The second complaint was that the “Greater Middle East” project does not contain any mention of the need to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, although it is the lack of resolution of this problem that is the main cause of instability in the region. No expenditures on democratization and economic or social reforms will bring results until the Palestinian issue has been resolved. Some Arab critics have gone further and said that Washington’s entire project for reconstruction of the Middle East is aimed at ensuring the interests of Israel and the United States in the region.

The third complaint was about the U.S. intention to “place in one basket” quite different North-African and Middle Eastern regions under the name of the “Greater Middle East”. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi said that “the Arab Maghreb has no relation to what is happening in the Middle East”. The French Le Monde Diplomatique noted in April 2004: “…besides the Arab countries, it (the project) covers Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Israel, whose only common denominator is that they lie in the zone where hostility to the US is strongest, in which Islamic fundamentalism in its anti-Western form is most rife.”

The fourth complaint was that the project aimed at the construction of a new Middle East sympathetic to Americans, automatically splits the Arab world into “acceptable” and “objectionable”.

Finally, particular concern was also provoked in the Arab world by the natural comparison of the basic message of Bush’s new Middle Eastern initiative to the Helsinki Act signed in 1975. The “Greater
Middle East” project, like the Helsinki Act, linked political and economic cooperation with democratization and the respect for human rights. We all know what the obligation to respect human rights in their territories eventually led to in the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. Some experts have suggested that the formula which worked then – “if an authoritarian system opens up to the world, it crumbles” – will undoubtedly also work in respect to the authoritarian regimes in countries of the North African and Middle Eastern regions.

On March 29th, 2004, a two-day summit of the League of Arab States (LAS) was supposed to begin in the capital of Tunisia. However, on March 27th, 2004, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali announced that the summit was cancelled. The cause of disruption was the sharp divisions between the countries participating in the summit on the reforms required from the Arab world by the U.S. administration. According to the State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia Hatem Ben Salem, “Arabs were unable to use the opportunity to appear before the world as a large civilized community” and did not work out a common stand on issues of “great importance for the modernization and development of their countries”.

On May 17th, 2004, U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice arrived in Berlin, where she met with members of the Palestinian Authority. The meeting discussed, in particular, the “Greater Middle East” project.

A senior U.S. administration figure who accompanied Rice on the trip reported on condition of anonymity that “the Palestinians say they are ready to build democracy.” However, according to the American side, first the appropriate security institutions must be created: “The Palestinians need a new way to organize, train, and rearm in order that they can then ensure the safety of Palestine themselves, including the destruction of terrorists ... Now we have a different approach than before: first create institutions, then creation of the state, not vice versa”.

According to the American official, upon the creation of institutions economic and political reform will begin, and money from the EU and international organizations will come into the region. Supporters of Arafat would find that peace, prosperity, security, and democracy would bring with them new figures, and Arafat would lose support.

On the same day at a press conference, Rice said while answering the question of the Russian newspaper Izvestia that Americans are changing the course they have adhered to for decades: «Our country has
approached regimes in this way for 60 years: it is authoritative, but stable... And what did we get? Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. And September 11th. This is not stability, this is a cancer that is spreading further... If you recall the period after the Second World War, Harry Truman and Adenauer focused specifically on democratic values. And Europe obtained prosperity. We are trying to do something similar in the Middle East».

On May 22nd-23rd, 2004, the summit of the League of Arab States (LAS) that was disrupted in March finally took place in Tunisia. There, among other things, “the Arab Program” of reform for the region was presented, put forward by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria in opposition to the American initiative. The main provisions of the program can be reduced to the following:

– reforms should be carried out by Arab countries “from within”, taking into account the particularities of each country and, moreover, gradually to avoid destabilization of the situation;
– reforms must serve the interests of the region, rather than the interests of external forces;
– success of reforms is possible only upon resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict;
– religious extremist groups should not be allowed to benefit from the reforms.

At the summit, Hosni Mubarak proposed the establishment of the so-called “Inter-Arab mechanism for monitoring, coordination and consultation”. This body: a) would in the course of ongoing dialogue within the Arab League find common ground on issues of reforms in the Arab world, and b) would not allow major world powers to intervene in the internal affairs of countries in the Middle East under the pretext of conducting reforms there. However, the presidents of Syria and Tunisia found Mubarak’s proposal “unclear”. As a result, the Egyptian president defiantly left the summit.

The media described the presentation at the Tunisian summit made by Lebanese President Lahoud, backed by Syria as “extraordinary”. Lahoud said that “the United Arab camp must confront Israel and the United States”. According to him, “Israel today leads the United States, not vice versa, which creates a threat not only to the Middle East, but also for the United States”. Lahoud expressed the opinion that the whole contrivance of a reconstruction plan for the Middle East was intended to “divert the attention of the world community from what is happening in the Palestinian territories”.
Thus, achievement of “pan-Arab agreement” at the Arab League summit in Tunisia was not possible. We add that it was attended by only 13 out of 22 Arab heads of state, and the closing session was attended by only 7 Arab leaders.

Meanwhile, a full-scale presentation of the “Greater Middle East” project was scheduled for June 2004. Before the G-8 summit, Washington presented a working paper entitled “G8 Greater Middle East Partnership”. The section entitled “Economic Opportunities” contained Washington’s appeal for “an economic transformation similar in magnitude to that undertaken by the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe”.

The document argued among other things that the road to prosperity and democracy lies through strengthening the private sector, and that thanks to microfinance “a mere $100 million a year for five years will lift 1.2 million entrepreneurs (750,000 of them women) out of poverty, through $400 loans to each”. The U.S. plan called for the transfer of regional banking and financial affairs to new international institutions.

On June 9th, 2004, the meeting of the heads of the G-8 began at Sea Island (U.S.A., Georgia). To the surprise of many observers, the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Kuwait (the key countries of the region whose fate had to be discussed at the summit) were not among the guests of the summit, although they had been formally invited. Heads of several “undesirable” countries in the region had not been called to the summit. As reported by the media, the leaders of Morocco and Qatar were also not invited, although Washington was pleased with these countries. In the end, the region in question was represented at the summit only by the leaders of Afghanistan, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey, Yemen and Iraq.

By the beginning of the G-8 summit, the content of the “Greater Middle East” project had changed somewhat. The idea of creation in the West of an advisory center in the sphere of sharia law was gone. Apart from that, European countries expressed the opinion that it was not possible to artificially unite states as diverse as Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Gulf and the Arab Maghreb countries within the framework of a “Greater Middle East”. The discussions resulted in an American initiative called the “Broader Middle East and North Africa”. Over the course of the summit, it became clear that the U.S. initiative had not found glowing support even among those on whom the Americans could count on.
The position of France, Germany, and Russia was that the facilitation of reforms can be carried out only at the request of authorities in the region. Jacques Chirac said that Middle Eastern countries should have the right to choose: whether they want the assistance Bush offers them and whether they need “missionaries of democracy”. In his words, “imposed values always carry an aftertaste of humiliation”.

In general, according to information leaked to the media, it was France that came out most strongly against several items of the plan. For example, seeing the creation of a Foundation to Promote Democracy for the region in the project (authorship of the idea is ascribed to Condoleezza Rice), Jacques Chirac reportedly telephoned Bush and said France would not support anything of the sort. In the end, this initiative was transformed into a “Democracy Assistance Dialogue” in the framework of the Forum for the Future — structure organized by the Middle Eastern countries themselves.

Violent disputes also arose between representatives of the “Big Eight” about the financial “contributions” that each of the G-8 countries were suggested to contribute to promote political and economic reforms in the region. At the summit, none of the “Big Eight”, except the U.S.A. expressed such a desire. On the contrary, the Americans were reminded that the Middle East in and of itself does not suffer from poverty.

Arab allies reproached Bush for the fact that in planning to normalize the situation in the Middle East, he “forgot” about the “Palestinian question”, without a resolution of which the problem can not be solved. Jordan’s King Abdullah said that “initiatives seen as imposed from the outside will only hurt the efforts of genuine reformers in our region”.

As a result, the “Greater Middle East” project has undergone very significant changes. It retained just a small bit of Bush’s suggestions: support for businesses in the region, special credits for small entrepreneurs, especially women, combating illiteracy, and so on. At the insistence of European and Arab countries, an item was introduced into the document that the assistance of the “Big Eight” in carrying out reforms in the Middle East must take place in parallel with facilitation of the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of a road map providing for the peaceful coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian state.

The title suggested by George W. Bush was changed: “Greater Middle East” has been turned into “Broader Middle East”. And the final plan confirmed by the summit was given the title “Partnership for Progress”.
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and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa”.

On June 14th-16th, 2004, the G-8 initiative regarding reforming the Middle East was discussed at the 31st session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In their speeches, a number of delegates directly connected the success of reforming the Middle East with a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Reforming OIC itself with the goal of more effective protection of Muslim countries’ interests and conducting reforms that would correspond to Muslim values was under discussion too.

After the session was over Abdullah Gul, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (who was then the Chair of OIC) pointed out: “If we are unable to solve our own problems, external pressure on us will become stronger... The OIC betrayed Muslim countries, acting like a servant for the U.S.A.. It appeared incapable of taking up effective actions even after the tragic events in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Today, the organization is perceived as a center for the development of elaboration a humiliating project – the American initiative of the Greater Middle East”. On June 28th, 2004, the U.S.A. handed over power in Iraq to the jurisdiction of the Iraqi government.

On October 1st, 2004, the “Greater Middle East” project was discussed at a special session with the participation of representatives from the Group of Eight and the target countries of the initiative. This time, the target countries behaved much tougher than at the G-8 summit in June. They essentially told the “industrialized countries” that in their countries, they would carry out only those reforms, which they considered reasonable, but not those that the West considered to be reasonable.

According to many experts, because of the negative position of the Arab countries (primarily Egypt and Saudi Arabia), as well as several European allies of the U.S.A., the “Greater Middle East” project lost not only its original name, but also its original meaning and driving force. However, subsequent events showed that no matter what the name of the project was (“Broader Middle East” or “Greater Middle East”), its essence had not changed; that is to say, the U.S.A. had not abandoned the idea of a radical “transformation” of the macro-region.

We will dwell on another important topic. The initiative of the U.S.A. has been treated very ambivalently not only by the political elites of the Arab and G-8 countries, but also by the expert community. The main criticism has been reduced to a few points.
First of all, the experts referred to the following facts. As of 2004, none of the 22 Arab countries (total population was at that time about 275 million people) could qualify as democratic. The ruling clans in many countries of the region had been in power already for 20-30 years or more. Democratic institutions had been successfully established in non-Arab Muslim countries – Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, partially in Pakistan, Bangladesh and even Iran, but in the Arab states the situation was worse.

Although Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen had made some steps towards formal democracy over several years until 2004, to speak of a triumph of full democracy in these countries would be more than a stretch. In none of the Arab countries were the highest authorities elected by popular vote in the course of fair (in terms of a liberal democracy) elections. As a rule, their legislatures had far fewer powers than the executive. Legal political parties, with the exception of the ruling one, were generally very weak and did not represent a real opposition to existing government. In fact, in most countries of the region under examination there was neither turnover of rulers, nor the separation of powers or legal opposition.

In the view of this regional specificity a natural question arose: if the stated goal of the project is the reform of such seasoned authoritarian regimes, who will replace the authoritarian rulers? The project was intended to replace authoritarian regimes by legalizing and supporting active opposition groups. At that, in circumstances, when the real opposition in the majority of countries in the region was represented by Islamists, and in circumstances where only they could potentially benefit from the fruits of “democratization”.

We present only two quotations from the Russian press. The newspaper Moscow News wrote on June 11th: “Regime change, for example, in Saudi Arabia, a key state in the region, is a goal not only for Bush but also for bin Laden. He even benefits from the democratic pathos of Washington. After all, democratic elections in any of the Gulf states will bring to power not Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, but those for whom the symbol of American participation in the modernization of the Arab world will be footage of the Baghdad prison Abu Ghraib”.

Expert magazine on June 14, 2004 wrote: “The legalization of banned political parties would enable Gamaye Islamamiye and the Muslim Brotherhood to become active in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the parties of the oppressed Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia who
are practically followers of al-Qaeda, and Harakat-ul-Ansar and the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen in Pakistan (...) To legalize the opposition in all the Arab countries means to untie the hands of a powerful Islamic armed force; to negate the role of unelected elites means to strike at the dynastic monarchies and secular military junta, which again gives a living space for grass-roots parties of an Islamic bent... The Soros method of stimulating students’ protests against the odious regimes today would be playing with fire in the Muslim world – a world where the pressure has reached an unprecedented force”7.

So, that a stake on the opposition forces in the Middle East region is largely a stake on the Islamists was obvious to a wide range of experts and politicians even in 2004, which is to say at an early stage of discussing the reconstruction of the Greater Middle East.

(It is typical that at the same time there continued to remain the persistent idea that by offering the “Greater Middle East” project to the world, the U.S.A. acted in the interests of Israel; that is, “betrayed” the interests of Islam.)

The parliamentary elections in Egypt held in November-December 2005 confirmed expert assumptions that the role Islamists will play in the process of “democratizing of the Middle East” will not be a minor one.

Chapter 3. The Initial Phase of the Democratization of Egypt

As we can recall, Hosni Mubarak reacted negatively to the “Greater Middle East” project. Nevertheless, he was unable to resist the pressure of the U.S.A., which demanded the democratization of Egypt. Activation of opposition forces had already started in the spring of 2004, when the U.S.A. was still only carrying out “outreach” over its Middle East initiative.

At first, it was the Islamists who asserted themselves. In March 2004, the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Egypt since 1954, but represented in legal politics through the membership of its activists in a number of sanctioned parties, as well as under the guise of “independent” deputies) expressed the demand to carry out reforms in the country related to all spheres of life: the political, social, judicial, cultural, and so on. The Brotherhood insisted on the necessity of removal of the army’s
participation in politics and limiting the president to two terms in the post.

Then began the formation of “democratic forces”. The so-called people’s movement Kefaya (“Enough!”) was created, the goal of which was to prevent Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power since 1981, from subsequent re-election to the presidency. (In 2011, the movement Kefaya became an active participant in the protests in Egypt which led to the removal of Mubarak).

In addition, the parliamentary deputy and professional lawyer Ayman Nour created and officially registered the liberal party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”).

In February 2005, Mubarak, pushed by the U.S.A. to “democratic change”, announced his intention to carry out constitutional reform that would allow democratic and competitive presidential elections to be held in the country (in practice for many years the candidature of the President of Egypt was proposed by two-thirds of the parliament and then approved by popular referendum). This initiative of Mubarak received mention with special approval in a speech given by Condoleezza Rice.

Shortly after Mubarak announced the impending reform, there began protests of thousands of people, mostly students, in Cairo and Alexandria, which then spread throughout the entire country. The main demands of the demonstrators were the abolishment of the state of emergency imposed in 1981 after the assassination of Anwar Sadat, conducting democratic reforms, and the resignation of Hosni Mubarak.

As noted by commentators, even a few months earlier such slogans would have been unthinkable in Egypt, and just as unthinkable would have been the demonstrations themselves, officially banned by the law on the state of emergency. The Kefaya movement took active part in the organization of anti-presidential rallies. Moreover, the leaders of Kefaya openly declared that they were deeply impressed by the “velvet” revolutions that had occurred in Ukraine and Lebanon and would like to achieve a similar revolution in Egypt18.

At the end of March 2005, the activists of the Muslim Brotherhood held their own demonstration for the first time in many years. Having learned that the Muslim Brotherhood was going to hold a demonstration by the parliament building, the police arrested 50 leaders on the eve and then closed off the area. In response, the Brotherhood led three groups of 3 to 5 thousand people each to the three major squares of
Cairo: Ramses, Tahrir and Sayeda Zeinab. The demands of the Brotherhood corresponded to the demands of the secular opposition, which were to abolish the state of emergency and to conduct democratic presidential elections.

In May 2005, a nationwide referendum was held, in which the population supported the constitutional amendments initiated by Mubarak.

On June 20th, 2005, Condoleezza Rice (at this time already U.S. Secretary of State) said while speaking at the American University in Cairo: “For 60 years, the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East – and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people. It is time to abandon the excuses that are made to avoid the hard work of democracy.”

On September 7th, 2005, Hosni Mubarak won victory at competitive presidential elections, receiving 88% of votes. His main competitor, Ayman Nour (who used the orange color in his election campaign in solidarity with the Ukrainian Orange Revolution), received 7%. Many opposition forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood, boycotted the elections.

On October 6th, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush said while speaking at the National Endowment for Democracy: “We’re encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform, to strengthen their own societies in the fight against terror by respecting the rights and choices of their own people. We’re standing with dissidents and exiles against oppressive regimes, because we know that the dissidents of today will be the democratic leaders of tomorrow.”

We quote once again the forecast of the Russian expert that we have previously mentioned: “... democratic elections in any of the Gulf states will bring to power not Vaclav Havel or Lech Walesa...”. What has been said about the “Gulf States” is quite true for other countries in the Middle Eastern region, and the forecast soon began to come true.

Unlike the presidential election, which did not bring any surprises, the parliamentary elections held in Egypt in November and December 2005 were very dramatic. “The hard work of democracy” yielded its first tangible results. The Muslim Brotherhood achieved a sensational success, getting 88 of their representatives through into the parliament as independent candidates. (The Egyptian parliament consists of 454
Having improved its results compared with previous elections in 2000 by 6 times, the Brotherhood was the second largest faction. As noted by the editor-in-chief of the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram*, Osama Saraya, “the political environment largely changed after several amendments to the constitution were made: due to the fact that the threshold for entering parliament was reduced to 5%, the legislature has become representative.”

Allowing free elections, Mubarak was confronted with the unprecedented success of the Muslim Brotherhood already in the first round, when they received 34 seats (the other opponents of the government gained an insignificant number of votes). Not having the legal right to carry out direct recruitment, the Brotherhood disseminated information about their platform, as well as information about their candidates, by word of mouth and more often – through the mosques. Their main slogan was: “Islam is the solution”.

According to Reuters, on the eve of the second round, the government detained nearly 200 “brothers”, among whom there were parliamentary candidates. The Egyptian media reported that in a number of polling stations clashes between voters and the police were observed. At the end of the second round, the opposition claimed that the police had arrested about 800 activists of the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the retaliation of the authorities (although the extent of this retaliation was possibly exaggerated), the Muslim Brotherhood gained another 29 seats in the second round. “These elections are the beginning of a new period in the history of Egypt. Now the voice of the opposition will be heard” said the first deputy head of the Muslim Brotherhood association, Mohamed Habib.

A few days later one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Moneim Abu el-Fotouh, stated: “When a political alliance comes to power by democratic means, all those who boast of their commitment to democracy should welcome this, even if the program of the winners and their way of thinking varies from their own”.

The last day of the election, December 7th, 2005, was marked by large-scale clashes across the country. World news agencies, citing local human rights organizations, reported that many polling stations were blocked by the police. They could be entered only by supporters of the ruling party upon showing their party membership cards. In some cases this led to street fights, where voters broke into stations using stones and smoke bombs. 11 people were killed and several hundred were injured.
As the TV station al-Arabiya reported, in the context of fierce pressure from the authorities, the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated a high degree of organization. On the eve of the last round of elections, they formed an “information army” numbering 25,000 people. Several units of this “army” went from house to house, urging residents to support the “right” candidate. Other units widely used computers and mobile phones to inform the public. Among other things, they sent out emails that explained who they should vote for. Finally, there were those who were engaged in public relations activities. These representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood spread information about the stations blocked by the police.

By the final stage of the parliamentary elections, the number of the arrested members of the Muslim Brotherhood exceeded 1,500 people, if the reports of the opposition are to be believed. And the number of seats they won, as mentioned above, reached 88 (20% of the vote).

The representatives of the secular opposition received quite a different result. In total, the candidates from opposition parties and independent candidates (unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood) received 21 seats. The contrast between the passivity of the intellectual electorate of the secular parties and the assertiveness of the voters of the Brotherhood, who stormed the polling stations blocked by the police, was too great to disallow an unambiguous conclusion: the only real alternative to power in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood.

Typically, the next day after the parliamentary elections the U.S.A. rose in defense of the Muslim Brotherhood and condemned the Egyptian authorities.

Our task does not include a step-by-step review of the Middle East policy of President George W. Bush (including policy with regard to Egypt) right up to the departure of his administration from the scene in January 2009. Below, we focus only on the one aspect of this policy that is essential for our research; in particular, the so-called “public diplomacy” and “war of ideas” intended to promote the democratization of the macro-region.
Chapter 4. The “War of Ideas”

On July 26th, 2005, The New York Times published an article alleging that the White House was steadily moving away from the term “war on terror” and tending now to call the protracted operation to destroy al-Qaida and other terrorist groups “the global struggle against violent extremism”. Moreover, U.S. officials assert that the “struggle against terrorism” must have not only a military, but also an ideological component. As stated by the Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, for victory, an “ideological element” is necessary.

A similar position was expressed by U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley: “It is not just about military operations against terrorists. Our mission is wider. This is a global struggle against extremism. We must challenge the bloodthirsty ideology of our enemies and offer a more positive view.”

According to senior U.S. military officials, the issue of the insufficiency of “only military” techniques was raised in January 2005, during U.S. President George W. Bush’s consultations with advisers on security issues. After that, there appeared a new element in Bush’s speeches: describing countermeasures against terrorism, he began to touch upon the clash of ideas and worldviews.

It is noteworthy that the day the afore-mentioned The New York Times article was published, something happened that confirmed that from now on the “ideological component” would be given serious consideration. Members of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Karen Hughes to the post of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This post was created in the structure of the U.S. foreign affairs agency for the first time. According to the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Andrew Kuchins, the appearance of such a post was directly related to the recognition of serious problems with the prestige of the U.S.A. abroad.

Karen Hughes, like Bush, was a native of Texas. She was the closest aide and personal image-maker of Bush during his two gubernatorial and two presidential election campaigns. During Bush’s first term, Hughes led the press service of the White House. Thus, the role of “chief promoter” of the U.S.A., responsible for America’s image in the eyes of the world and, above all, Islam, was given to a long-trusted associate of George W. Bush.
The appointment of Karen Hughes occurred at a time when the negative opinion of the U.S.A. that had formed in the world (in particular in the Arabic world) after the American military operation in Iraq had reached its peak. According to information presented in a report by the Advisory Committee at the State Department on Cultural Diplomacy, the image and reputation of the U.S.A. abroad at the time were “worse than ever”, and many countries around the world viewed the U.S.A. “not so much as a beacon of hope but as a dangerous force that must be confronted”.

The report emphasized that in the countries such as Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, the majority of the respondents “viewed George Bush as a greater threat to the world order than Osama bin Laden”. It was indicated that the greatest damage to the reputation of the U.S.A. was caused by local television broadcasts about U.S. policy in the region, especially about Iraq and the Middle East problem. Based on these facts, the authors of the report strongly recommended that U.S. authorities intensify the fight for improvement of the U.S. image abroad.

In August 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice approved Karen Hughes for the position of her Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.

On September 8th, 2005, Karen Hughes announced that the U.S. State Department had created a “rapid response unit”, which would monitor the world’s media and help the American administration “to more aggressively respond to rumors, inaccuracies, and hate speech whenever – wherever they are engaged in around the world”. This unit would help to quickly bring Washington’s position to U.S. ambassadors in various countries so that they could confidently speak on behalf of America. In addition, the U.S. State Department planned to deploy regional “rapid response teams” that would work based on the local context.

According to Hughes, while working in a foreign information space a technological initiative “will have to be implemented that will allow greater flexibility and efficiency in using the Internet, web chats with digital video, and even text messages. It is necessary to adopt into our arsenal all the power of modern technology to spread out our information”.

On September 25th, 2005, Karen Hughes said that the U.S.A. had entered into a “global war of ideas”: “...we must develop a concrete national strategy to maintain and gain victory in the global war of ideas. I"m trying to create such institutions, which, after our departure, after the
completion of the presidential term [of George W. Bush] will allow America in the long run to prevail in what we understand as a struggle of ideas that lasts for several generations”³². This statement was made during Hughes’ first Middle East tour as Under Secretary of State. During this trip, she visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Hughes told the reporters accompanying her that “the rapid response teams” (which should positively represent White House policy, as well as refute or mitigate the negative information about the actions of the Bush administration) were to be created in the Middle East and other regions, above all in Muslim countries.

Speaking to the Egyptian youth in the American University in Cairo, Hughes stressed that the U.S.A. intended to change its policy toward the Middle East states: “For 60 years we have tried to maintain stability in the region, sacrificing democracy. And we didn’t succeed in either of these two. And, as rightly noted by Ms. Rice, now we will take another path — we will support the democratic aspirations of the peoples”³³. Hughes essentially reiterated what Condoleezza Rice said within the walls of the same university three months before, in June 2005.

In 2006, George W. Bush ordered Karen Hughes to lead the specially established Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Coordinating Committee, an “interagency group on the war of ideas, the main actors of which are the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Ministry of Defense, and the intelligence community”³⁴.

In June 2007, the Coordinating Committee led by Hughes presented a document to the public entitled “U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication”. The main objectives listed in it were support of the fundamental values of American society and ensuring U.S. national security. From this perspective, the strategy included:

– stress on the U.S. commitment to freedom, defense of human rights, the provision of human dignity and equality of all people before the law;
– finding people in this world who share these ideals;
– support for those struggling for freedom and democracy;
– opposition to those who spread the ideology of hatred and oppression.

It was suggested to the corresponding U.S. structures that they carry out effective work with so-called “influential groups” and “vulnerable
groups”. “Influential groups” were understood to be politicians, public figures, religious leaders, journalists, and other authoritative people in their countries and regions. “Vulnerable groups” were understood as youth, women as well as national, religious, and other minorities.

In order to achieve these goals, a transition was planned in accordance with the tactics of “democracy in action”, involving the activation of the state media (such as the radio station Voice of America), the expansion of educational programs and exchange program for experts, assistance to different countries in the sphere of public health, and so on.

Karen Hughes resigned in December 2007. Despite some achievements, she never made a real breakthrough. For example, according to a survey conducted in September 2007 by the BBC, more than a half of the respondents in the world described the influence of the U.S.A. as “generally negative”.

Hughes’ successor in the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and head of the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Coordinating Committee was James Glassman. Glassman’s career advancement is closely linked with work in the media. He was an editor, publisher, and columnist for The Washington Post. Later he managed the website TCSDaily.com, dedicated to problem of the connection between high technology and public policy. Further he published the magazine The American, was a member of the Research Center of the American Enterprise Institute. In 2007, Bush appointed Glassman as Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the federal body that controls American media broadcasting in other countries: Voice of America, Radio Marti and TV Marti, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, as well as a variety of channels operating in the Middle East.

In February 2008, Glassman presented by President George W. Bush for appointment (June 2008) to the post of Under Secretary of State, pointed to the need to incorporate “new technologies in the arsenal of a global ideological war”. Citing data from a survey of public opinion in Muslim countries, according to which 20% of the population believed that U.S. policy was aimed at “weakening and dividing the Islamic world”, Glassman called such a result a consequence of poor interagency coordination, and he announced that to address the shortcomings in this work he intended to restore the framework of the service of public diplomacy, which had seriously suffered in the reorganization carried out in the 1990s.

On October 28th, 2008, James Glassman held a briefing on the topic “U.S. Public Diplomacy and the War of Ideas”.36
Glassman listed the main activities in the sphere of U.S. “public diplomacy”: “explanation of our policy and principles to the outer world”, the implementation of “cultural and educational exchanges”, as well as “leading a war of ideas”. Moreover, he noted that in the last four months, the emphasis and focus had been transferred to precisely the war of ideas.

The main objective of the war of ideas is “not to fix foreigners’ perceptions of the United States, but to isolate and reduce the threat of violent extremism, not with bombs and bullets, of course, but with words, images, and deeds”.

According to Glassman, the U.S.A. «... were very good at the war of ideas during the Cold War. But after the Berlin Wall came down, the war of ideas was also largely dismantled.... For example, USIA was merged into the State Department. The number of public diplomacy officers fell. Radio Free Europe was cut back. Funding for ideological engagement dried up”.

By the time George W. Bush became president, “there was no war of ideas strategy to speak of and no infrastructure”. However, Glassman indicated that by the end of Bush’s presidency, his administration had created a strategy, a platform and a new way of doing things. All of this was already done and the new administration that would come to power after the election could join in this major undertaking.

The Internet was given a significant place in Glassman’s speech. Glassman stressed that Internet technology could enhance the capacities of the global networks that promote freedom and democracy and fight violence. America’s enemies (al-Qaeda and Hezbollah) also use Internet technologies. “But in general, violent extremist groups cannot adapt their approach to the new web 2.0 social networking technology that is sweeping the internet, technology that stresses democratic interaction. Al-Qaida does not want to expose its ideas to criticism.

We are latching onto the latest U.S. privately-developed technology – Facebook and Google, for example – against the violent extremists. Our belief is that the private sector understands how to use this technology to connect with millions of people far better than we in government understand it. We are hitching a ride on their fast-moving train. I recently came back from Colombia, and in Colombia, a small group of young Colombians, without government assistance, used Facebook to build a movement that put 12 million people around the world into the streets on February 4th, including 1 million in Bogota alone, in demonstrations against the FARC...”
Glassman said: “We are acting as a facilitator to speed the use of the same techniques — again employed by foreign citizens, not governments — to build movements against violence in other [countries]... Globally, we have dozens of such projects, and we use the State Department’s greatest asset, our network of embassies and consulates, to develop an understanding of what is wanted and needed on the ground”.

The Middle East is among the regions that are under scrutiny within the undertaking led by Glassman: “We are backing the project for the future of the Middle East, which is convening the best minds to launch a mainstream think tank in the Middle East region”.

Glassman also said that the State Department had created a special information program “Digital Outreach Team” for work in non-U.S. segments of the Internet. It had already been initiated by Karen Hughes. Under Glassman, this program was expanded and continues to develop. In particular, Glassman mentioned his intention to start work in the Russian-speaking sector of the Internet:

“And we have a small number — we’d like to have a larger number — of people who go onto the internet, into chat rooms, onto popular websites, onto blogs in some cases, and talk about American policy, correct mistakes that are being made, and refer people back to factual documents. They identify themselves as working for the State Department. They do this in Arabic, in Farsi and in Urdu, and we’re considering a few Russian language members of the digital outreach team”.

(Given the fact that the “Digital Outreach Team” had previously worked in “risk zones”: in Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu, the message about the intention to hire several Russian-speaking employees was seen by many Russian media outlets as the entry of Russia into the list of countries in the “risk zone”. Experts linked it to events in the Caucasus in August 2008 and the information war that accompanied it).

James Glassman resigned in January 2009 when the Obama administration replaced the Bush administration after the presidential elections. But shortly before his departure, in December 2008, he organized and hosted a conference dedicated to the struggle against repression, oppression, and violent extremism.

After the mass protests in Egypt in 2011, the conference became a hot topic. It was referred to as an example that indicated the “hidden American support” of Egyptian “leaders of the uprising”. What is it?

On February 1st, 2011, The Daily Beast published an article by Mike Giglio entitled “The State Department’s School for Revolutionary
Bloggers». It reported that in December 2008, a renowned Egyptian opposition activist visited the campus of Columbia Law School for the presentation of “three key staffers from Barack Obama’s social media team: Joe Rospars, Scott Goodstein and Sam Graham-Felsen” (these employees played an important role in the Obama election campaign). The event was also attended by “an outgoing official from George W. Bush’s State Department”, James Glassman (to whom the idea of holding the conference belonged); an expert on technology and innovation from the Glassman team, Jared Cohen (at the time of writing the article, Cohen was already an employee of Google); Howcast president Jason Liebman; co-founder of Facebook Justin Moskowitz, who made a presentation entitled “The origin and instruments of social change”, and others.

The event was organized by the NGO Alliance for Youth Movements (AMD), which received funding from the State Department.

In addition to the Egyptian activist, the conference was attended by about two dozen campaigners from around the world, “among them was a Colombian who successfully used Facebook to mobilize a 12-million-strong march against the country’s brutal Marxist guerrillas known as the FARC, as well as a Venezuelan activist, who had organized «No Mas Chavez»—a popular student-organized protest aimed at President Hugo Chavez”.

Opposing the point of view that this activity clearly indicates secret U.S. support of Egypt’s opposition leaders, Mike Giglio says that nobody ever made a secret of this conference. It was advertised openly.

Moreover, Mike Giglio asked for comments from James Glassman. In response, Glassman again quite frankly said that he had in his time come to the State Department with a dream to “help to develop a non-violent movement around the world”. By inviting the representative of the Egyptian anti-government April 6 movement, he knew that it would be perceived ambiguously. After all, the U.S. administration had provided Mubarak with significant financial and military aid. However, the event corresponded to an “overall strategy in Egypt, which was to support civil society and to encourage people to promote democracy as much as they could”, Glassman said.

Thus, it follows from the article by Mike Giglio that the U.S.A. did not provide “secret support for the leaders of the uprising” in Egypt. However, they provided open support for “the people that promoted democracy”. This was stated by one of the key figures in American “public diplomacy” and the “war of ideas”, James Glassman.
The fact of Glassman’s joint participation in this event (a member of Bush’s administration leaving the political scene) and “Obama’s key employees, responsible for social networking”, at the very least allows the assumption that the baton has been passed on. It may also mean that the message sent by Glassman at the briefing in October 2008 (when he had essentially proposed the team that would replace the Bush administration to take advantage of the strategic and infrastructure developments related to the “war of ideas”) was received.

It seems that subsequent events confirm this assumption. The Obama administration backed the use of Internet technology as an “effective instrument for advancement of democracy”. In her speech dedicated to the freedom of the Internet at the Newseum in Washington on January 21st, 2010, Hillary Clinton said: “We stand for a single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas”. According to her, this is a new challenge for America that will continue to uphold the principles of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech.

Clinton condemned countries where the freedom to use the Internet is restricted. She mentioned limited access to social networks in Vietnam, the detention of 30 bloggers and activists in Egypt, and censorship for religious purposes carried out in Saudi Arabia. On the list of countries that Clinton was discontent with, one could also find Uzbekistan, Moldova, North Korea, Tunisia and Kenya, among others. China underwent particularly harsh criticism in connection with Internet censorship.

Further, the U.S. Secretary of State proposed the creation of transnational rules of behavior on the web: “With the spread of these restrictive practices, a new information curtain is descending across much of the world. And beyond this partition, viral videos and blog posts are becoming the samizdat of our day,” she said. It is interesting that Clinton used the word “samizdat”, which clearly refers to the dissident movement in the USSR of the era of the Iron Curtain.

According to Clinton, the Internet can help humanity push back against those who promote violence and crime and extremism. She mentioned: “In Iran and Moldova and other countries, online organizing has been a critical tool for advancing democracy and enabling citizens to protest suspicious election results”.

A brief remark: many analysts have noted that after Barack Obama became the U.S. President, information technologies were applied a
few times “to a large extent” in various countries: in 2009 in Moldova and Iran, and in 2010 (after the speech by Clinton that we have just quoted) in Thailand.

We do not set ourselves the task of proving that it is the U.S. administration that has initiated the application of information technology in the afore-mentioned countries. However, it is undeniable that in her speech, Clinton at the very least expressed moral SUPPORT for online organizing of people as a critical tool for advancing democracy, as well as indicating the desirability of using Internet technology as an effective instrument for support of democracy.

Has this American line met opposition from other states? Absolutely, and here you can find a dramatic example — China.

Strictly speaking, Clinton raised the topic of “Internet freedom” in her speech on January 21st, 2010, in direct relation to the “Chinese” storyline.

In November 2009, Barack Obama, speaking in the municipality of Shanghai during his first visit to China, said: “I’m a big supporter of non-censorship. This is part of the tradition of the United States that I discussed before, and I recognize that different countries have different traditions. I can tell you that in the United States, the fact that we have free Internet – or unrestricted Internet access is a source of strength, and I think should be encouraged.”

The reason for this statement was that since March 2009, Chinese authorities have banned public access to Facebook, and from July 2009 – to Twitter, explaining it by the need for social harmony. Moreover, after anti-government protests in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in July 2009, residents of this region were deprived of access to all foreign websites.

In December 2009, the e-mail addresses of Chinese human rights activists, as well as more than 30 U.S. companies (including the American Internet company Google) were attacked by hackers. Analysts studying malware came to the conclusion that these programs were likely to have been created in China.

In January 2009, Google announced its intention of terminating its work in China in connection with the hacking attack on its mail server and the company’s disagreement with the strict censorship that operates in the PRC in regard to Internet resources.

On January 21st, 2010, in the speech we have already referred to, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in addition to accusing China
of the restriction of Internet freedom, demanded that China give a clear answer to the allegations made by Google. The next day, on January 22nd, the same demand was announced by Barack Obama.

The same day, January 22nd, the Foreign Ministry of PRC protested the U.S. intervention in the management of China’s Internet space, pointing out that an allusion to the limited internet freedom in China contained in Clinton’s speech was “fundamentally untrue and undermined Chinese-US relations”40. The Head of the Internet and Digital Media Academy of Social Sciences of China’s Min Dahong said: “How the Internet develops in China and how it is managed is the business of the Chinese themselves. With regard to the Internet, China does not need lessons from the U.S.A”41.

Meanwhile, the U.S.A. continues to openly demonstrate its interest in the development and application of Internet technologies and the promotion of “freedom of the Internet”.

On February 15th, 2011, a year after her first speech, Hillary Clinton gave a second lengthy speech dedicated to the Internet at George Washington University (“Pros and cons of the Internet: the opportunities and challenges in a networked world”)42. The U.S. Secretary of State made it clear that she was influenced by the recent events in Egypt and Tunisia, where people “have found ways of using communications technology to organize and express dissatisfaction, which … led to a revolutionary change”.

The U.S.A.’s increased interest in the Internet is easily explained: according to Clinton, today the Internet is used by 2 billion people and in the next 20 years nearly 5 billion people will join the network: “It is these users who will determine the future”.

Thus it is even more important to have a unified concept with regard to the Internet, the starting point of which is “freedom of connection”, Clinton said.

Having acknowledged that an open Internet creates its own problems (it is used by terrorists, extremist groups, traffickers in people, and so on), the Secretary of State pointed out that the U.S.A. has nonetheless clearly made its choice in favor of openness. It is necessary to deal with threats without losing openness, she said. Another – incorrect – approach is to give priority to security “as a pretext to justify the brutal reprisals against freedom”.

Clinton questioned the provision according to which “in order to promote tolerance the government should suppress hateful ideas”. She
further spoke about the concept of a “marketplace of ideas”, according to which the suppression of hateful ideas will only lead to a situation in which their carriers will go underground, “where their beliefs become entrenched, as they will not be contested.” If, however, we discuss all the ideas, the “marketplace of ideas” will bear fruit: «When ideas are open for discussion, those that are of value, as a rule, get stronger, while weak and false ideas usually disappear, perhaps not instantaneously, but over time,” the U.S. Secretary of State said.

(There are precedents that refute this thesis. For example, the free market of ideas in Germany in the early 1930s led to the political triumph of Hitler’s ideas. The free market of ideas in the U.S. in early 1950s led to the political triumph of the ideas of McCarthy).

Further, Clinton developed and deepened this theme. According to her, “online freedom can be meaningful only if it becomes activism in the real world. That’s why we are working within our initiative Civil Society 2.0 to connect NGOs with the activists who have access to technology and relevant skills that will contribute to the increased efficiency of their work”.

The Secretary of State announced that the State Department had recently launched Twitter channels in Arabic and Farsi in addition to the already existing channels in French and Spanish. Furthermore, similar channels in Chinese, Russian and Hindi will be launched.

In addition, the U.S.A “continues to help people in a repressive environment to circumvent Internet filters». In the past three years, grants amounting to $20 million were allocated for the development of technologies to combat Internet repression, and in 2011, additional funding for this purpose will amount to $25 million.

Clinton promised that in 2012, the U.S. administration will complete its International Strategy for Cyberspace, indicating that this is one of the U.S.A.’s foreign policy priorities. It was in connection with the priority of this trend that she established the Department of the cyber security coordinator, whose head was appointed as Christopher Painter, “the National Security Council’s former acting senior director for cyberspace and a leader in this field for 20 years”.

On April 26th, 2011, the newspaper Hill, referring to the Assistant Secretary for International Information Programs, Duncan MacInnes, reported that since the end of March the U.S. State Department has no longer maintained their portal America.gov. Materials that had previously been prepared for this portal were now transferred to head website of the State Department, State.gov, and to the websites of the
U.S. embassies, and simultaneously on the basis of these materials brief reports for social networks (including Facebook and Twitter) are posted. The reorientation on the support of “assets based social networks” was carried out in connection with the events in the Middle East and North Africa. The aim was to make propaganda more dynamic and aggressive. As pointed out by MacInnes, in order to find a way to young people, “in the Internet one should go where people already are. People will not come to you, you must go to them”.

Thus, in 2004 the U.S.A. openly declared that it was radically altering its course for Middle East policy. In the previous 60 years, it backed a premise that regional stability would be achieved by supporting pro-U.S. authoritarian regimes. The new course is intended to support the democratic aspirations of the peoples of the region.

In 2005, the U.S.A. announced its entrance into a “global war of ideas” against terrorists, extremists, and other oppressors of freedom and an intention to utilize modern Internet technology in this war.

In 2006, the public was informed of the establishment of an interdepartmental group on the war of ideas, the Coordinating Committee for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy.

In 2007, the document “National Strategy for U.S. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications” was published in which again it was reported completely openly that the U.S.A. would provide support for those in the world who struggle for freedom and democracy. For this, it intended to work in different countries with “influential groups” and “vulnerable groups”.

In 2008, James Glassman publicly expressed his regret that the structures that had worked so effectively in the field of the war of ideas in the era of the Cold War had been largely dismantled after the fall of the Berlin Wall. After this, he reported that during the second presidency of George W. Bush, a new strategy for the war of ideas and an infrastructure allowing for this war to be waged had been developed. He also suggested that the future U.S. president take advantage of these developments. Glassman evaluated social networks (Twitter, Facebook) as a promising direction.

In late 2008, Glassman and officials responsible for social networks from the team of Obama, who had won the elections, hosted a conference for young opposition leaders from different countries. This openly advertised conference was attended both by those who had already successfully used social networks to organize mass protests and
“neophytes”. Participants included a representative of the Egyptian April 6 movement, which brought crowds into the streets in 2011 using the power of the Internet.

In 2009, Barack Obama said the U.S.A. did not approve of restrictions on Internet access imposed by the leadership of a number of countries (China, and so on).

In 2010, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton defined Internet technology as a “critical tool for advancing democracy” and called for making the Internet “equally accessible for the entire population of the planet” pointing out that this is a new challenge for the U.S.A. in the fight for freedom of speech.

In 2011, Clinton proposed the development of a concept, the starting point of which would be “freedom of connection” of the Internet. The Secretary of State has openly declared that the U.S. provides support to people in countries “with a repressive Internet environment” by allotting grants for development of technologies to combat the “Internet repression”.

We note that under both Bush and Obama, senior U.S. officials openly and publicly declared support for democratic forces in authoritarian countries, as well as their stake in Internet technology as a “critical tool for advancing democracy”.

Apart from facts we have just enumerated, we can also recall a statement by James Glassman we have already quoted, according to which the general strategy in Egypt “was to SUPPORT and encourage people to promote democracy, to the extent possible” (in connection with this lies the invitation of the activist of the opposition April 6 movement to the conference on social networks in December 2008).

Let us also recall the facts that were widely reported by the media and were on everyone’s lips in connection with the events of 2011:

– the secret dispatch of the American Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scooby on December 30, 2008, published by WikiLeaks, in which she, albeit with reservations and doubts, reported the plans of the opposition to overthrow the Mubarak regime before presidential elections to be held in September 2011 (as she was told by the April 6 activist)...

– confessions of the senior manager of Google Middle East branch Wael Ghonim, who said in his interview with English-language media that he had created a Facebook page “against the Mubarak regime”, which was visited by hundreds of thousands of people...

Is it possible after all this to deny the phenomenon of support for the “democratic” opponents of Mubarak on the part of the U.S.A.?
Does this mean that it was the protests organized with the help of Internet technology that led to the “Middle Eastern revolutions”? No. Of course, in many countries of the region there have truly accumulated serious problems that had caused discontent among the population. However, the protests brought the natural oscillations of dissatisfaction the character of an explosive political resonance.

This topic is discussed today by many researchers. For instance, in the report of the Foundation Statfor analysts Mark Papik and Sean Noonan, released on February 3rd, 2011, we read: “Social media themselves do not cause a revolution... Social media are tools that enable revolutionary groups to reduce expenditures on participation, organization, recruitment, and training. But, like any tool, social media have inherent strengths and weaknesses, and their effectiveness depends on how effectively leaders use them, and whether they are accessible to people who know how to use them”44.

On March 1st, 2011, a similar opinion was expressed by Michael Nelson, Professor of Internet Studies at Georgetown University: “In the end, it is not the Internet that causes a revolution, but it helps to cause it just as the invention of the printing press in the 15th century helped spread the Protestant Reformation in Europe, thus facilitating information exchange”45.

To paraphrase Michael Nelson, we can say that the U.S.A. contributed to the rapid developments in the Middle East and North Africa through SUPPORT of different types:
– informational (the topic we have just examined);
– financial (the statement by George Soros that his funds will facilitate the revolutionary process happening in the Middle East, which we will discuss in detail in Chapter 9);
– force (in Libya);
and so on.

Chapter 5. “Global Political Awakening”

Thus, it is possible to speak of a certain continuity between the actions of the Bush administration and the Obama team in regards to waging a “war of ideas” (a stake in the development of Internet technology, a special emphasis on social networks, and so on).
But is there continuity in the Obama administration’s whole Middle Eastern policy in relation to the course taken by the Bush administration?

Barack Obama’s Cairo speech in June 2009 when the new American president spoke of his intention to “seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world,” sounded like a sharp contrast to the “crusader” statements made by his predecessor.

Can we relate this line announced by Obama in the first year of his presidency to some distinct ideologeme?

It is known that in the course of the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama’s foreign policy advisor was Zbigniew Brzezinski. In 2007, Brzezinski’s book Second Chance, was addressed by and large to the future — then not yet publicly known — U.S. president.

The author analyzes the foreign policy mistakes of the three U.S. presidents: George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, who were leading the country from 1991 to 2006 (Bush’s second term was not yet finished at the time of the writing of the book); that is, the period when the United States, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, found itself in the role of the world’s undisputed leader.

Brzezinski wrote that because of mistakes made by the “three global presidents”, America essentially missed the chance given to it in 1991 to be a true global leader. If at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, America elicited global admiration, yet now it “was widely viewed around the world with intense hostility, its legitimacy and credibility in tatters, its military bogged down in the new “Global Balkans” from Suez to Xinjiang, its formerly devoted allies distancing themselves, and worldwide public opinion polls documenting widespread hostility towards the United States”.

In the book, a lot of attention is paid to the failure of the Middle Eastern policy of the three “global presidents”.

According to Brzezinski’s assessment, the first “global leader”, George H. W. Bush, put forward the idea of a “new world order”, but failed to fill this idea with real content. The author believes that Bush brilliantly achieved two tasks: “…the delicate task of peacefully managing the dismantling of the Soviet empire and then on cutting Saddam Hussein’s excessive ambitions down to size…” At the same time, Bush was inadequate for the demands of the historical moment. The historical moment called for “a grand vision for the world at large and for decisive U.S. political intervention in the Middle East”.

61
Bush initially gave the impression of a man ready to put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Back in May 1989, four months after the inaugural, Bush’s secretary of state bluntly told AIPAC, the primary Israeli-American lobby, “For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel... Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity... Reach out to Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights”.

In March 1990, Bush declared that there should be no new settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem – despite the fact that the government of the Likud Party pursued a policy of expanding Jewish settlements in Palestinian territories.

However, Brzezinski points out that the military conflict with Saddam Hussein in early 1991 diverted Bush’s attention from the Israeli-Palestinian problem, and upon the end of military actions, the peace process got bogged down because of the intransigence of the Israeli Prime Minister Shamir (who did not want, among other things, to abandon the construction of new settlements).

Bush’s major achievement Brzezinski believes is that he managed to attract Arab states to participate in the anti-Saddam coalition. But having won a triumphant victory over Hussein, Bush then made a major historical mistake: he did not seek removal of Hussein from power. The quick cease-fire in February 1991 let Hussein keep sufficient military forces, and he firmly quelled a Shiite rebellion that broke out in Iraq (subsequently this led to sharp clashes between Sunnis and Shiites, greatly complicating the situation in Iraq after the overthrow of Hussein). Had the removal of Hussein been carried out in the spring of 1991, the next U.S. president would not have had the 2003 war in Iraq.

According to Brzezinski’s assessment, the elder Bush did no more or less than commit the “original sin”: “The unfortunate result was that Bush’s uncomsummated success in Iraq became the original sin of his legacy: the inconclusive but increasingly resented and self-damaging American involvement in the Middle East... The unfinished business of both the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Iraqi cease-fire came to haunt Bush’s successors”. Moreover, the Arabs (with whom an alliance was built in the course of the operation against Saddam Hussein) “increasingly saw America’s role in the region not as an innovative influence, but as a replay of the colonial past”.

With the rise to power of the second “global leader”, Bill Clinton, the idea of a “new world order” was replaced by the idea of globalization,
which carries benefit and significant opportunity for all without exception. However, as pointed out by Brzezinski, this optimistic idea “stumbled” on the fact that the world did not become prosperous after the Cold War. During the period of Clinton’s presidency, there occurred the escalation of violence in Somalia, the cataclysmic events in Rwanda with millions of victims, ethnic wars in the Balkans, and the civil war in Sri Lanka.

Over the course of Clinton’s two terms, the Middle East festered “with little progress and some serious setbacks in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process”51. Brzezinski believes that Clinton twice had the opportunity to advance the Israeli-Palestinian settlement—early in his first term and shortly before leaving the White House, but was not successful in this. The intervening years “were wasted while U.S. policy gradually drifted from impartial commitment to a fair settlement to an increasingly one-sided pro-Israel posture”52.

Meanwhile, Iraq made its contribution to the growth of tension in the Middle East. The Iranian problem was continuously heating up. In addition, anti-Americanism intensified, one manifestation of which was anti-American terrorism, which strengthened as the political temperature in the region rose.

All of these challenges, Brzezinski states, “demanded much more than just faith in the historical momentum of globalization”53. In the end, Clinton “left office with Israeli-Palestinian relations in a worse condition and the Middle East more volatile than when he had stepped into it”54.

But the most disastrous mistake made by the third “global leader”, George W. Bush (the chapter “Catastrophic Leadership” is devoted to him). Under him, the doctrine Brzezinski calls “Manichaean”55 was eagerly pursued. This doctrine emerged long before September 11th, 2001, under the influence of the conservatives, whose strategic outlook “was unabashedly sympathetic to the views of Israel’s Likud party and gained significant support among American Christian fundamentalists”56. This strategic view consists of the conviction that the challenge previously emanating from the U.S.S.R and communism now comes from the Arab governments and militant Islam. The doctrine could have well remained uncalled for, if September 11th had not occurred. But that catastrophic event “gave it the appearance of relevance”57.

In order that the doctrine seem more respectable, its creators emphasized ideological continuity with respect to two famous works.
Francis Fukuyama’s thesis from the work *The End of History* about the inevitability of democracy “provided a powerful case for those who advocated that America should propagate democracy, by whatever means available, as the central theme of U.S. policy in the Middle East”\textsuperscript{58}.

But simultaneously, neo-conservatives addressed the idea of an existential conflict with Islam, expressed by Samuel Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations*.

“The result was a Manichaean doctrine with which neither of the two scholars could ever have felt at home: democracy passionately propagated as the inevitable historical destination of a mankind engaged in an existential clash of basic values”\textsuperscript{59}, writes Brzezinski.

If you talk about the strategic value of the “war on terror” declared by the U.S.A., then it, according to Brzezinski, reflects “traditional imperial concerns over control of Persian Gulf resources as well as neoconservatives’ desire to enhance Israel’s security by eliminating Iraq as a threat”\textsuperscript{60}.

According to Brzezinski’s assessment, the White House was engulfed with arrogance, but initial results of this combination were certainly conducive to hubris\textsuperscript{61}. (At this point, some experts cannot help but comment that Brzezinski wrote of retribution with a deep sense of satisfaction.) The war called a “war on terror” and acquiring an increasingly more “sinister tone of a clash with the world of Islam”, discredited America’s global leadership. “America was able neither to rally the world to its cause nor to decisively prevail by the use of arms. Its actions have divided its allied, united its enemies, and created opportunities for its rivals and ill wishers. The world of Islam has been stirred into bitter hatred”\textsuperscript{62}.

The second major accusation presented by Brzezinski against George W. Bush again regards the Israeli-Palestinian settlement. In his view, the U.S.A. transformed from a mediator between Israelis and Arabs into an Israel supporter. As a result, the U.S. ability to exert a decisive influence on the development of events declined substantially. Thus, Bush created a situation in the Middle East in which the U.S.A. was sure to lose, in the end, all its Arab friends.

How fair is the accusation Brzezinski leveled at Bush for supporting Israel’s interests against the interests of “Arab friends”?

We return to the question of the continuity of the Middle Eastern courses of George W. Bush and Barack Obama that was posed at the beginning of this chapter. It would seem their courses are dramatically
different: Bush declared war on radical Islam, and virtually the entire Islamic world rose against him, whereas Obama began his presidency with a demonstration of friendly intentions towards the Islamic world.

However, apart from the continuity already noted by us with regard to the “war of ideas” taking advantage of modern Internet technologies, it is also possible to speak about continuity in the building of relations with a certain part of the Islamic world: that part, which until quite recently the U.S.A. classified as “radical Islam”.

For example, Obama’s clearly manifested trend towards separating the Islamists into the “bad” (to which al-Qaeda is attributed) and the “good” (among these fall the Muslim Brotherhood) did not emerge today or even yesterday.

Furthermore, the idea asserted by Brzezinski that in offering the world the “Greater Middle East” project, the Bush administration acted in the interests of Israel (that is, “surrendered” the interests of the Islamic states), is very wide-spread and has become almost “locus communis” for the Islamic world. However, not very many facts fit within this scheme.

We illustrate this assertion with just one example. For this, we will point out some “density of events” organized with the direct participation of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005.

In June 2005, Rice made a Middle East tour, during the course of which the beginning of a very significant transformation was laid.

On June 18th, 2005, she visited Israel and the Palestinian Authority, where she held talks with Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas.

First of all, Rice said that the U.S.A. supports Israel’s disengagement plan with the Palestinians, providing for the withdrawal of all Israeli institutions in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank. This program was proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and approved in February 2005. Rice stressed that the program’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip would “improve the situation in the region.”

We note that Sharon’s willingness to make concessions evoked an outburst of indignation from his countrymen. The first reason for Sharon’s “compliancy” that comes to mind angered the indignant even more: Ariel Sharon’s son Omri was at that time in the midst of a scandal involving the illegal financing of his father’s campaign during the 1999 parliamentary elections (the elder Sharon was seeking the post of head of the Likud Party at the time). Thus, lying on the surface of the answer
was that Sharon’s “family troubles” influenced his “compliance”. (We are not debating whether or not this version is true. What is important is that in those days the version was in circulation and further exacerbated the situation).

At the talks with Abbas, Rice said that while the U.S.A. continues to view Hamas as a terrorist organization, “palestinian voters are free to vote for those whom they deem fit”. In addition, Rice stressed: “The houses of evacuated settlers must be destroyed”, which, according to her, had already been agreed upon by both parties.

On the day of Rice’s meeting with Abbas, the Palestinian parliament signed a new law on elections. According to this law, the number of deputies to the legislature the Palestinian Authority was increased from 88 to 132. Moreover, one-half of them had to be elected from party lists and another from multi-member constituencies.

It is thanks to this legislative innovation that Hamas easily took control of the parliament: a few months later, in January 2006, Hamas won a resounding election victory, occupying 74 seats of the 132-seat parliament. The ruling Fatah Party received only 45 seats. Moreover, during voting on the general Party lists, Hamas beat Fatah only by a very slight margin, but the elections for the multi-member constituencies brought Hamas three-quarters of seats they won.

On June 20th, 2005, Condoleezza Rice arrived in Egypt, where she held talks with Hosni Mubarak. Speaking on the same day at the American University in Cairo, she said that the U.S.A. was “changing course” in respect to the Middle East region, and that “it is time to drop all the excuses that avoid the hard work of democracy.”

As a result of the persistent recommendations of Rice to the government of Hosni Mubarak to “not avoid the hard work of democracy”, the Muslim Brotherhood in the elections in December 2005 took 88 seats in parliament and formed the second largest faction.

On August 10th, 2005, a source close to Sharon made a sensational statement: Sharon might leave the Likud Party and run for the post of prime minister from another party. The sensation was that in Israel, as a rule, the head of the party winning the elections becomes the prime minister. Sharon was indebted to Likud for this post. To leave one’s party after that and continue to remain prime minister meant to fracture the country’s political system, moreover, at a very difficult moment.

On August 15th, 2005, the evacuation of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip began. The evacuation was preceded by major protest actions
in Jerusalem at the Wailing Wall and in Tel Aviv, where one hundred thousand people gathered at a rally. The Israeli protesters were arrested en masse.

Ariel Sharon stated: “Despite the pain that I feel we should do this. We cannot hold onto Gaza forever. More than a million Palestinians live there, crowding in refugee camps, poor, and without hope for the future”\(^63\).

Following the evacuation of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip, the evacuation of some Israeli settlements in the West Bank of the Jordan River began.

In addition, under the disengagement plan with the Palestinians, it was agreed that the border between Gaza and Egypt (the so-called Philadelphi corridor — the south part of the Gaza Strip, abutting the Sinai Peninsula and extremely “permeable” for smuggling arms, ammunition, and drugs) would be protected by the Egyptian police. The Israel Defense Forces had to leave this territory.

As stated by a former Israeli military intelligence officer Kopel Shumakh, “the withdrawal of troops from the Philadelphi Corridor was an initiative not so much from Israel as the U.S.A. and the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice personally”\(^64\).

On August 28th, 2005, Sharon’s son Omri was formally charged.

On August 30th, 2005, Sharon announced the end of the withdrawal of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

On September 12th, 2005, it was reported that the last Israeli soldier had left the Gaza Strip and the Palestinians had set fire to the synagogues as “symbols of the occupation”.

On November 7th, 2005, the Knesset rejected a list of candidates for ministers proposed by Sharon. Opponents of Sharon stated that approval of these candidates would be “awarded for their help in expulsion of the Jews”.

On November 14th, 2005, the second phase of Condoleezza Rice’s stepping-up campaign began. On this day, the U.S. Secretary of State, who was supposed to fly to South Korea, suddenly changed her route and arrived in Jerusalem. Then she held talks in Ramallah with Mahmoud Abbas. After this, she reported that a “fundamental solution” had been found to the problem of the movement of Palestinians across the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The solution turned out to be this: video obtained by the Rafah checkpoint, must from now on be viewed at a nearby checkpoint not only by Israelis but also by Palestinians, as well as representatives of the EU. In addition, plans were
announced to build a Gaza airport and seaport, and Israel was to remove around 100 roadblocks in the West Bank.

We note that this “fundamental decision” was taken at the very moment when Egypt was holding the first round of parliamentary elections, which brought the Muslim Brotherhood its first 34 seats.

On November 15th, 2005, Sharon’s son Omri admitted that he had received bribes as campaign manager of the Likud Party.

On November 17th, 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (the head of the ruling Likud Party) agreed with the new leader of the Avodah Party (i.e. the anti-government party) on early parliamentary elections. Analysts began talking about a catastrophic demolition of Israel’s political system.

On November 21st, 2005, Sharon withdrew from the Likud Party and demanded an early dissolution of parliament. The political crisis was primarily a consequence of a split in the ruling coalition because of conflict over the withdrawal of Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip that had been completed in September.

On November 25th, 2005, the Israeli and Palestinian sides finally agreed to open the Rafah checkpoint in the Gaza Strip. For the first time in 38 years, the Palestinian Authority had an open exterior boundary, allowing the Palestinians to move more freely to the territory of Egypt.

On November 26th, 2005, at the next round of parliamentary elections in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood received 29 more seats in parliament. The elections were accompanied by clashes between supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling National Democratic Party, as well as mass arrests of members of the Brotherhood.

On December 9th, 2005, the final results of the parliamentary elections were announced in Egypt. The ruling party won 73% of the seats. The Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of the seats, giving them the opportunity to create the single largest opposition faction.

On December 19th, 2005, Sharon suffered a minor stroke. In Gaza, the ungrateful Palestinians greeted the news with exaltation.

Reports appeared in the media about Sharon’s new plans, his having said earlier that all of Gaza would be cleared. However, now there was talk already of a transfer of a part of the territories of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinians, and the de facto partition of Jerusalem.

On January 4th, 2006, Sharon’s other son Gilad now came under suspicion in the case of an Austrian businessman Martin Schlaff.
story threw an even darker shadow on Ariel Sharon than the scandal surrounding Omri Sharon. The inquiry expressed the suspicion that Martin Schlaff engaged Gilad Sharon with the aim of resuming the work of the Jericho casino Oasis (Schlaff was its principal owner). This casino, which came into operation on the territory of the Palestinian Authority in 1998 and generated huge revenues, was closed after a statement by the Israeli military that terrorist snipers had made the casino a firing position and that the revenue from casinos financed terrorist activities.

On the night of January 5th, 2006, Sharon had a massive stroke.

We will pause to ask a question:

– if the direct result of a visit by Ms. Rice, who demanded that the Egyptian authorities conduct genuinely democratic elections, was an unprecedented strengthening of the position of the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood;

– if the result of the blessing given by Rice for the participation of Hamas in parliamentary elections became this Islamic organization’s acquisition of the majority of seats in the PNA’s parliament (remember that Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood);

– if Sharon’s “compliancy”, expressed in the unilateral withdrawal of Israelis from the Gaza Strip, the transfer of the Philadelphi Corridor to the protection of Egyptian border guards, and so on, has led not only to the listed concessions, but also to the biggest political crisis in Israel, then is it possible to call all this “support for Israel”’s interests to the detriment of Arab friends”?

But we will return to the ideas outlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book Second Chance. We recall that we stopped on the assessment the author makes on the foreign policy of George W. Bush.

Brzezinski’s verdict is harsh: Bush’s foreign policy has undermined America’s geopolitical position, throwing the country into a state of danger. Europe is alienated from the U.S.A., Russia and China are behaving more and more confidently, coordinating a number of directions in their efforts (that are contrary to U.S. interests). Asia turns from the United States. The Middle East is about to explode. The world of Islam is permeated with anti-American nationalism. “The evocative symbol of America in the eyes of much of the world ceased to be the Statue of Liberty and instead became the Guantanamo prison camp”.

Thus, summarizing Brzezinski, in the period that began after the Cold War, America lost two great historic opportunities.
Firstly, it failed (and not only America is to blame for this, but also the other participants in the process) to use the potential of the Atlantic community and was not able to work out a common global agenda for it. A union of America and Europe would have made them a decisive force in the world. Acting separately, they reach a deadlock.

Secondly, America failed to achieve decisive progress in the Israeli-Palestinian settlement, and this has had enormous costs. After the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate followed first the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and then the U.S.-European rift and the explosion of Arab hostility towards the U.S.A. This growing hostility creates the risk of a gradual forcing out of the U.S.A. from the Middle East region, which China will not fail to take advantage of: “Neither the region’s ruling elites nor the Chinese are ignoring this prospect. The vulnerable Middle Eastern elites need a foreign protector, and China needs stable access to the oil those elites control”66.

From all this, it follows that there is a monumental task before the new American president who will replace Bush: to restore the legitimacy of America as a global leader and the chief guarantor of international security. But for this, the new American president must learn from the mistakes of his or her predecessors and also deeply understand the essence of the historical moment. It is the fact that a global political awakening has occurred, but the awakened world is no longer amenable to imperial domination.

Only having properly evaluated the changes occurring in the world and having led these changes, does America gain an opportunity to get a second – and last – chance for global leadership.

What does Brzezinski understand as a “global political awakening”? According to his evaluation, today for the first time in history, all mankind is politically conscious and politically active. In that part of the world that is traumatized by memories of long years of foreign or imperial domination, global political activity is expressed in a vigorous search for human dignity and cultural and economic opportunities. Political awakening is global in its geography and encompasses all social strata. From a political standpoint, it is radicalized.

“Third World youth are particularly volatile. The rapidly expanding demographic bulge in the twenty five and under age bracket represents a huge mass of impatience. This group’s revolutionary spearhead is likely to emerge from among the millions of students concentrated in the often intellectually dubious tertiary level educational institutions of developing
countries. Semimobilized in large congregations and connected by the Internet, they are positioned to replay, on a far vaster scale, what occurred years earlier in Mexico City and Tiananmen Square. Revolutionaries in waiting, they represent the equivalent of the militant proletariat of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”.

The danger, according to Brzezinski, is that the global political awakening of huge masses of people could turn against the U.S.A. After all, this awakening is anti-Western, anti-imperial, and largely anti-American. In the process, “it is setting in motion a major shift in the global center of gravity. That in turn is altering the global distribution of power, with major implications for America’s role in the world”.

In order not to lose its dominant position, America needs to identify itself with the idea of a universal sense of political dignity, which implies not only freedom and democracy. It includes social justice (to become an attractive model for the social awakening of humanity, American society must gradually overcome its own “personal hedonism”), and gender equality, and respect for the cultural and religious mosaic of the world (without this respect, any attempt to “democratize from without” is doomed to failure).

That is, America (against which the global political awakening is primarily directed) should become a world leader, almost a revolutionary engine, to which awakened people tie their hopes and aspirations.

Brzezinski notes that the anti-Western attitude is more than a populist attitude. This is a manifestation of a global demographic shift (which brings after it changes in both the political and economic balance). According to estimates provided by Brzezinski, the combined populations of Europe and the U.S.A. in 2020 will be only 15% of the world’s population. But billions of people – the politically awakening part of the non-Western population – are eager to establish themselves. And this is a qualitatively new factor influencing the redistribution of power in the world.

Next Brzezinski moves to his main point:

“In this increasingly complicated global context, much will depend on whether America succeeds in restoring some degree of comity in its relations with the world of Islam. A protracted failure to do so will create opportunities for China to enhance its role, not only with Indonesia or Pakistan but also with Iran and the Persian Gulf states. If America’s position in the region continues to deteriorate, a Chinese political presence might be very welcome. That would greatly increase China’s global influence and could even tempt
some European states to conclude that it is in the long-term interest of the European Union to forge a special relationship with the energetically emerging East Asian community.

The book concludes with a call to acknowledge that for America there is nothing more dangerous than if the American policy were universally viewed as arrogantly imperial in a postimperial age, mired in a colonial relapse in a postcolonial time...

Thus, American foreign policy must conform to the realities of a post-colonial and (this is very important!) post-Western time. The U.S.A. can still do it – if the next president tangibly relates American power to the aspirations of politically awakened humanity.

To this end, according to Brzezinski’s recommendations, for the new American president replacing George W. Bush it is necessary that relations with the Islamic world be restored. Otherwise, an explosion of Islamic anti-Americanism will expel the U.S.A. from the Middle East, and China will take its place.

Insofar as in Brzezinski’s description a global political awakening is a large-scale and irreversible process, it is impossible to extinguish the energy of a huge, heated mass (in particular, the energy of Islamic anti-Americanism). It can only be redirected.

How can this be done? By finding allies, for example, within the Islamic world who are ready to direct the swirling energy of the Islamic population towards the “revolutionary” transformation of the region.

Chapter 6. Redemption from the “Original Sin”: Shifts in the Middle Eastern Process

Analyzing the tumultuous events in Egypt, Nahdet Misr newspaper called the Egyptian revolution unique. It explained that its uniqueness was in that revolutionary youth overthrew the regime not with the help of the weapons that had previously been used, but with new media technologies, and without having a charismatic leader.

In Chapter 4, we have already presented the opinion of a number of analysts, according to which social media by itself does not cause a revolution. It is an instrument that can provide a certain effect only in skilled hands.

That is, the question is still about the subject, about these “skilled hands”. The energetic youth who came out onto the streets, thirsting
for change and self-realization (an illustration of the “global political awakening”, as described by Brzezinski) had no charismatic leader. But this does not mean that no one at all directed them. It is not enough to bring out a large crowd with the help of media technologies. In order to prevent the crowd being dispersed immediately, and with ease, it must behave accordingly, and spontaneous self-organization cannot be expected.

As we recall, during the parliamentary elections in Egypt in 2005, the secular forces of a liberal orientation appeared very pale against the backdrop of the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast to the Brotherhood, they were not ready for street fighting and the implementation of violence. Yes, since then much water has flown under the bridge. Yes, in that time the liberal forces have “grown up” and energized. In the parliamentary elections in October 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to consolidate and build upon their triumph five years ago (Mubarak took into account the lessons of 2005!). Does this mean that the balance of secular and Islamist opposition forces in Egypt in 2011 has radically changed?

In the early days of protest demonstrations in Egypt, nothing was heard of the Muslim Brotherhood. The “revolutionary majority” was clearly not oriented towards the idea of building an Islamic state and the rule of sharia law, which the Brotherhood had upheld for many years. Therefore, there was talk of the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood and the possibility of their splitting up – it was said the hot young “brothers” would join the revolutionary ranks of the Egyptian champions of the idea of democracy and there would arise a “generation gap” in their system of values that would blow up the Brotherhood from the inside.

According to the picture painted by the media, the Brotherhood first appeared in the wake of the revolutionary process and only then jumped quickly onto the steps of the departing train’s last car.

However, representatives of the Brotherhood offered a different picture. Thus, Deputy Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Rashad Muhammad al-Bayoumi said in an interview with RIA Novosti: “We from the first day (i.e. from January 25th, 2011) allowed our youth to participate in the revolutionary movement on the Internet through the Facebook site. On the next day, they received instructions to provide more serious support”. According to al-Bayoumi, even the leaders of the National Democratic Party (the former ruling party under Mubarak) acknowledged that “it is the Muslim Brotherhood that defended the
revolution, because the Muslim Brotherhood are trained to resist violence and proved it during the attack on demonstrators at Tahrir Square. Members of the movement organized and protected the lives of revolutionaries in the square… they repelled the thugs hired by the NDP.” The movement “insisted that the revolution be carried out to the end and that there was no retreat.”

But perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood exaggerated its achievements before the revolution?

On February 5th, 2011, (the day when the leadership of the ruling National Democratic Party of Egypt resigned) Hosni Mubarak said that it was the Muslim Brotherhood who had organized the riots that led to the bloodshed and collapse in the country.

However, Mubarak has long been accused of deliberately exaggerating the danger posed by the Muslim Brotherhood in order to convince the West of his indispensability.

During the “revolutionary events”, the idea that the danger posed by this movement was greatly exaggerated was again foregrounded. The Muslim Brotherhood were found to be an operative, but not dangerous force. From this followed the conclusion that they needed to be urgently engaged in the negotiation process.

In Chapter 9, we examine a series of recent statements by U.S. officials on the Muslim Brotherhood in detail. These statements show that the U.S. administration now distinguishes “good” and “bad” among those who only recently were listed as radical Islamists. In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood is now “good”, and al-Qaida is still “bad”.

After these statements, it is not difficult to anticipate future developments. This distinction means that the ten-year period during which the U.S.A. led first a “war on terror” and then “fought extremism and violence” is coming to an end and that soon the international community will be presented with several corpses identified as the dead leaders of al-Qaeda (as it occurred on May 2nd, 2011, when Barack Obama announced the annihilation of bin Laden). On this basis, the U.S.A. will declare victory over the “evil terrorism”, and among other things, it will be able to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan without a loss of face, which Barack Obama has long promised to do.

Thus, the current American president has obtained a chance to get out of a stalemate, in which the U.S.A. found itself due to mistakes made in the Middle East a decade ago, under George H. W. Bush. We recall that Brzezinski believes the main mistake of the U.S. president was his
inability to complete two processes (and this, by Brzezinski’s definition, constitutes his “original sin”, which subsequent presidents and all of America as a whole have had to pay for).

Firstly, having defeated Saddam Hussein in 1991, George H. W. Bush did not remove him from power. If not for this occurrence, the U.S.A. would either never have begun the “war on terror”, or this war would have developed differently, and the U.S.A. would not be “bogged down” in Afghanistan and to an even greater degree in Iraq.

Secondly, Bush did not show enough perseverance in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These two unresolved matters, as pointed out by Zbigniew Brzezinski, “became a constant concern for Bush’s successors”.

The annihilation of bin Laden allows for the conclusion of the first matter: the “war on terror” can now be stopped.

But in order to normalize relations with Islam, this is not enough. It is necessary to ultimately overcome the “original sin”; that is, a real move forward in the Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

Active steps in this direction are already being implemented.

Variations on this theme began even before the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. One of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Muhammad Ghanem, said in an interview with English-language Iranian news service Al-Alam, that the Egyptians should prepare for war with Israel and the Suez Canal must be closed and the supply of Egyptian gas to Israel halted. Later, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were forced to declare that any decision regarding the peace treaty with Israel was in the hands of Egyptian citizens and no one will impose their views upon them. But on February 11th, the day of Mubarak’s resignation, the leaders of Hamas tellingly received representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and expressed a hope that “a new Egyptian regime will help lift the Israeli siege on the Gaza strip”.

On May 2nd, 2011, the annihilation of the leader of the terrorist network al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, in the Pakistani city Abbottabad was announced.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas called the elimination of bin Laden an “assassination”. In particular, the head of the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, Ismail Haniyeh, said it was “a continuation of the American policy based on oppression and the shedding of Muslims and Arab blood. We condemn the assassination and the killing
of an Arab holy warrior”. But the Palestinian Fatah movement supported the elimination of bin Laden.

However, this did not prevent Hamas and Fatah from reconciliation. On May 3rd, 2011, representatives of 13 rival Palestinian factions, mediated by Egyptian authorities in Cairo, signed a preliminary agreement on reconciliation and national unity. Among the signatories are: the head of the Hamas politburo Khaled Mashaal; the leader of the Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Shalah; Fatah representative Azzam al-Ahmad; Ahmad Jibril of the organization Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) General Command; and Maher Taher of the PFLP. The Egyptian authorities were represented by Muhammed Ibrahim, a military intelligence officer.

On May 4th, 2011, a comprehensive agreement was signed between the various Palestinian factions. The signing took place not just anywhere, but at the headquarters of Egypt’s General Intelligence Services. The ceremony was attended by members of the League of Arab States (LAS), Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, the special envoy of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU Catherine Ashton, Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, and other officials.

The signed agreements propose holding parliamentary and presidential elections in the Palestinian Authority, as well as the formation of “consensus cabinet”.

The conclusion of the agreements was exuberantly welcomed by youths both in the West bank and in the Gaza Strip.

Thus, Mubarak’s Egypt, with all possible qualifications, has been loyal to Israel. The new, post-Mubarak Egypt has made a clear gesture of disloyalty to Israel. The reconciliation of Fatah and Hamas can only be done in an anti-Israeli context. This is essentially the second anti-Israeli gesture of Egypt after the anti-Mubarak revolution. In February 2011, the new Egyptian administration gave two Iranian warships permission for passage through the Suez Canal. That has not occurred since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.

Now Egypt is facilitating the reconciliation of warring Palestinian factions.

What will this reconciliation mean politically? Is this reconciliation not a kind of “Camp David” in reverse: at the time, it was peace with Egypt that allowed Israel to unlock the hostile Arab arc around it and
now post-Mubarak Egypt is initiating inter-Palestinian peace, almost fatal for Tel Aviv?

Until May 3rd, 2011, the following situation existed in the region: in the West Bank of the Jordan River, the official power of the Palestinian Authority was in charge, headed by Mahmoud Abbas. The Hamas administration had established itself in the Gaza Strip and was hostile both to the Fatah faction in the West Bank and to Israel.

Relations between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were essentially severed after armed clashes between the two Palestinian factions in Gaza in June 2007. In this situation, the administration of Abbas was willing to negotiate with both Israel and with moderate Arab regimes.

What will happen now?

Formally, the intervention of the “consensus cabinet” in the Israeli-Palestinian political settlement is not expected and it remains the prerogative of Fatah. However, the statements made during the signing ceremony make this doubtful.

The head of the PNA, Abbas, said that he chose Hamas as his political partner, rather than Israel. He added that the Israelis are interfering in the internal affairs of Palestine, while he himself never tries to influence Israeli policy. According to Abbas, Israel will now have to make a choice: either the building of settlements or peace.

Abbas was echoed by Mashaal, who noted that the Palestinians would finally be able to develop a common strategy for building its own state and the fight against their common Israeli enemy.

OIC Secretary General Ihsanoglu called the agreement on inter-Palestinian settlement a “historic achievement”.

On the day of the signing of the full agreement between Hamas and Fatah, May 4th, 2011, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with EU Special Representative for the Middle East Tony Blair in London. During the meeting, Netanyahu said that he appealed to Abbas to abandon the dialogue with Hamas and return to dialogue with Israel. Moreover, the Israeli Prime Minister stressed that from the standpoint of Israel, it is unacceptable to hold peace talks with a government, a substantial part of which calls for the destruction of Israel and the glorification of bin Laden.

We note that Palestinian reconciliation was not the result of a spontaneous process, but proceeded in parallel with the Egyptian and Tunisian events (gathering momentum in January 2011) and apparently in conjunction with it.
Already back in January 23rd, 2011, the broadcasting company Al-Jazeera – the primary media sponsor of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions – reported that from several Thousands of confidential documents, including correspondence and the minutes of negotiations between representatives of the Palestinian Authority, the U.S.A. and Israel, it followed that the representatives of the Palestinian Authority had secretly recognized the annexation of almost all of East Jerusalem by Israel and had gone on to other concessions in order to come closer to the creation of a Palestinian state.

One of the sensations was that allegedly the government of the PNA offered to create a joint committee with the Israelis and transfer Temple Mount to its administration. Great public response was elicited by the report that the Palestinian negotiators discussed the possibility of limiting the number of Palestinian refugees who could return after the signing of a peace treaty to 100 thousand.

The Chief Negotiator of the Palestinian Authority Saeb Erekat called the reports “a bunch of lies”. However, he was forced to resign on February 12th.

Two days later, on February 14th, Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority Salam Fayyad submitted the government’s letter of resignation. Abbas accepted the resignation of the cabinet, but asked Fayyad to form a new government, which he did.

Looking ahead, we note that since the signing of inter-Palestinian agreement, Hamas has categorically refused to discuss the candidacy of Fayyad for prime minister for the “consensus cabinet”, calling him a “symbol of the Palestinian schism”. (It is true, though, that Hamas has agreed to consider Fayyad as finance minister in the new government).

On March 15th in Gaza and Ramallah, the youth movement March 15 held demonstrations with Thousands of protesters demanding that the Hamas and Fatah stop their infighting.

On March 16th, Abbas said that he would not run in the presidential elections scheduled for the autumn, noting that “elections can not take place until the West Bank and Gaza Strip unite”.

Thus, at first Al-Jazeera, known for its peculiar behavior during the Tunisian and Egyptian events, provides leaks that compromise the Fatah administration of the PNA.

Then appear youth movements on the street, explicitly referring us again to the Tunisian and Egyptian precedents.
In the end Abbas, who is the Palestinian equivalent of Ben Ali and Mubarak, declares that he will not run for another presidential term. In the situation that is developing, this means that power will be handed either to a member of Hamas or a member of Fatah who will listen to Hamas in everything.

Against this backdrop, there is another process: the actual preparation of a unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence.

On April 12th, Agence France-Presse reported that the UN Office for the Coordination of Middle East Peace Process concluded in a special report dedicated to the Palestinian issue that the administration of the Palestinian Authority as a whole is ready to become the government of an independent state.

On April 13th, Le Figaro wrote that Israel fears a “diplomatic tsunami” in connection with the probability of an almost unanimous acceptance of a Palestinian state in the upcoming September session of the UN General Assembly.

On April 14th, the British Financial Times published an article by former National Security Advisor to George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, in which he explicitly formulates the principles which should guide Obama in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement:

“First, territory and borders should be addressed. Two states, based on the lines of June 4 1967 with minor, reciprocal, and agreed-upon modifications as expressed in a 1:1 land swap is needed, to take into account areas heavily populated by Israelis in the West Bank.

Second – find a solution to the refugee problem, an appropriate model of ‘two states’, which would not presuppose the universal right of return to Israel and would take account of resentment at the injustice of Palestinian refugees, while providing them with real monetary compensation and assistance in resettlement.

Third, Jerusalem has to be made the undivided capital of both Israel and Palestine, with Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty. There should be a special regime for the Old City, providing each side control of its respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them.

Last, on the issue of security, Mr. Obama must push for a non-militarized Palestinian state, together with security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian sovereignty, and a U.S.-led multinational force to ensure a peaceful transitional security period.”
Thus, the preparations for a proclamation of a Palestinian state are underway. In the prevailing circumstances, it will be the Hamas movement that will be the main engine of this process, and we have repeatedly pointed out the proximity of this movement to the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood).

We believe the enumerated facts provide a sufficiently strong basis for the following hypothesis: the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the forces with which the U.S.A. intends to build an alliance in the reformatting of the Greater Middle East. In connection with this, we suggest going even further to a specific examination of the history and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, much about the role of which in the modern Middle East peace process has already been said above.

Chapter 7. The Muslim Brotherhood

The alliance between the West and the Islamists did not arise over night. The Muslim Brotherhood movement emerged with the support of the West.

The Muslim Brotherhood organization was founded in Egypt in 1928. Its founder, Hassan al-Banna, was born in 1906 in the village of Mahmoudiya, in the south of Egypt. His first mentor was his father, Sheikh Ahmad al-Banna, who had received a religious education at Al-Azhar University, where he had studied with the founder of the Salafi movement, Muhammad Abduh. It was the ideas of Abduh and one of his closest associates — the Syrian Rashid Rida — that formed the basis of the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Mohammed Abduh, following his teacher, the ideologist of Pan-Islamism Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, believed that the Muslim world should return to the purity of faith inherent in the first decades of Islam. The concept of pan-Islamism was based on the idea of a global Islamic state — a caliphate. Abduh and al-Afghani argued for the re-establishment of a Muslim Caliphate headed by the House of Osman. Until 1924, when Turkey was declared a republic, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire were considered the head of all Muslims.

In 1904, Rashid Rida founded the Ottoman Consultative Society and assigned the mission of uniting the supporters of Ottoman unity residing in Egypt. The main goal of the society was to create a basis for an advisory board for the Ottoman state, while keeping the ruling Ottoman dynasty
in power. In 1908, the society collapsed because of Rida’s closest associates — the brothers Rafiq and Hakkı al-Azm joined the Young Turk Party’s Committee of Union and Progress. Rashid Rida wrote: among the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress there is not one Turk, and it can be considered as “Ottoman” only in the Turkish sense of that term. In 1922, Rashid Rida published his famous treatise The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate, which sets out what it believes to be the advantages of a caliphate over other forms of government.

The British administration in Egypt followed the activities of the founders of Salafism with interest. Abduh was on friendly terms with the British Governor-General Lord Cromer. In 1899, Abduh was a Mufti of Egypt. One of the friends of Abduh, said: “Now Abduh is perhaps the biggest Anglophile among the Egyptians”.

Al-Afghani and Abduh were members of the Masonic Star of the East Lodge, founded in 1871 and controlled by the United Grand Lodge of England. According to the Egyptian historian Muhammad Sabry, al-Afghani joined this lodge with the assistance of the British Vice Consul Raphael Borg.

The founders of Salafism found supporters in British politicians, despite the fact that they openly declared the irreconcilable contradictions between the West and the Islamic East. The British were interested in the possibility of using reformers as a tool to fight the national liberation movement in Egypt. They were impressed with Pan-Islamism, which prevented the development of nationalist ideas and the ability to use Islam as a “weapon” against the socialist and communist movements.

In 1927, Hassan al-Banna was appointed Arabic teacher at a primary school in the city of Ismailia near the Suez Canal and in the same place in March 1928, he created the Society of Muslim Brothers. It should be noted that at that time Ismailia was the capital of the Suez Canal zone occupied by the British and it was the headquarters of the Suez Canal Company. The first mosque of the Muslim Brotherhood was built in 1931 with money from this company.

By 1934, more than 50 branches of the Muslim Brotherhood had been opened in Egypt. They were engaged in the creation of schools, mosques, and factories. In 1935, the first branch of the organization appeared abroad; the Aleppo branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was created, which became the headquarters of the Syrian Brotherhood.

In 1939, the Muslim Brotherhood became an official political group. Hassan al-Banna formulated one of the primary Islamist theses: the
indivisibility of religion and politics: “If someone tells you: ‘This is politics!’ Say: ‘This is Islam, and we do not recognize any separation’”.

The main political goal was proclaimed by al-Banna to be the “liberation from foreigners of all territories where Islam is disseminated, the unification of the Muslim peoples on the basis of the Koran, the creation of a worldwide Islamic state – a ‘federation’ of Muslim nations…”.

After the end of the Second World War, the authority of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt grew so much that they could compete with the most influential political party, Wafd, for primacy in the leadership of the liberation movement. The Muslim Brotherhood spoke openly for the first time of its political program calling for the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic Republic.

The popularity of the Brotherhood grew even more after October 1947, when Hassan al-Banna announced the formation of militant groups of their supporters to participate in military operations to liberate Palestine.

In Egypt itself, the number of terrorist acts directed against enemies of the organization increased rapidly. On December 4th, 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood killed the police chief of the Cairo, General Selim Zaki. The king and members of the government, fearing for their lives, took pains not to appear in public places.

On December 8th, 1948, Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, concerned about the terrorist activity and the growing influence of the Brotherhood, issued an order banning the organization and the confiscation of its property. The resources of the organization were seized and dozens of its members were placed behind bars. In retaliation, on December 28th, 1948, al-Nuqrashi was killed by a member of the Brotherhood and on February 12th, 1949, Hassan al-Banna was shot dead in Cairo by a government agent.

In 1950, the Muslim Brotherhood was legalized in Egypt as a “religious association”. As early as the next year, they restored the military wing of the Brotherhood, taking part in a guerrilla war against the British, having ignored the decision of the Egyptian parliament to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. In the end, the leaders of Wafd were forced to turn to Sheikh Farghali, who led the Muslim Brotherhood’s military groups in Ismailia, to resolve issues in the Suez Canal zone.

In July 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood supported the anti-monarchical revolution accomplished by the Association of Free Officers
headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser. At first they tried to influence the policy of the Revolutionary Command Council headed by Muhammad Naguib and Nasser. But Nasser’s refU.S.A.l to reconsider a secular path for Egypt’s development made conflict between the revolutionary leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood inevitable.

On January 12th, 1954, members of the Brotherhood and supporters of Nasser clashed at Cairo University and there were victims on both sides. In August 1954, the head of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Hudaybi, spoke against the project of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. An assassination attempt on Nasser by the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1954 during a military parade in honor of concluding the agreement with Britain led to the organization being officially banned again on Dec. 5th, 1954.

In connection with the assassination attempt on Nasser, the Arab press repeatedly noted the existence of covert communication channels between the Muslim Brotherhood and Britain and other Western powers. According to official Egyptian data, the Muslim Brotherhood held secret negotiations with the British in order to secure support for the overthrow of Nasser. In the same vein, the meeting of Hassan al-Banna’s son-in-law, Said Ramadan, with U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 can be recalled.

During the judicial proceedings, it became clear that Naguib maintained close contact with the Brotherhood. He was dismissed from the post he occupied and taken into custody. By the end of 1954, more than a thousand people from the Brotherhood had been detained, and by October 1955 — more than three thousand. The number of organization members who left for Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria increased. Before 1960, the organization engaged primarily in collections on behalf of prisoners’ families.

By 1961, new leaders and groups had been determined within the Brotherhood. The radical wing of the organization was represented by Sayyid Qutb, Hussein Tawfik’s group, which advocated the widespread use of violence, and the Ain Shams group of Mustafa Mashhur, which included those who had achieved a special degree of dedication and became “fida” (sacrificing their lives in the name of faith).

In 1964, the majority of imprisoned members of the Brotherhood were released under an amnesty. As early as in 1965, the UAR security authorities (UAR – United Arab Republic, a union of Egypt and Syria) uncovered a new Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy aimed at overthrowing
the government. About 6,000 people were arrested. Several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Sayyid Qutb, received the death sentence.

In prison, Sayyid Qutb wrote his most famous work – *Milestones on the Road*. He argued that everything not related to Islam is evil and sin and that sharia law is the only correct path which should be followed by Muslims. According to Sayyid Qutb, mankind had gradually fallen into a new Jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic, “barbaric” period in Arab history), and jihad should be employed in the struggle against the infidels – both among Muslims and non-Muslims.

During the reign of President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), the policy of the authorities with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood softened, although the organization could act exclusively as a religious association. In 1971, a provision was introduced into the Egyptian constitution stating that the principles of sharia are the main source for legislation. In 1978, a law was passed prohibiting those spreading ideas contrary to the sharia from occupying important positions in elected public bodies and public organizations. Despite the fact that Sadat accepted many of the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood, statements by the Islamic opposition against government corruption, foreign influence and so on continued.

The conclusion of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 led to a further dissociation of the Brotherhood into moderates and radicals. The radicals created several terrorist organizations and carried out a series of attacks, one of which was the murder of Anwar Sadat.

In 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood launched a large-scale terrorist war against the Syrian president Hafez al-Assad. In June 1979, they killed 32 and wounded 54 cadets in the artillery school in Aleppo. After an assassination attempt on al-Assad in June 1980, the Syrian parliament declared membership in the Brotherhood a serious crime. The army was involved in the suppression of an uprising instigated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in February 1982, practically destroying the Syrian branch of the Brotherhood.

In late 1987, the terrorist organization of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was formed – Hamas – the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and in the same year the first Intifada began.

In Sudan in 1989, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Turabi, became the ideological mastermind of a military coup, as a result of which the military came to power under the leadership of Omar al-Bashir, who was committed to the Islamization of the country.
In 1991, Hassan al-Turabi announced that great hope and future prospects had appeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union — Islam should be the successor to communism on the territory of the former Soviet empire and transform it into an Islamic sharia state from the Black Sea to the Pamir. From 1992 to 1996, Osama bin Laden lived in Sudan at the invitation of al-Turabi.

In Europe, the first branches of the Muslim Brotherhood appeared in the mid-1950’s, when activities of the organization were banned in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In 1958, the son of Hassan al-Banna, Said Ramadan, created the Islamic Society of Germany in Munich. The investigation conducted after September 11th, 2001, revealed the involvement of the leaders of the Islamic Society of Germany in the creation of Bank Al-Taqwa and the funding of Hamas, the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, the Tunisian party An-Nahda, and al-Qaeda.

In 1989, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe was formed with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1997, the European Council for Fatwa and Research was created at the Federation. The Council was headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi — one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, known for his radical views. Thus, in 2000, he said that as long as the people of Chechnya were fighting for their land, honor, and faith against the brutal enemy forces, this war was a jihad.

In a fatwa in 2002, al-Qaradawi remarked that Islam, «after being expelled from it [Europe] twice” will return “as a conqueror and victor” (albeit with the stipulation that the conquest of Europe this time will be carried out “not by the sword, but by preaching and ideology”)67. In 2008, under pressure from the Conservative Party, the sheikh was denied an entry visa to the UK. The reason for the denial was a BBC interview with al-Qaradawi, in which he called the suicide bombings in Israel as “martyrdom in the name of God”.

Specialists on Islam note the significant role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the radicalization of the European Muslim community. For example, a researcher at Harvard University, Lorenzo Vidino, points to a unique feature of the policy of the Brotherhood: “While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society”.

In the U.S.A., the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood were banned for a long time. But starting around 2005, the State Department took a
number of steps to create platforms for cooperation with so-called “moderate Islamists”. This has been proven by the American researcher Ian Johnson, author of *The Mosque in Munich: The Nazis, the CIA and the rise of Muslim Brothers in the West*. He presented the following facts: In 2006, there was a conference between the European Muslim Brotherhood and American Islamic organizations in Brussels. Among the guests was the Islamic Society of North America, which has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. An analytical report by the CIA in 2006 said that the Muslim Brotherhood possess “impressive internal dynamism, organization, and media savvy”.

In Egypt itself, the activities of the Brotherhood have so far been severely limited by the constitution of the country, which prohibits the establishment of political parties on a religious basis. In the early 1980s, Mubarak withdrew the accusation of involvement in the assassination of Sadat from the leaders of the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 1984, the Brotherhood, restored as a religious organization yet without being able to independently engage in political activities, has worked with various political parties – the New Wafd, the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Socialist Party.

In 1987, the Brotherhood was represented in Parliament by several deputies. In 2000, it had 17 seats in parliament. In December 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood, as we have already said, had a sensational success, sending 88 of their representatives to parliament as independent candidates. The then head of the Brotherhood Mohammed Akef said in an interview with the newspaper *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* in December 2005: “I deny any doubts about our intentions. Our intentions are known and presented publicly. We demand full democracy and a peaceful transition of power”.

The Muslim Brotherhood often speaks about its commitment to democracy. They emphatically interpreted this democracy only as an instrument of regime change, never contradicting their own views about the ideal political system: an Islamic state, where the power of the ruler is limited by the Islamic sharia laws. At the same time, to create an Islamic state, the Brotherhood, following the teachings of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, plans to proceed gradually, step by step. On the website of the Muslim Brotherhood movement on October 30th, 2009, a manifesto was posted, which stated among other things, the necessity of creating “a Muslim individual, a Muslim family, a Muslim government and a Muslim state, which will create the Islamic countries uniting all Muslims”.
Experts note that Mubarak’s regime, allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to solve many social problems, essentially became an “incubator of Islamism”. The Brotherhood has an entire network of kindergartens, schools, and hospitals and provides their services to thousands of Egyptians. Moreover, it is obvious that the Brotherhood is not going to limit itself to social activities and will actively participate in the political struggle.

In February 2011, the head of the Brotherhood, Mohammed Badi said the organization is preparing a platform for creating a political party, stipulating that it does not expect to win a parliamentary majority and would not present a candidate for presidency. However, in April Badi said that the Muslim Brotherhood can count on 75% of the seats in Parliament; moreover, one of the leaders of the organization stated his readiness to take part in presidential elections. On May 1st, the establishment of the Party of Freedom and Justice was announced, whose leader is to be a member of the Politburo of the Brotherhood, Mohammed al-Mursi. The new party will, allegedly, be independent from the Muslim Brotherhood, although it intends to coordinate their actions.

On February 15th, 2011, an article was published in The Wall Street Journal about the “true face” of the Muslim Brotherhood. The author recalls that in February 1979 in The New York Times it was stated that “the depiction of [Khomeini] as fanatical, reactionary and the bearer of crude prejudices seems certainly and happily false” and that his entourage of close advisers is uniformly composed of moderate, progressive individuals.

Now the situation repeats itself. One of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Essam el-Errian, presents a “soothing” version of the goals of their organization: “We aim to achieve reform and rights for all: not just for the Muslim Brotherhood, not just for Muslims, but for all Egyptians.”

But, as stressed by The Wall Street Journal, this is only one side of the Brotherhood. The history of this disciplined underground organization, in view of everyone engaged only in a charitable and social work, has excellently taught its members to speak the right words to different target audiences. As an example, The Wall Street Journal gives the following statement by the head of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohammed Badi: “Resistance is the only solution against the Zio-American arrogance and tyranny..., the improvement and change that the
[Muslim] nation seeks can only be attained ... by raising a jihadi generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue life.”\(^{95}\)

The list of contradictory and ambiguous statements and actions by representatives of the Brotherhood can be continued.

The Brotherhood has spent much effort to build relations with the Copts. In the 2005 elections, there even appeared the slogan “Christian brothers say ‘yes’ to Muslim brothers”. However, when in April 2011 unrest began in southern Egypt, caused by the appointment of the Christian Coptic Emad Mikhail as governor of the southern province of Qena (where a significant portion of the population is Coptic), representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood movement not only joined the protests but demanded the immediate establishment of an “Islamic state” in southern Egypt.

In the afore-mentioned interview in The New York Times, El-Errian points out that the Brotherhood has opposed the use of violence since its establishment. But even if you do not take into account the history of the organization, it is sufficient to cite the words of its founder Hassan al-Banna: “Our method is counsel and advice, and if that fails, then eradication by force, and elimination”\(^{96}\).

Chapter 8. The History of Cooperation between the West and Radical Islamists

The relationship between the West and Islamists is not reduced to the support that Britain once extended to the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result of the development of certain concepts and ideas, the cooperation between the leaders of a number of Western countries and radical Islamists in the post WW II period aquired a systematic character.

From the mid-1950s, in the period of D. Eisenhower’s presidency, the United States began developing the concept of combating the Soviet Union through the conducting of local conflicts, above all on the territory of Asia and Africa. The authors of the concept were W. Rostow and R. Hatch (see book An American Policy in Asia, published in the 1955\(^{97}\)), Henry Kissinger\(^{98}\) and others.
In the same period, the anti-Soviet military alliances SEATO and CENTO were established in Asia under U.S. leadership in 1955.

In 1959, the U.S. Congress passed the so-called Resolution on Captive Nations, which asserted that many people inside and outside the Soviet Union— including the “peoples of Turkestan and Azerbaijan, as well as the North Vietnamese,” and so on— were enslaved by the Communists. With this, the concept of local conflicts was given an additional ideological justification.

In 1961, the U.S.A. adopted the strategy of “flexible response” (or “the McNamara Doctrine”, which replaced the post-war strategy of “massive retaliation”). An integral part of the new doctrine was the above-mentioned concept of local conflicts. The doctrine of “flexible response” also became the official doctrine of NATO.

In 1974, an influential non-governmental international organization, the Club of Rome, proposed the so-called concept of “organic growth” as a solution to the problem of Earth’s overpopulation. This concept justified the restriction of the consumption of resources and reduction of the world’s population at the expense of industrially underdeveloped countries. The concept de facto prescribed countries of the “first world” a very specific control of the “third world” to facilitate its reduction.

After the defeat the U.S.A. suffered in 1973 in Vietnam, the open use of U.S. troops in the Asian region’s conflicts was terminated for a long period. The U.S.A. placed its stake on local allies in Asia in the fight against Soviet forces. A period of clandestine operations by Western intelligence services in alliance with radical Islamists begins.

The first of these operations was the organization of the opposition against Afghan president Mohammad Daud, who came to power in 1973. An uprising in 1975 against the Daud regime by Afghan radicals, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, was organized with the help of the Pakistani intelligence services. Later, the former Interior Minister of Pakistan and Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Advisor on Afghan Affairs, Naserullah Babar, spoke in several interviews about how he organized this uprising. In one interview (in 1989, in The New York Times) Babur distinctly stressed the fact that the U.S.A. had financed Afghan dissidents since 1973 and was complicit in carrying out this operation.

In the mid-1970s, there was an obvious change in the policy of Western countries in relation to the moderate regimes in the East, such
as the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran and Bhutto in Pakistan. These rulers consistently sought to achieve greater independence from Western countries – both economically (especially in the context of the oil crisis that began in 1973 and led to serious concerns in the West) and politically. Former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing wrote in his memoirs that in 1975, trying to convince the Shah of Iran to stop rising oil prices, he was impressed by the Shah’s determination to gain independence from Western countries, including the United States, and Bhutto also sought to gain greater independence from the great powers and supported an alliance of countries in the Asian region. In 1972, Pakistan left SEATO. Obtaining an abolition of the embargo on U.S. arms to Pakistan, Bhutto confirmed his country’s readiness to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

In 1976, with the rise to power of President Jimmy Carter, the U.S.A. began to exert strong pressure on the Shah of Iran with a demand to comply with “human rights”. This pressure undermined the already tense situation within Iran.

In 1977, the CIA released a report that predicted the beginning of a fall in oil production in the U.S.S.R. and its intention to enter into a struggle with the U.S.A. in the Gulf region in order to obtain control over Middle Eastern oil. This report was intended to justify counter “preventive measures” by the U.S.A. leading to their full control over the Gulf zone.

In parallel, the U.S.A. intensified efforts to undermine the U.S.S.R. In 1977, National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, formed a group at the National Security Council (NSC) to begin development of a secret program to destabilize the U.S.S.R. by means of stirring up the ethnic factor (in 1961, Brzezinski also predicted the collapse of the U.S.S.R. into independent nation-states in his book The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict). The main objective of the group’s activity was the Islamic regions of the U.S.S.R. In addition to Brzezinski, the facilitators of the aforementioned programs were the former British intelligence officer and the famous orientalist Bernard Lewis and the French professor with Russian aristocratic roots Alexandre Bennigsen.

In early 1978, a program for stirring non-Russian nationalities in the U.S.S.R. to independence (or, in the words of Brzezinski – for “de-legitimization of the U.S.S.R.”), which was developed by this group in the NSC, was adopted by the U.S. administration. This fact is first mentioned by Robert Gates, who under Carter was Deputy Director of
the CIA, in his memoir *From the Shadows*, and was then detailed in an interview with Brzezinski on CNN. Maria Rozanova, the wife of one of the most prominent Soviet dissidents, Andrei Siniavsky, has also spoken openly in the central Russian media about the work of Bennigsen and Soviet dissidents to foment inter-ethnic conflicts in the U.S.S.R.

In July 1978, Bhutto’s government in Pakistan was overthrown and General Zia ul-Haq’s radical regime came to power.

By the autumn of 1978, stable channels of communication had been established between the U.S. administration and the radical Islamist opposition to the government of the Shah of Iran. Henry Precht, then the Country Director for the State Department’s Iranian Desk (a key figure in the Department for Iranian politics), later testified that in the fall of 1978, his first meeting was held with an associate of Khomeini, Ibrahim Yazdi, brokered by a political scientist from the University of Pittsburgh, and persona non grata in the State Department, Richard Cottam. Precht stressed that he personally had taken timely action and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran had also established the “necessary contacts with the opposition”. Two channels of communication were established through Yazdi: through mediation of the Political Adviser to the Embassy Warren Zimmermann, and by direct telephone contact established by Precht himself. Moreover, soon there arose contacts at the embassy in addition to Yazdi. And at the end of December 1978, according to Precht, contact was established with Ayatollah Beheshti, the closest associate of Khomeini and the second most important spiritual leader of the Iranians.

Later in his memoirs, Carter pointed out that U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was not a supporter of preservation of the Shah’s government. And U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan, according to Carter’s account, was an open lobbyist of Khomeini.

On December 26th–28th, 1978, the former French Interior Minister Michel Poniatowski visited Tehran on a secret mission on behalf of Giscard d’Estaing. This emissary reports in a secret note to Paris (published by Giscard d’Estaing in the appendices to his memoirs), that the Shah was aware of the Americans’ plan to betray him, and in particular, of the fact that Sullivan had entered into secret talks with leaders of the Iranian opposition about forming a new government. France also did not offer any options for the “soft” neutralization of Khomeini, located at that time in the Paris suburb Neauphle-le-Chateau.
In December 1978, *The Washington Post* published an article outlining the theses of a secret report by the White House Adviser on Iran, George Ball, demanding the Shah’s renunciation of absolute power and the establishment of a civilian coalition government in Iran that included opposition leaders. The U.S.A. offered to carry out the role of arbiter and to confirm its long-term economic presence in Iran.

The final decision on the need for an “early departure of the Shah” was adopted in December 1978 at a summit in Guadeloupe by the leaders of the U.S.A., UK, Germany, and France. In their memoirs, the meeting participants, however, differed somewhat in describing the details of adoption of the decision. In his memoirs, Carter claimed the complete “unanimity” of the leaders of the four powers on the need for the departure of the Shah. If, however, we believe Giscard d’Estaing, he himself and FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made an attempt to speak in defense of the Shah, however, Carter spoke out unequivocally against his former ally.

In January 1979, *Time* magazine reported to the greater public Brzezinski’s thesis about the formation of an “arc of crisis” along the shores of the Indian Ocean, as well as “evidence of the fact that the reign of the Shah of Iran is over.”

After the victory of the Iranian revolution in the February 1979, the U.S. administration quickly established relations with the regime of Khomeini – again according to the testimony of Precht, through the mediation of the previously established secret channels of communication.

Thus, the building of the Islamic “arc of crisis”, which, as American politicians asserted until the mid-1990s, was supposedly created by the Soviet Union, was in fact started by the West.

In 1996, Gates said in his memoirs that back in March 1979, the issue of supporting the Afghan rebels, providing the opportunity for “sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire” was discussed at the highest level.

Two years later in an interview with the French *Le Nouvel Observateur* Brzezinski confirmed this information, adding that Carter signed a secret directive to help the mujahideen on July 3rd, 1979, six months before the U.S.S.R.’s entry into Afghanistan, and that on the same day he, Brzezinski, sent the U.S. President a memo alleging that “assistance will propel the Soviet Union to military intervention” (or, as Brzezinski
clarified in an interview with a French newspaper, it had the affect of “drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap”\textsuperscript{115}).

Even before Gates and Brzezinski, the fact that the real objective of U.S. participation in the Afghan war was to involve the Russians in a “trap”, similar to the one the U.S. got into in Vietnam, had been indicated by the former head of the Afghan Department of the Pakistani intelligence ISI General Mohammad Yousaf. In his book called \textit{The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower}, published in collaboration with the Anglo-American military historian Mark Adkin, Yousaf recalls the statement of U.S. Congressman Charles Wilson to the \textit{Daily Telegraph} on January 14, 1984. Wilson then stressed that “there were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one.” Yousaf claimed: “Wilson epitomized the attitude of many American officials that I met that Afghanistan must be made into a Soviet Vietnam…. This view was similarly prevalent among CIA officers including, particularly, the Director, William Casey. I could see they were deeply resentful of their failure to win in Vietnam, which had been a major military defeat for the world’s leading superpower. To me, getting their own back seemed to be the primary reason for the US backing the war with so much money… General Akhtar agreed with them that the war could be turned into a Soviet Vietnam. He had convinced the President it was entirely feasible, and now it was my job to see it carried out”\textsuperscript{116}.

In his book, Yousaf described in detail Pakistan’s main partners in the Afghan operation: “For every dollar supplied by the US, another was added by the Saudi Arabian government. The combined funds, running into several hundred million dollars a year, were transferred by the CIA to special accounts in Pakistan under the control of ISI”. Yousaf pointed to other sources of international assistance for the mujahideen: “\textit{Until 1984 the bulk of all arms and ammunition was purchased from China… But in 1985 the CIA started buying large quantities from Egypt.}” (The presence of large shipments from Turkey was also noted)\textsuperscript{117}.

The fact of the CIA’s cooperation in the fight against the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan with Saudis, Egyptians, the British, and Chinese was confirmed by Brzezinski in the afore-mentioned interview with CNN\textsuperscript{118}.

Already having become the official enemy of the United States in the 1990s, the leader of al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden, said in an interview with a French journalist: “\textit{To counter these atheist Russians, the Saudis chose me as their representative in Afghanistan… I settled in Pakistan, in}
the Afghan border region. I set up my first camp where these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers. The weapons were supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis.”

Some representatives of the American leadership later expressed regret in connection with the nature and consequences of their struggle against the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan. For example, the former CIA director of the Afghanistan operations, Charles Cogan, noted in 1995 that in Afghanistan, the U.S.A. sacrificed the drug war to fight the Cold War against the Soviets. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs under Reagan, Richard Murphy, admitted: “We did spawn a monster in Afghanistan.” (Incidentally, in contrast to these persons, Brzezinski has never expressed the slightest doubt of the utility of this political line. According to him, the collapse of the Soviet Empire was certainly more of a priority than “some stirred-up Muslims.”

The beginning of war in Afghanistan made it possible for Carter (at the instigation of Brzezinski) on January 23rd, 1980, to publicly pronounce the thesis that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force” (the so-called “Carter Doctrine”).

Put forward by the U.S.A. in the early 1980s, the doctrine of “low intensity conflict”, according to which regional conflicts were seen as a direct threat to the security of the United States, justified all the more active intervention by the Americans in the politics of the Middle East. Besides the assistance to Islamic radicals allegedly “provoked by the Soviets”, it was asserted that the U.S.A. supported most moderate regimes in the East (for example, Saddam Hussein’s regime). In fact, however, U.S. policy in the East consisted of unleashing local conflicts in the region that corresponded to their interests.

Thus, the U.S.A. not only supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, but also facilitated the beginning of that war. In his memoirs, Brzezinski admitted that after his visit to Amman in July 1980, he submitted a report to Carter which explained that the Iran-Iraq conflict “was consistent with American policy in the region.”

Islamists were introduced to the Central Asian territory of the U.S.S.R. from Afghanistan. According to the memoirs of Mohammad
Yousaf, at a meeting with him and the head of ISI, General Akhtar, in February 1984, Casey suggested: “Northern Afghanistan is a springboard for Soviet Central Asia. That happens to be the soft underbelly of the Soviets. We need to ship over the literature, in order to sow discord. And then we have to send guns there to push for local uprisings”. The Pakistani side expressed its consent. And already by April 1984, as Yousaf reports, the first foray into the territory of Soviet Central Asia took place, straightaway bringing in a large number of recruits. In 1986, the first uprising along ethnic lines took place in Alma-Ata (Kazakh Republic of the U.S.S.R.), which launched the process that was soon followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After the departure of the U.S.S.R. from Afghanistan, the project nurturing “the services related Islam” in the area and its spread outward from the region continued. An authoritative scholar of the Taliban, Ahmed Rashid, recalled in his book: “It was April 1989, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had just been completed. I was returning to Pakistan by road from Kabul…. Suddenly, along the road behind me, a truck full of Mujahedden roared up and stopped. But those on board were not Afghans…. The group was made up of Filipino Moros, Uzbeks from Soviet Central Asia, Arabs from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Uighurs from Xinjiang in China…. Under training at a camp near the border they were going on weekend leave to Peshawar…. That evening, Prime Minister Benazair Bhutto had hosted a dinner for journalists in Islamabad. Among the guests was Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, the head of intelligence… I asked him if he wasn’t playing with fire by inviting Muslim radicals from Islamic countries that are considered allies of Pakistan. … “We are fighting a jihad and this is the first Islamic international brigade in the modern era…”, replied the general.”

With the increasing destabilization of the U.S.S.R. and the virtual elimination of the Soviet center of power from world politics, Western countries are more and more openly unleashing conflicts in the Middle Eastern region. Thus, Saddam Hussein launched a war against Kuwait in August 1990 only after receiving a clear message that the U.S.A. would not oppose its implementation. On July 25th, 1990, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie said in an interview with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. “have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. … The issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction.” These words wrapped in a diplomatic guise were very
difficult to interpret in any way other than as a go-ahead from their Western ally for the initiation of the campaign, and that is how Saddam Hussein regarded it.

Using the Kuwait crisis and under the cover of the objectives of protecting allies, but actually not too interested in their opinion, the U.S.A. quickly sent its troops to the region. According to a statement by Jordan’s King Hussein, American troops began to cross into Saudi Arabia (Operation “Desert Shield” was launched on August 7th, 1990), even before any request from the Saudis for help in organizing security. Talking about this, King Hussein referred in an interview with a correspondent for The New York Times to a personal conversation with Margaret Thatcher in particular, informing him that U.S. troops were “halfway to Saudi Arabia” before they were formally requested.

After the collapse of the U.S.S.R in 1991, Western governments continued to semi-publicly provide support for radical Islamists in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and other Middle Eastern countries. One of the most obvious examples was in Tunisia. In the 1990s, the U.S. government accused Tunisian authorities in connection with the lack of legalization of the banned Islamist organization, Al-Nahda (Renaissance). Not without reason did the leader of Al-Nahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, who has lived in London since 1993, describe Americans as “more compliant than the Europeans” in an interview.

The 2003 operation in Iraq was a new example of western countries’ aggressive defense of “their vital economic interests in the region”. The recently published minutes of meetings between British ministers and oil companies have stopped the debate about the presence of an economic underpinning for the Iraqi operations. Characteristic are the statements contained in these records made by the former director of the British Foreign Office’s Middle East Department, Edward Chaplin, in October 2002: “Shell and BP could not afford not to have a stake in [Iraq] for the sake of their long-term future... We were determined to get a fair slice of the action for UK companies in a post-Saddam Iraq.”

With the beginning of the “Twitter” revolutions in the East, representatives of exiled radical Islamist organizations that have found support in the West drastically increased their activities.

Libyan Prince Mohammad as-Senussi, heir to the dynasty deposed by Muammar Gaddafi and head of the Senussi order, which is closely connected with the Muslim Brotherhood, today calls on the
international community to decisively fight against Gaddafi from a suburb of London where he has lived the last 13 years.132

Since the beginning of the Tunisian “Jasmine” revolution, Ghannouchi has returned from Europe to Tunisia. And on April 16th, the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe announced a fully-fledged dialogue with “Islamist movements”. “Surprise us, and we too will surprise you”, he said at a meeting with Egyptian and Tunisian representatives of Ghannouchi’s party, An-Nahda.133

These phenomena and recent events, as well as those presented above and below, have added new strokes to the longtime plot of cooperation between Western countries and radical Islamists.

Chapter 9. The Territory of Facts

Thus, let us repeat this question once again: what is actually taking place before our eyes in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and across the entire region? The answer to the question of what exactly is happening can invariably be addressed by one or another interpretation of what has taken place. But as soon as we begin to do this, in parallel with the seemingly so necessary interpretations arise the inevitable conflicts generated by these interpretations. Here it is fitting to refer the reader, for example, to the work of one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century Paul Ricoeur – Conflict of Interpretations (Le conflit des interpretations).

How can such a multiplex, severe conflict of interpretations be avoided? What is more, ancient philosophers understood that the truth sometimes emerges in debates, yet sometimes it perishes. How can we not destroy the truth, but instead strive to attain it? And how do debates in which the truth emerges differ from debates in which it is destroyed?

It has long been established that this difference in the nature of disputes and the degree of their effectiveness is determined primarily by the conceptual language being used. If each of us uses our own language, we will become like the builders of the Tower of Babel, with all the ensuing consequences. In addition, professional ethics are certainly important; moreover, ethics of a kind that will in no way be sacrificed to the values or other biases of the interpreter. Finally, much depends on our ability to draw a clear dividing line between facts and interpretations: “This, this, and this are located on the territory of facts.
(factual territory), moreover, they are so unquestionable that their denial may testify only to professional negligence. And that, that, and that are located on the territory of interpretations.”

Unfortunately, all too often facts are sacrificed to interpretive schemes. The ability of the human mind in general, and the consciousness of a professional interpreter of the facts in particular, to ignore facts if they do not fit into his or her interpretive framework has been examined in detail by the eminent American philosopher and linguist Noam Chomsky. Here we direct the reader primarily to his most famous work *Syntactic Structures*, written in 1957, as well as to other works, both earlier (for example, *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory*, written in 1955) and later (for example, reviews of B. F. Skinner’s book, *Verbal Behavior*, in 1959; the devastating critique of Skinner’s behaviorism contained in the review reoriented American psychology from behaviorism to cognitivism).

Discussing how exactly the human brain processes information, Chomsky was the first to speak about cognitive programs for processing information which are not always articulated by the human mind and which the brain carries out; about a mental and universal grammar; and about the fact that a program’s rigid setting for processing information very often results in facts beyond the scope of this rigid setting being simply discarded by the consciousness.

Well, if we want to agree about something and understand it, we must modify the degree of the rigidity with which our brain enforces a particular interpretation upon facts, even before their perception. This requires some effort from us, but each of us can undertake these efforts if so desired.

We direct the message about this possibility primarily to ourselves and pledge to separate the wheat of the facts from the chaff of interpretations, being aware that, like all researchers, we have our own interpretive frameworks and hence the bias that comes from them. All we can do here is to resist this bias rather than indulge in it.

There are a large number of interpreters speaking about the “machinations of Americans” given rise to by the events that interest us in the Middle East and Northern Africa.

No fewer are the number of researchers who reject such “machinations” and scoff at those who believe in their existence.

But can anyone among the researchers who rigidly and reasonably reject “American intrigue” (“American machinations”, and so on)
confirm the absence of the American project for a “Greater Middle East”?

Can anyone from among these researchers confirm that U.S. President George W. Bush did not address graduates of the University of South Carolina on May 9th, 2003? And that he did not say in this speech that a new Middle East must be created within ten years?

Avoiding any sort of bias in everything that relates to interpretation of this speech by George W. Bush (and of subsequent speeches of high-ranking U.S. officials), we deem it necessary to point out that speaking in South Carolina, George W. Bush talked of beautiful and noble things: of ensuring new opportunities for economic growth in the vast Middle Eastern region, of reducing dependence on the vagrancies of the oil market, of just laws, freedom and prosperity that must prevail in this region, and so on.

We will simply place on record the undeniable sequence of unconditional facts:

– in October 2001, the U.S.A. began military action in Afghanistan against the Taliban;
– by the beginning of 2002, the U.S.A. defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan;
– on March 20th, 2003, the U.S.A. began military operations in Iraq;
– on April 9th, 2003, the U.S. troops took Baghdad;
– on May 9th, 2003, the U.S. President George W. Bush, speaking to graduates of the University of South Carolina, declared an intention of the U.S.A. to radically change the face of the entire Middle East.

Now the reader could justifiably reproach us in that by avoiding the conflict of interpretations, we focus excessively on the item-by-item examination of commonly-known facts. However, agreeing in general with the reader, we will nonetheless continue this thankless activity.

Firstly, because only on this path can one truly attempt to avoid a conflict of interpretations.

And, secondly, because modern society in general (and even the community of researchers debating one or another problem), focusing on an event that coincides with a specific time, leaves what preceded the event out of the scope of the discussion, even if what preceded it has a very direct connection with the event.

Thus, as we have already mentioned, on May 9th, 2003, George W. Bush spoke of a far-reaching – virtuous and ambitious – U.S. plan for the accelerated reconstruction of a huge and very complex region.
On November 6th, 2003, George W. Bush gave a keynote address at the National Endowment for Democracy on the global democratic revolution in the Middle East and Northern Africa; a revolution that the U.S.A. intends to support in connection with the inability of other ways to achieve the very desirable and virtuous goals of fulfilling the fundamental interests of the population of this vast region.

Once again we stipulate that in this speech, George W. Bush is quoted with a coherent presentation of the new American concept of a “Greater Middle East”: noble and unconditional things were spoken about, fully compatible with the traditional content of American politics. He himself linked his new program with the American mission to spread democracy around the world; that is, with what has always been the ideological axis of American foreign policy. Bush compared his doctrine with Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms”.

To call the desire of Americans to strengthen democratic institutions around the world, drawing on various resources (both informational and otherwise), a “conspiracy” or “intrigue” – is undignified in the least. All that we want to draw the reader’s attention to here is the unprecedented novelty of the “Greater Middle East” project, emphasized by the U.S. president himself. We emphatically draw the reader’s attention to the fact that it was the U.S. president himself who declared this unprecedented novelty, and that in drawing the reader’s attention to this, we speak of an undeniable fact that is beyond all possible interpretations. “Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East,” said Bush in his speech. “The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution”, he said.

We ask the reader again and again: is there even a shadow of interpretational bias in pointing out the words of the U.S. President? Moreover, where is the INTERPRETATION at all? Are these words really not an indisputable political FACT? As we say in such cases – a “fact of a statement”?

Bush goes very far in his statements. He insists that the policies pursued by Western countries in the Middle East for 60 years are wrong, that they did not bring any positive results, and that the root of this error is the desire to buy stability in the region at the cost of freedom.

Again we emphasize that in such statements there is not a gram of interpretive bias and no interpretation at all. It is not we who, thinking
up something for Bush, say that the American army’s capture of Baghdad was a turning point in the global democratic revolution. It is not we who assert with this that the global democratic revolution can and should use the U.S. armed forces as a necessary means. This is all said by the U.S. President. Let the reader him or herself read Bush’s speech that we are discussing and be assured that in stating all this, we act as a kind of “repository of statements”, and not at all as a “repository of interpretations”.

On the same day, November 6th, 2003, Condoleezza Rice, then the National Security Advisor for the U.S. President, commented on the speech of her chief. She repeated and expounded on the thesis of the futility of supporting authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in the name of stability and security.

A careful reading of George W. Bush’s statements and Condoleezza Rice’s commentary, which we have been discussing above, will allow the reader to arrive without difficulty at his or her own impression about the specific content of the super-project proposed by the senior U.S. political leadership and which is addressed to a very large and problematic mega-region extending from Morocco to Pakistan and from Turkey to Sudan.

We say without irony that such beneficial things like democracy and economic freedom have been prescribed for the entire region. It was assumed that such prescriptions would be able to overcome the growth of anti-American sentiment in the macro-region and facilitate the establishment of friendly democracies there. During implementation of the prescriptions, reliance on reformist forces, independent commissions to monitor elections, law firms, human rights groups, and other interest groups was assumed. It was also proposed to create new media oriented to the population of the region, and so on.

Not the U.S. president, not his national security adviser, and not the high-ranking experts extremely friendly to the president (Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Pearl, Wolfowitz, and others) actually conceal the similarity between this message of a mega-project addressed to the Middle East and the message of the previous mega-project addressed to countries suffering “under the heel of communism”.

In connection with our categorical intent to avoid a conflict of interpretations, we again emphasize that it is not we who speak of a corresponding similarity, but the authors of the “Greater Middle East” mega-project; that is, we again are not dealing with an interpretation,
but the fact of an explicated statement; a fact that it is simply impossible to ignore, regardless of the particular interpretive model into which one wants to integrate this fact.

In January 2004, the U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney announced at a summit of the economic elite in Davos: “Helping the people of the Greater Middle East overcome the democratic deficit is, ultimately, the key to winning the broader war on terror.”

In view of the task we have set ourselves, we again emphasize that it is not we, the interpreters, who speak of a shortfall of freedom in the “Greater Middle East”, the provision of the population of that region with American aid in filling this gap, but the U.S. Vice President. We only cite his specific speech and point out its time and place. Just this and nothing more.

2004 became the time of an American struggle for various U.S. partners’ correct understanding of the real content of the new mega-project initiative. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Marc Grossman, and other senior American officials undertook a tour with the aim of clarifying similar statements, which unequivocally testifies to the scale of interest of the U.S. leaders for the support of their momentous initiative.

Let us keep in mind, that not only leaders “inconvenient” for the U.S.A., such as Bashar al-Assad and Muammar Gaddafi, were opponents of the American initiative, but also traditional supporters of the U.S.A., the Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who later became the King of Saudi Arabia. The list of high-ranking opponents rapidly expanded. But the Americans, tirelessly worked to advance their brand new mega-project:

The disruption of the Arab League summit in Tunisia scheduled for March 29, 2004, in connection with the contradictory attitudes of participants towards the American mega-project...

The Berlin meeting between Condoleezza Rice and members of the Palestinian Authority, held May 17, 2004, in the course of which the new American approach was discussed: first the creation of the “right” institutions, preparation of the country for democratic elections, then creation of the state, not vice versa...

The interaction of Condoleezza Rice with reporters (in particular, with the correspondent of the Russian newspaper Izvestia) on the same day, May 17th, 2004... In the course of this communication, Rice again stressed the then U.S. leadership’s rejection of the American course
conducted in the region for 60 years, as well as called the authoritarian stability on which the U.S.A. previously relied a source of terrorist threat and “a cancer”. It is not difficult to familiarize oneself with this factual statement either through the original source or the material in Chapter 2 of this book, and having reviewed it, to recognize that reference to this fact introduces no interpretive bias into our discussion)... The failure of the new Arab League summit held May 22nd-23rd, 2004, in Tunisia, which did not bring the desired results for the Americans... The American plan for a full-scale presentation of the “Greater Middle East” project in June 2004 at the G-8 summit... The demonstrative absence at the summit of representatives of key countries in the “Greater Middle East”: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Kuwait... Criticism of the plan by European countries... Discussions leading the plan to a dead end on specific issues, including issues of financing the American mega-project... The urgency with which Condoleezza Rice (having become U.S. Secretary of State) and George Bush W. Bush (elected for a second term) spoke of a profound re-examination of all the constants of American policy pursued earlier in the region of interest to us... (The reader can also look at all this in detail in Chapter 2 of this book). The unconventional behavior of Condoleezza Rice in Palestine in 2005, essentially “giving the go-ahead” for Hamas’ participation in the elections... It all has no relation to a choice of one or another interpretive framework. There is no need to interpret it! At least at the start. You must simply look carefully, read carefully, and listen carefully to it. Is there any trace of conspiracy theory of the U.S.A.’s “sinister designs”? Is there any – even the most reservedly negative – interpretation of U.S. motives? And is there any interpretation in general or slanderous one in particular? Are we really slandering the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy James K. Glassman, claiming that he carried out the U.S. State Department’s “digital outreach team” informational program? Mr. Glassman himself announces this proudly! It is he, and not us, who narrates in detail how his predecessor, Karen Hughes, conceived this initiative; how he picked up the baton from her; how as far back as in 2006 (we request the reader to once again look at the undeniable political
calendar of events we have presented) U.S. President George W. Bush charged Karen Hughes with leading an interagency group on “the war of ideas”; how the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. intelligence community were included in this group at the directive of the U.S. President; and how the group created carried out the “project for the future of the Greater Middle East”... Glassman is proud of his initiative!

What did we add to this his haughty, unquestionable statements? Not a thing. At this stage absolutely no evaluation is needed. We do not want to discuss whether these initiatives were good or otherwise. We do not want at this stage to subject what is happening to any interpretation. We only ask whether Glassman said what we have listed here? Or do we implicate him and attribute something to him, pursuing our own tendentious purposes?

The fact of Glassman’s statement is undeniable. Anyone can confirm this – both by having read Chapter 4 of this book where it is all described in detail and by having examined the primary source.

Thus, in 2005 – 2006, the American leadership set out to create new means of waging a “war of ideas”. Moreover, all those to whom the war was entrusted relied on the plan of the “cold war” that was waged against the U.S.S.R. and expressed joyful readiness to implement the same war in connection with the new American mega-project in the Middle East. Here we convey only undeniable facts to the reader, and we invite you to familiarize yourself with the extensive information that proves we are talking precisely about a fact, and nothing more.

Categorically avoiding any kind of demonization of U.S. policy, we emphasize that the widely discussed documents presented by WikiLeaks and published in the newspaper The Daily Telegraph do not actually contain anything extraordinary. Yes, some activist of the April 6 Movement visited the campus of Columbia Law School in December 2008. Yes, he listened to the presentation of three key members of Barack Obama’s team, responsible for social networks – Joe Rospars, Scott Goodstein, and Sam Graham-Felsen. Yes, along with the Egyptian activist, other activists from around the world also listened to the presentations – from Colombia, Venezuela, and so on. Yes, the co-founder of Facebook himself, Justin Moskowitz, gave a speech to the activists. Yes, the president of Howcast, Jason Liebman, participated in the conference. Yes, the initiator of the idea of the conference was James Glassman.
But to what do these facts testify? To some sinister U.S. plot? Enough! This is one of the events in the framework of campaigns that have been carried out by the U.S.A. for decades and originate from the American irrevocable belief in its democratic mission in the world. Where is the “sinister conspiracy” here? We are discussing something far more significant – the continuity of U.S. policy on the issue of the Greater Middle East and the transfer of the baton in the implementation of this policy from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Although many other parameters of the course have been radically altered, on this issue there is continuity. Along with many others, it is embodied by the figure of James Glassman.

We emphasize that the scandalously discussed secret dispatch of Margaret Scooby, the U.S. ambassador in Egypt, means nothing in itself and is neither sinister nor unprecedented, and not even plain scandalous. However, in aggregate with the facts reported to the international community by Glassman it means a lot, and we repeat - not in the sense of “American machinations”, but in the sense of the continuity of American policy. Here there is pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt carried out by the U.S. State Department on the initiative of an Egyptian opposition leader... Here there are efforts of the State Department directed at ensuring meetings between an Egyptian opposition activist and senior U.S. officials... Here are the attempts of the Egyptian opposition activist to convince the Americans to pressure the Egyptian government by threatening to disclose information about the accounts of corrupt high-ranking Egyptian officials in offshore banks...

We are talking about a certain support from the United States for a certain kind of Egyptian opposition figure, apparently intending to displace the President of Egypt, Mubarak, who was seemingly friendly to the U.S. But was he friendly? After all, if the U.S. seriously intends to carry out its “Greater Middle East” mega-project (and no doubt as to the seriousness of this intention seems to arise, does it?), then in the context of this initiative Hosni Mubarak simply cannot be as friendly to the U.S.A. as he was before such an initiative was set in place. If the U.S.A. persistently talks of a fundamental change in all the policies it has carried out for 60 years, then the one who was a friend of the U.S.A. under the old policy could become anyone under the new policy, including the enemy.

On February 11th, 2011, Barack Obama said in connection with the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak: “And while the sights and sounds
that we heard were entirely Egyptian, we can’t help but hear the echoes of history – echoes from Germans tearing down a wall...”

In this public speech of the current U.S. president, who has problematized virtually all the component policies of his predecessor, much more was said than in Scooby’s secret messages; or rather, not said, but confirmed. Since the very beginning of the implementation of the American “Greater Middle East” mega-project, this mega-project has been compared to the Cold War against the U.S.S.R. He essentially followed the template of that war, about which U.S. policymakers and the highest officials themselves spoke openly. The first wave of the global democratic revolution ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist system and the U.S.S.R. This was the first U.S. triumph in the framework of global democratization; that is, what was called “perestroika” in the U.S.S.R.

The events in Egypt, or rather, in the whole Greater Middle East, following one after another with incredible speed and repeating the political typology of one another, are the second wave of global democratic revolution; that is, what may fully be called “Perestroika-2”. Once again we emphasize that it is not a tendentious interpretation of American actions that talks of this. The authors themselves talk of these actions; moreover, in a purely complementary manner (for example, we direct you to the tasks set by George Bush in 2005: “We’re encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform.... We’re standing with dissidents and exiles against oppressive regimes, because we know that the dissidents of today will be the democratic leaders of tomorrow”

But in implementing a second wave of global democratic revolution, it is impossible not to ask the key question of what forces will come to power on the crest of this second wave, already referred to as a “political Islamic tsunami”.

After all, you must agree, by definition there cannot be the mega-project that does not contain an answer to this question. Still more, that a very great deal has been already revealed to the gaze of those carrying out the mega-project – the radicalization of Iraq, the growing influence of Iran in connection with the destruction of the Iraqi-Iranian balance of power, the questionable results of democratization in most parts of the territory of the U.S.S.R., and so on.

If the goal is democracy and prosperity, even if it is provided with the help of military intervention, as in Iraq (the axis of the global
democratic revolution), then it is impossible to juxtapose reality with such a virtuous aim. It is impossible not to see that this goal has not been reached, and it is impossible not to wonder why it has not been achieved. Otherwise, either the marginal narrowing of consciousness must be spoken of (which is hardly the case), or the presence of highly pragmatic goals along with the ideal, and about the absolute dominance of these pragmatic goals, which is always the case in Realpolitik. But then what pragmatic goals are we talking about?

In the case of “Perestroika-1”, which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the socialist world system, the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., and so on, the pragmatic goals were clear. It was the weakening of the most dangerous geopolitical and ideological adversary, which of course was the Soviet Union, which headed the world communist system.

Who is such a pragmatic enemy whom the U.S.A. in smashing in the course of “Perestroika-2”? Which, we recall once again, the highest officials of the U.S. administration openly compare to “Perestroika-1”? We emphasize that we are talking about the discussion of a crushed or successfully attacked pragmatic super-enemy, and not about achieving ideal goals. Incidentally, we do not deny the existence of U.S. idealistic goals and we do not impinge upon the American dream of achieving the “City on the Hill” of its global democratic mission.

But if we are talking about this mission and about the achievement of some ideal goals in the framework of this mission, it is necessary to analyze the correspondence of these goals to the results achieved in Iraq; that is, to ask the same key questions about the forces brought to power as a result of the second wave of the global democratic revolution.

If we are talking about pragmatics, then it is necessary to carry out a pragmatic, analytical hermeneutics of what is happening, as Ricoeur would have said; that is, to venture onto the shaky ground of interpretations.

Wanting to avoid this to the utmost degree and in the maximal part of our investigation, we will take into use the U.S. version, according to which everything is driven by ideal goals – in the service of global democracy and global prosperity. We say this without any inner irony. We just want to relate this version with certain facts that respond to the question of which forces should, in the opinion of the Americans themselves, come to power in the Middle East as a result of the second wave of the global democratic revolution that is “Perestroika-2”.

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Moreover, we want to remain on factual territory as before and avoid any interpretations inasmuch as it is possible.

The authoritative statements in this case we call facts, which can be checked and which have all the necessary attributes — a source, a date, and so on.

On February 10th, 2011, such an authoritative source as Fox News familiarized us with the speech of the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper at a meeting of the Committee on National Security in the House of Representatives: “The term “Muslim Brotherhood”... is an umbrella term for a variety of movements, in the case of Egypt, a very heterogeneous group, largely secular, which has eschewed violence and has decried al-Qaeda as a perversion of Islam”.

This was not said by us, but by James Clapper, a representative of the American establishment, of the intelligence community, a senior official, by definition possessing access to all these materials and the highest level of competence. This high-ranking person says that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are representatives of the secular part of the population? And this is listened to at a meeting of the Committee on National Security in the House of Representatives?

Targeting our book at the competent reader, we give him or her this unprecedented, you must agree, factual statement, and out of reasons of tact, we refrain from commentary, but not from attempts to answer the question: “Why would official people say something like that in an official place?”

As for the real Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Palestine (Hamas, as we have already stated, is simply a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), Syria, and so on, then here we refer the reader to Chapters 6 and 7 as well as to Part II of this book, where objective information is provided on this topic that cannot be unknown to Mr. Clapper and to the other high-ranking officials, whose statements we now turn to.

On March 4th, 2011, The Washington Post reported: “The White House’s internal assessment, dated Feb. 16, looked at the Muslim Brotherhood’s and al-Qaeda’s views on global jihad, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States, Islam in politics, democracy and nationalism, among others. The report draws sharp distinctions between the ambitions of the two groups, suggesting that the Brotherhood’s mix of Islam and nationalism make it a far different organization than al-Qaeda.... If our policy can’t distinguish between al-Qaeda and the Muslim...
Brotherhood, we won’t be able to adapt to this change,’ the senior administration official said.\(^\text{37}\)

To adapt to changes? But what is the goal of American policy? Implementation of the global democratic mission (which is the second wave of the global democratic revolution, no longer localized on the territory of the U.S.S.R. and the world system of socialism, but on the territory of the Greater Middle East) — is this adaptation to changes?

Incidentally, before we answer that question, we will take a look at one more factual statement.

On March 26\(^{th}\), 2011, the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, responding to a question from the TV channel Rossiya about the fact that in the wake of the second global democratic revolution radical Islamists could come to power in a number of states in the Middle East, he stated the following: “What people vote for, they get”\(^{38}\).

Thus, the global democratic mission of the U.S.A. may have as its ideal goal the coming to power of radical Islamists. So what? What would be the pragmatic outcome of this arrival? Is the U.S.A. ready for the pragmatic costs arising from this course of events that is in many respects inevitable?

Before we introduce the reader to another factual statement, we want to stipulate the following. The author of the remark we are going to discuss is the financier George Soros. George Soros, contrary to those we quoted earlier, is in no way an official, and he does not reflect the official line. All too often the actions of George Soros run counter to official U.S. policy. It would be possible not to attach any weight to Soros’ statements if those statements were not in accordance with the profound statements by Gates and Clapper. But insofar as this correspondence exists, we believe it is not superfluous, having made this stipulation, to acquaint the reader with Soros’ statement and to present the reader with the opportunity to independently assess the extent to which this statement is “politically relevant”, as the analysts say. In our view, the statement has at least greater than zero relevance, but this is only our point of view, and nothing more. But let us make a transition from our point of view to the statement.

On February 3\(^{rd}\), 2011, The Washington Post published George Soros’ article “Why Obama Has to Get Egypt Right”. The article says: “...the best-organized political opposition that managed to survive in that country’s repressive environment is the Muslim Brotherhood. In free elections, the Brotherhood is bound to emerge as a major political force, though it is far
from assured of a majority. ... President Obama personally and the United States as a country have much to gain by moving out in front and siding with the public demand for dignity and democracy. This would help rebuild America’s leadership and remove a lingering structural weakness in our alliances that comes from being associated with unpopular and repressive regimes. Most important, doing so would open the way to peaceful progress in the region. ... As a committed advocate of democracy and open society, I cannot help but share in the enthusiasm that is sweeping across the Middle East. ... My foundations are prepared to contribute what they can.”

On February 6th, 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview with the American National Public Radio (NPR): “I think the Egyptian people are looking for an orderly transition that can lead to free and fair elections. That’s what the United States has consistently supported. The people themselves and the leaders of various groups within Egyptian society will ultimately determine whether it is or is not meeting their needs. Today we learned the Muslim Brotherhood has decided to participate, which suggests that they are now involved in the dialogue that we have encouraged.”

We leave it to the reader to judge, to what extent the coincidence of Soros’ point of view with the view of the following persons is random: Clapper, Director of National Intelligence (recall, his point of view was made known on February 10th, 2011); the authors of a secret report commissioned by the White House (recall, the report was made on February, 16th, 2011); the opinion of a high-ranking representative of the U.S. administration about the need to distinguish between al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, voiced in The Washington Post on March 4th, 2011; and the views expressed by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on March 26th, 2011.

We will also present the reader with the opportunity to decide for him or herself whether the U.S.A. can carry out ambitious mega-projects such as the “Greater Middle East”, the second global democratic revolution, and so on, if as a result the pragmatic interests of the United States suffer? Will these projects receive the support of the U.S. elite in this case (Congress, for example)? Will the taxpayer’s money be utilized in the project?

Only in order to help the reader form their own estimate, we will introduce him or her to a few factual statements.

contends: “The next months, indeed years, are bound to be turbulent. Yet that turbulence is preferable to the false stability of autocracy…”

Preferable for whom? About how many “next years” are we talking about? Three? Five? If one can talk of the next years, then one can talk about the next decades. In any case, from a pragmatic point of view, this statement is difficult to explain. It combines well with the position of Steven Mann, an intellectual close to Condoleezza Rice and George Bush, who studies the theory of manageable chaos. But is it not possible in an attempt to explain the meaning of the statement, and indeed the entire project of the second global democratic revolution with a radical Islamist face, that addresses U.S. interests — to use not Steven Mann’s theory or a concept of George Soros, but something more authoritative for the current American political leadership?

Trying to find this “something”, we are confronted with the concepts of Brzezinski, who is rather close to Barack Obama’s team and to the current U.S. President himself.

In 2007, Brzezinski’s book Second Chance is published, in which this high-ranking expert who is strongly involved in current policy introduces the concept of a “global political awakening”. The essence of the concept is as follows: there is a beginning of a global political awakening of the third world countries (compare with the “second wave of the global democratic revolution”). The global political awakening at the moment is anti-American in character. It is necessary to change this character, entering into an alliance with Islam, which is the locomotive of the global political awakening. Otherwise, the main competitor of the U.S. in the 21st century — China — will obtain special opportunities.

In Chapter 5 of our book the reader could find the detailed description of Brzezinski’s concept. To familiarize oneself with this concept further, one could read Brzezinski’s book and get assured that the summary of the meaning of his work presented here is in no way biased.

And here’s another fact (or, as we say, “factual statement”) — an interview with Paul Craig Roberts, former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury in the administration of Ronald Reagan, given to the Iranian Press TV. On April 26, 2011 Roberts, said: “We don’t want to overthrow the government in Bahrain or in Saudi Arabia where both governments are using violence against protesters because they’re our puppets and we have a large naval base in Bahrain. We want to overthrow Gaddafi and Assad in Syria because we want to clear China and Russia out
of the Mediterranean. China has massive energy investments in eastern Libya and is relying on Libya along with Angola and Nigeria for energy needs. This is an American effort to deny resources to China just as Washington and London denied resources to the Japanese in the 1930s”.

Further, Roberts refers to the IMF report, which stated that “the ‘Age of America’ is over and that the American economy will be bypassed by China in five years and then the US will become the second largest economy rather than first”. On this basis, Washington seeks to “block China’s acquisition of resources in order to make the development of the Chinese economy slow down. This is a major reason why the CIA has been active in eastern Libya and it’s the reason protests broke out in the east not in the capital like in the other Arab countries and it’s the reasons it’s armed”.

Roberts points out that the process of the eviction of China from Libya is in full swing: out of the 30,000 Chinese who were in Libya before the start of military operations, 29,000 had already been evacuated, “the Chinese companies are losing hundreds of millions (dollars) from this intervention. They have 50 massive investments there all going down the drain…”

By driving out the Chinese, the U.S.A. simultaneously punishes Gaddafi, “It’s also payback to Gaddafi for refusing to join the US Africa Command (AfriComm). It became operative in 2008 and was the American response to China’s penetration of Africa… Gaddafi refused to participate — he said it was an act of imperialism trying to purchase an entire continent”, said Roberts.

Once again: this is not our interpretation of what is happening; this is the statement of a competent and respectable person, the former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury and now the a regular columnist of The Washington Times.

We contemplate over and over again this aggregate of facts, and complement the aggregate with two simple theoretical constructs.

The first is the principle of action. Society is a system. Upon rendering one or another action – be it a power, political, financial or multidimensional action – on a system, the subject of that influence generates a response. This response does not correspond to an abstract expectations of the subject as to how it should be, but to the real system parameters. In political terms, the most important parameter of a system is the alignment of forces. He who has an influence cannot speak of society as an object of that influence in an abstract, sentimental way. Any society is specific and consists of particular forces. By suppressing
some of these forces, the one who influences strengthens other forces. These are not abstract punditry, but the ABCs of Realpolitik, which, incidentally, George Soros is well aware of.

Suppression of Mubarak, Gaddafi, Al-Assad, or other politicians of the region related to those authoritarian, semi-secular forces usually referred to in political science as the “military” – acts to strengthen not the pro-American liberal reformists who are infinitely weak in the Greater Middle East, but radical Islam. There is already the experience of Iraq that shows this to be precisely so. Before the Americans entered Iraq, we warned the Nixon Foundation, whose representatives visited our Experimental Creative Centre. You can pick up materials and confirm that all our warnings were one hundred percent valid. Later, the legitimacy of such logic was recognized by all – right up to the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

And what happened? Having stepped on this rake, as they say in Russia, and having received experimental proof of the validity of this theory of influence, the Americans once again act, not realizing what it will lead to? The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton candidly admits she does not know what the military action in Libya carried out by the U.S.A. and other countries will lead to. But based on the theory of influence, it is clear what it will lead to: the strengthening of other real forces operating in Libya, which are either Senussi and associated local terrorist Islamic organizations or... or al-Qaeda. In any case, the Islamic radicalization of Libya will be established.

Does the U.S.A. act with a focus on this result because it meets the pragmatic interests of the U.S.A.? Yes or no? If it meets them, than what are they?

Does the U.S.A. act with a focus on this result because it corresponds to the U.S. mission? What is that mission? A global democratic mission with the face of bin Laden?

From the first simple theoretical construct we proceed to the second, which is just as simple and obvious.

The U.S. proposes democratization with the help of one life-saving action: the holding of free democratic elections. Could this be a means of salvation, for example, in feudal Russia? Or in slave-owning Greece? Or in archaic tribal states, for example, in Africa? Everyone knows that in the aforementioned cases, free elections would not lead to any democratic system of life. For example, in Greece, there existed democracy – but not for the slaves. If you interfere in ancient Sparta,
overthrow Spartan authoritarianism, and offer free choice, you will reproduce and reinforce the entire structure of the slave society. It is so often discussed by eminent political thinkers that it is hardly worth discussing such an obvious matter in more detail. It is better to turn directly to what this implies.

In order for free democratic elections to create a quasi-Western democratic modern society, it is necessary to carry out modernization; that is, destruction of the traditional — archaic, patriarchal — society. When this society is destroyed; when the respective prejudices fall and their place is taken by the law as the primary regulator of life; when the barriers between social classes collapse; and when the free, rational individual arises; then and only then will free elections become both desirable and necessary, and most importantly — they will consolidate the sought-after structure of society and provide the sought-after social dynamics.

Consequently, first modernization, that is, the transformation of traditional society into a modern one, and then — free elections. Otherwise, the result will be counterproductive. Traditionalism will be strengthened and the clamps that connect the social fabric will be torn down, insofar as we are talking about a kind of modern society. If the resources of traditionalism are insufficient, then not only the state will fall apart, but also society, for example, into tribes. There is a high probability that this could happen in Libya and in the Cote d'Ivoire.

Americans have been totally guided by this theory, creating some ostensibly corrupt schemes in the preceding decades. So what, has this theory now been abandoned? Has the principle of exerting influence also ceased to function? Why?

Posing these questions, we inevitably turn from the territory of facts to the territory of interpretations. And by offering one possible interpretation, we express a sincere desire to familiarize ourselves with other interpretations, provided of course that they do not contradict the facts, elementary common sense, and the simplest and most obvious theoretical calculations.
Chapter 10. The Territory of Interpretations

In proceeding to this territory, we are again attempting to avoid any extreme judgments. With this aim in mind, we will begin by concentrating on a discussion of what is called political technology. That is to say our focus will not be on that which answers the question “Why is this done?” Instead, our focus will be on that which answers the question “What is in fact being done?” As well as the question “How is it done?”

All experts in this field note the incredibly packed schedule of the so-called “political tsunami,” the vast number of political excesses witnessed in the states of the Muslim world. Objections that maintain that revolutions always take place along the lines of a chain reaction (also known as “the domino principle”) are not terribly convincing, as such chain reactions occur over a period of several years, rather than two months. In cases where the density of events is so great, rather than referring to the contagious nature of a revolutionary example, one should consider the significant influence of the technological basis of the events being studied.

There is a great deal that should be added to a statement of this kind. For example, the analysis of the price dynamics for foodstuffs. And it should be remembered that price dynamics is to some extent conditioned by the operations of stock market speculators. However, in examining the nature of what has occurred, we should focus on the most obvious factors.

Therefore, we'll set aside problematic components of what occurred and note that Mubarak managed to achieve high rates of growth in Egypt, even in 2008; that by ensuring these rates, he was able to harmonize the interests of the rich and poor strata of the population to a certain degree; that at the moment of the beginning of the Egyptian events, the well-to-do segment of Egyptian society was not groaning under the thumb of a monstrous regime, but spent their time comfortably in overflowing cafes and restaurants; and that the poor segment of society experienced many hardships of course, but also had certain preferences nonetheless, for example, in the form of especially cheap bread for the poor. And so on.

As for Libya, Mr. Gaddafi had managed to solve a huge number of social problems there: problems of socio-economic development and problems of harmonization of the interests of very different strata of the population. All experts, including experts from the UN, are certain that
Mr. Gaddafi has progressed much further in addressing these issues than the vast majority of governments in the African continent.

Thus, what is the procedure that enables masses that are not driven to despair to be set in motion? There are always contradictions in any society. And in Egypt not just contradictions existed. There we have all grounds to speak of sufficiently acute contradictions, yet still insufficient to be the self-sufficient detonators of what occurred.

Of course, technological aspects and aspects of manageability are interwoven in any process — as is the spontaneous energy of discontent. Of course, Mubarak’s regime engendered the spontaneous energy of discontent, just as any regime of a similar type. Of course there existed a hatred of the regime and dissatisfaction of the general public. But all this was only the organic preconditions with the help of which the huge political process that we observe could be set in motion.

In the theory of systems of this kind, the process is called “natural oscillations”. The theory asserts that natural oscillations by themselves are almost always insufficient to initiate a process, and that upon natural oscillations must be superimposed so-called “forced oscillations”, whose frequency should coincide with the frequency of the natural oscillations. This coincidence is often called the “political resonance”. This type of political resonance is almost always necessary. And only very rarely, in especially adverse, catastrophic situations, can a full-fledged political process be initiated solely by its own natural oscillations; that is, the spontaneous discontent which is superimposed upon the dysfunction of the authorities generated by the catastrophe.

In Egypt, there was obviously neither a catastrophe nor organic dysfunction of the authorities.

So what was there then?

Do the facts that we have already discussed not allow us to put forward a hypothesis according to which in Egypt there was a resonance between its own internal vibrations, engendered by numerous political contradictions, and certain compelling vibrations - the Big Middle East plan, the second wave of the “global democratic revolution,” “global political awakening” - and so on?

Why must we talk only of external influences (compelling vibrations alone), or only of the natural course of events (internal vibrations)? Why can’t we examine a combination of both?

As evidence we can cite another proposition, this one coming from an extremely authoritative Muslim leader, Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti
Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al-Sheikh: “The stimulation of agitation between people and their leaders in these protests is aimed at striking at the basis of the nation and destroying it...” The protests in Egypt and Tunisia—induced by poverty and unemployment—“hit” the economies of the Muslim states, “in order to turn them into backward countries”.

I would like to stress to readers that this is not the opinion of a run of the mill Islamic authority—it is the opinion of the head mufti of the country where Mecca and Medina, holy sites for all Muslims, are located. Why shouldn’t we pay heed to his words? And why should we set up a conflict between two extreme interpretations when there is a clear case for something that lies between the two?

It is well known that the senior manager in the Middle Eastern department of Google, Wael Ghonim, influenced the process in Egypt. Having been freed following his arrest on suspicion of organizing mass protests in Egypt, Ghonim himself stated in an interview with an English mass media outlet that he had created a Facebook page “against Mubarak’s regime”, which was visited by 375,000 people. He stated that he had created it in order to bring about Mubarak’s overthrow.

Are we to ignore such a statement? Nobody, after all, would claim that Ghonim gathered 375,000 people together on Facebook at random, in the context of idyllic political and social conditions within the country. Nowhere is idyl! Meanwhile, the Israeli minister for information Yuli Edelshtein appealed to the founder of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, with a request that he not publish mass calls for another intifada. We didn’t mishear, did we? The Israeli minister asked for this. For what? That external influences on Israel’s internal situation not be created.

We are not saying that Ghonim is an instrument or agent of the U.S. government. We are merely pointing out the clear presence of external influences, of compelling vibrations. These vibrations are being created by a major international corporation, or a government, or an international financier with a complex and ambiguous communications system, or a “team for digital external contacts”... In any event, we are dealing here with external compelling influences that are always brought about with internal contradictions—the system’s own vibrations—having been taken into account. That is an obligatory component of political technology. And you would have to be a very naïve person, or a person willfully avoiding a serious discussion of the subject, to declare that the obvious components of the same process are mutually exclusive.
To be fair, we should also specify that certain representatives of the American elite (first and foremost Republicans) attempted to protect Mubarak. It is a self-evident fact that he was defended by Frank Wisner, an authoritative retired diplomat from a very respectable American family.

Wisner tried to convince the American leaders that Mubarak could and should be left in power at least until the end of a brief “transitional period”. It was only this, as a matter of fact, that Mubarak requested of the so-called international community. However, at the last moment President Obama nonetheless decided to insist on the immediate departure of Mubarak. That is, he effected a doubtlessly political – neither ad hoc advisory or informational support, nor organizational, but political support for the opponents of Mubarak.

In looking at the essence of what is happening, we can examine another, fairly obvious, brand of political technology.

To this end, we will analyze the political structure of Egyptian society. In this society, there are several specific strata.

The first and highest stratum is the elite. It is the political leadership as such, personified by the figure of Mubarak and a narrow circle of his relatives and close associates.

The second stratum is the repressive apparatus. Sometimes it is not entirely correctly called the “military”.

The third stratum is the westernized minority of Egyptian society, sometimes not entirely correctly called the “middle class”.

The fourth stratum is the lower classes of Egyptian society, its traditionalist majority.

The second stratum – the repressive apparatus – is the key one. This apparatus can crush any popular revolt, even if the middle class and the traditionalist majority of Egyptian society are united in the framework of the rebellion.

However, with the rise of corruption in the repressive apparatus, the dependence of this apparatus on external forces also grows. After all, corrupt officials do not hide their money only on the territory of Egypt. They transport this money beyond Egypt’s borders. And they tend to stow the exported resources not only in “black” offshore accounts. Sooner or later, the entire system of accounts in which the resources of the corrupt officials are stowed beyond Egypt’s borders becomes transparent to the outside observer. The phenomenon arises not just of corruption, but of an “account-cracy”; that is, a community of holders
of large accounts abroad. This community is managed by particular resources externally. How exactly can be understood from the above-mentioned report of the ambassador Scooby, revealed by WikiLeaks: an Egyptian opposition member, in a conversation with American diplomats, called for representatives of the U.S. administration to use information on accounts to block repressive apparatus.

Finally, a kind of moment of truth arises. Leverage on the accounts will lead to deactivation of the repressive apparatus. Before that deactivation, the apparatus acts savagely and anti-democratically. And after the deactivation, it is filled with infinite respect for democracy and human rights. Having been filled with respect, the apparatus refuses to suppress political incidents.

In order to initiate incidents, westernized liberal movements such as April 6 are sufficient. That is, movements that have a straightforward, natural association with the so-called external forces. WikiLeaks described almost the entire structure of these links, moreover again down to the details.

But at the moment when it is necessary to not just initiate incidents, but also unleash them in full power, westernized liberal movements are insufficient. Also insufficient at that moment of deployment are the mechanisms for ensuring direct and natural links between exterior forces and the representatives of so-called civil society.

Then is necessary to activate the traditionalist, fundamentalist part of society, not through Twitter or Facebook, not through civilian cells and social networks, but through networks of an entirely different kind: through networks of fundamentalist mosques controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. And this is what was done.

After that, the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood cannot fail to be taken into account, or those of other radical forces involved in the process of the described format.

Characteristically, the capability of westernized liberal forces is always sufficient only for initiation of the process, because these forces are a kind of thin film. They are rather weak. They have a difficult relationship with the majority of Egyptian society. That is why sooner or later – and here George Soros is absolutely right – there will be talk of the transfer of power from the military, personified by the figure of Mubarak, to fundamentalists.

That’s exactly how it happened in Iraq, where power was transferred de facto from Saddam Hussein and the Baath party, that is, from the
secular authoritative elite and the military, to the Sunni and Shiite radicals. Having obtained this result in Iraq and having denounced it in Iraq, is it possible to influence other countries in a similar manner and expect a different result? Is it possible to act thus, for example, in Egypt and Libya?

Why didn’t opponents of the authorities get the power support in Egypt, yet did so in Libya? Because in Egypt the repressive apparatus was blocked completely, whereas in Libya it was blocked only to a small degree. Since it was blocked only to a small degree, Gaddafi began to win over his opponents. And everyone saw that when in a country destined to be destabilized the authorities achieve victory, its opponents begin to be provided with support by force. It is provided precisely then and only then. Imagine the urgency of desire of hasty dismantling of the political system of the entire macro-region, if the delay of this dismantling prompts the resolve to such unpopular steps. That, in a situation where the similar actions have just been denounced, and that the current political reputation of the U.S. President is based on the repudiation of such steps (as is the Nobel Peace Prize).

Apparently, there is talk of an extreme degree of political, even strategic necessity. But then what gives rise to this extreme degree of necessity? A commitment to democracy?

But can we call what is happening now in Egypt democracy? Can we consider democratic the announcement of the new Prime Minister Essam Sharaf, appointed by the military, that he will act only at the behest of the revolutionary youth, who represent the only legitimate segment of the Egyptian people?

When one segment of society is legitimate, and the other is not, can we speak of democracy? Can we speak of it if the million people who took to the streets mean more than the 80 million who did not?

Can we speak of it if “revolutionary youth” (or whoever stands behind them), according to long-established patterns, release criminals from prison, who are by no means involved only in the theft of goods from stores?

We will never know exactly how many people were killed in Egypt, or at least, not for a long time. People arriving from Egypt speak of atrocious acts committed by criminals at the instruction of the “revolutionary youth”. Egyptian tourism will be in disarray for a long time. It is unlikely that anyone from outside will compensate for the “holes in the budget” to the necessary degree.
Condoleezza Rice says that turbulence, that is chaos, will remain for years in Egypt and in the entire macro-region. But it is characteristic of turbulence to spread, engulfing more and more areas. What if the energy of chaos spreads to a substantial part of the greater Islamic arc, which stretches from Malaysia and the Philippines to Algeria? What other regions will be affected by the events? What exactly will begin to eddy in these regions?

In the North Caucasus, terrorist activity grows with each passing month. What will happen there with the heating up of the greater Islamic arc? What will happen in Central Asia? In other regions?

And what, nevertheless, is the significance of such a large-scale and such a desired, as we see, process? What does the introduction of such a profound adjustment in the assessment of the factor of radical Islamism mark? We emphasize – not the Islamic factor in general, but the factor of radical Islamism in particular?

Turning from the recording of events, facts, and statements to interpretation, modeling, and prognosis, we are obliged to stipulate the hypothetical nature of all of our constructs. But in science in general and in political science in particular, there is no way of constructing models free from hypotheses. The question lies only in the extent to which we can confirm a hypothesis, justify it, and finally transform it into a political theory, while remaining at the same time internally uninhibited; that is, ready at any moment to abandon the theoretical constructs if they come into conflict with reality.

The hypothesis we put forth is as follows.

There are signs of the end of a certain epoch that has lasted for about five hundred years. Quite a lot speaks to the fact that this epoch is coming to an end.

Some, it’s true, limit themselves to asserting the conclusion of a rather short epoch, called the “Yalta” epoch.

Others speak of the conclusion of a much longer epoch, named the “Westphalian” epoch (alternatively – the epoch of national sovereignties, nation-states, and so on).

What if in actuality an even longer phase of historical development is coming to an end? A phase which many call the “Modern Age” or the “Age of modernity”?

We have already discussed questions concerning the relationship between democratization and modernization in Chapter 9. In order to
move forward on this issue, we will provide strict definitions of the concepts we use.

**Pre-Modern, Modern, Counter-Modern, and Post-Modern are types of society which are characterized by particular norms and principles governing social life.**

**Modern** is a type of society governed by: a) secular national law; b) secularization of public life; c) atomization (individualization); d) industrialization, and so on. Society of Modern is sometimes referred to as industrial or even bourgeois (but with certain qualifications).

**Pre-Modern** is a type of society preceding Modern and governed by: a) religion, b) tradition, c) social class corporativity, d) the predominance of an agricultural way of life. Pre-Modern society is sometimes referred to as traditional or agrarian.

**Counter-Modern** is a type of society similar to Pre-Modern, but artificially implanted in the Modern and Post-Modern epoch.

**Post-Modern** is a type of society that forms on the wreckage of Modern and problematizes the basic principles of social governance.

Types of society can be formed spontaneously or on the basis of a clear conception. A conception in line with which a society of a certain type is created is a project.

Modern, Counter-Modern, and Post-Modern have been actualized to the greatest extent on the basis of a conception, which allows us to speak of the Modern project, the Counter-Modern project, and the Post-Modern project.

The actualization of the Modern project is “modernization”.

Having given these definitions, we can begin to examine rather complicated, but certainly not groundless conceptual and analytical hypotheses, having stressed that this is a hypothesis — nothing more and nothing less.

What if we are speaking of the conclusion of the Modern epoch and of the beginning of an entirely different epoch? What if all these restructurings, global revolutions, and global political awakenings are just a phase in the development of a mega-process leading to a profound reorganization of the world? A mega-process in which there is again room for both forced and natural oscillations?
If this is so, then we are as if standing on a narrow bridge connecting very different historical epochs. Or, more precisely, we are located at the junction of the concluding epoch (and therefore possessing distinct historical characteristics) and the beginning epoch (hence, by definition, possessing no such characteristics).

Most likely, the transitional period has certain variability. And in this sense, it is possible to say that we are at a divarication between the Modern epochs. Yes, not an epoch, but epochs. In such cases, the choice of path determines what the new time will become and in what world our children and grandchildren will live. We can make one choice and find ourselves in one new political dimension and one new historical epochality. And we can make another choice and find ourselves in another dimension and another epochality. Humanity is not always provided the opportunity for such a choice. But the moment we live in, by all appearances, presents us with this opportunity.

The content of the departing epoch is an all-encompassing and singular project without alternatives, according to which there is only modernity in the world and nothing more. In accordance with the Modern project, the entire world moves towards progress and humanism. We will all progress sooner or later. We can develop from a low to high level of productive forces, or from a high level to the highest. But sooner or later we will be there, at the top, and we will all be humanized, progressive, and merged into a single humanity. That is the Modern epoch.

It has indeed lasted about five hundred years. And if it now comes to an end, if evident are both its internal fatigue and its opponents’ aspiration to nullify the historical period still allotted to it, then it is possible to speak of the dismantling of the Modern; a dismantling that is carried out deliberately, with an eye to the objective factors inducing its fatigue and its readiness to crumble under the weight of accumulated internal contradictions.

How do the presence of such contradictions and the hypothesis of deliberate dismantling of the existing world order relate to each another? In our view, the relationship is approximately the same as between the structure of a demolished house and the explosive devices located within it. Not one professional demolition man will implode a house without taking into account its configuration and vulnerable points as well as the degree of wear of its support structures. And that means there is no contradiction between the hypothesis of dismantling the Modern and the high level of wear associated with its historical era.
To the contrary, only a madman, a romantic, or an adventurer can entertain the dismantling of an epoch in its prime possessing a high degree of internal stability and an unbarred historical perspective.

But if the Modern epoch is being dismantled (we emphasize once again – with an eye to its historical fatigue), then on the strength of what reasons? Who has it ceased to accommodate and why?

We will begin with the fact that if modernity has somehow ceased to accommodate someone, than this “someone” (if, of course, we speak of a real entity and not a sinister, lurking conspirator) will necessarily declare themselves openly, and will begin to justify their intentions to carry out the “historical dismantling” we discuss.

Has anyone begun to speak seriously about the need to close the books on the Modern epoch?

Yes, undoubtedly. Since time of their first reports, the Club of Rome has talked seriously about this, basing the impossibility of living further according to the laws of modernity on fundamental global constraints (stress on the ecology of the planet, the depletion of nonrenewable resources, and so on). No one intends to accuse the Club of Rome of a deliberate hoax. It goes without saying that ecological problems and the problems of resources are unbelievably acute. Nonetheless, does all this only come down to the objective severity of these problems? Or are we also dealing with something else?

This “something else” is fairly obvious. Simply not everyone wants to put the question squarely. We will risk doing this, stipulating that we are deliberately sharpening the problem within the framework of discussing one possible hypothesis. Nothing more than this, and nothing less.

Within the framework of the Modern, which allows new great countries such as India and China active status, all developing nation-states have the inalienable right to provide their citizens – as a prize for their accelerated growth – with a high living standard. Let us assume that the great developing countries will manage, successfully actualizing their national Modern projects in the framework of humanity’s modernity, to provide their citizens (even if in the longer historical perspective) with all that a citizen of Europe or the U.S.A. now possesses. Well, for example, a private house, two cars per family, and so on.

In this case, what will happen to nonrenewable resources? To gasoline, which must be poured into 6-7 billion new cars? To energy, which must be procured from somewhere in order to ensure the proper functioning of 2-3 billion new private houses?
Here is an obvious strategic problem, yet one not under discussion. But there is also a problem less strategic, yet possessing a certain pragmatic significance.

Modern as a historical epoch possesses certain rules or laws. One of these laws is the law of uneven development. Young nation-states, successfully playing by the rules of the Modern epoch, sooner or later catch up and overtake the old states that were previously leading. Thus, by the beginning of the First World War, the young German state began to catch up to and overtake the old leader — the British Empire.

As of today, the old leader, having won key positions fairly within the framework of the game established by the Modern epoch, is the United States of America.

But the rules of the game are such that a young leader cannot fail to appear. This leader in the eyes of the entire world will be the People’s Republic of China, which, in turn, looks back at another young player — India.

In such a statement there is not an ounce of alarmism and no attempt to demonize what is taking place. This is so because that is the way the world is; because in the framework of this world order, that is, in the framework of the Modern epoch, a young, powerful, and successful state will necessarily begin to overtake the leader.

The question is one — how will the leader behave? What will it do, if the rules of the Modern epoch oblige it to pass on the baton of leadership, yet it does not want to and cannot do this? Does not the temptation to cardinally change the rules arise? Given that modernity’s fatigue allows this to be done in principle.

We turn from these general constructs to the phenomenon of interest to us — the heating-up of the Greater Islamic arc.

In the United States there have existed and there exist two main stratagems.

One, relatively speaking, is the stratagem of the Republican Party or “Henry Kissinger’s signature dish”, according to which the Middle East rests on the following whales: Israel, Egypt, Turkey to some degree, and on stable military regimes, about which it has long been said: “Son of a bitch, but our son of a bitch”; that is, on secular authoritarianism.

The other stratagem that underlies, for the purpose of discussion, the Democratic party’s game or “Zbigniew Brzezinski’s signature dish”, contends that the United States needs radical Islamism in order to play on all the “world playing grounds”.

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It goes without saying that it is impossible to reduce each stratagem not only to the name of an individual, no matter how influential the political strategist, but also to one of the main political parties. Allowing ourselves a simplification, we just want to make the picture a bit clearer. One has to keep in mind at that the stratagems actually exist, and their association with particular figures and political actors is not as important as the fact of the stratagems’ existence.

What is the difference between these stratagems?

One of them (for simplicity we will call it “Kissinger’s” stratagem) states that the United States needs a new world order and that they perceive domination to be order. This is a kind of Fourth Rome.

Any world leader dreams of the establishment of a world order. The U.S. has dreamed of establishing a world order throughout the entire second half of the 20th century. After the break-up of the U.S.S.R., there arose real opportunities for the U.S. to carry out this dream. But it turned out that too high a price needed to be paid for its fulfillment, and that the American people, having tasted comfort and security, did not want to pay this price.

What indeed is a new world order according to the model of the Fourth Rome? It is Roman legions in all provinces and a plan for the provinces proposed by Rome called “Pax Romana”. After the Second World War, the U.S.A. had the drive to position its legions in the provinces called Japan and Germany, and to offer these provinces equivalents of “Pax Romana” in the form of the MacArthur and Marshall plans.

By the moment of entry of American troops into Iraq, it emerged that the U.S.A. did not have a comparable “Pax Romana” for this province. In addition, it turned out that too many legionnaires are needed for the new provinces even within the framework of the Greater Islamic arc. Not only 300-400 Thousand U.S.A. soldiers need to be kept in Iraq; 500-600 Thousand U.S.A. soldiers need to be placed in Iran (because any bombardment without this is just the pinnacle of cretinism). It is necessary to prepare for placement of a comparable contingent in Pakistan. And so on.

It became clear that the U.S.A. could not and did not want to withstand that burden, and that the American people do not want to have a three million-strong land-based army, because that is an army with mandatory conscription.

Thus, the United States understood that they could not become the Fourth Rome. What could be done? Relinquish world domination?
Firstly, no one ever relinquishes world domination due only to difficulties concerning its maintenance.

Secondly, the U.S.A. capitalized world domination, transforming it into an extremely profitable and extremely stable business plan, founded on two factors – the printing press and aircraft carriers. The printing press allows for financing the creation of new aircraft carriers, and new aircraft carriers protect the prerogatives of the printing press.

This does not at all mean that American industry is not highly effective and there are not American technologies within a great American economic complex as a whole. But the share of this complex in the world economy is different than 60 years ago, and that share is steadily decreasing.

The inability to ensure world domination according to the model of the Fourth Rome cannot fail to give rise in a particular part of the American elite to an aspiration to secure world domination by another model - that, which we conditionally associated with Brzezinski’s name – the model of a new Carthage. If a new world order cannot be established, then it is possible to create controlled disorder and to ensure domination within this framework. Perhaps unstable and problematic, but domination.

We look at a map of the modern world. This world can already be divided into three roughly approximate zones now – the Greater South (this is the Islamic arc), the Greater Far East, and the Greater West.

The Greater Far East is developing rapidly. Investment in this region provides great profits. The elites of the Greater South (primarily oil sheikhs, but not exclusively) have accumulated a lot of money. We are talking about trillions of dollars. For purely objective reasons, these elites do not want to place their money in Western banks that provide a very small interest rate. Hence the temptation to invest money in the very quickly developing Greater Far East, and having invested the money there, to support one’s investments with a particular energy policy and policy in general.

The thread of this connection cannot suit western financial capital. It understands that it is desirable to cut short in the initial stage this process of the beginning reorientation of the Greater South’s finances from the West to the East. It understands that if this process is not interrupted, then upon conclusion of the process, a new global crisis will begin with far-reaching consequences. A crisis in which the U.S.A., for example, will end up not in the first and not in the second place in
the global hierarcy, but in the fourth or even fifth. Such a loss of
capitalization is impermissible. In order to avoid this loss, it is possible
to go to great lengths.

It goes without saying that not everyone in the West and in the U.S.A.
thinks this way. But there are very high-level statements testifying to the
fact that similar thoughts dominate many minds. And having dominated
them, they will necessarily become a driving lever of real-world, big-
time politics.

Will they become or have they become?

Is not the heating-up of the Greater Islamic arc a transition from
the strategy of “new world order” to a strategy of “new world disorder”?-

Perhaps it is no coincidence that in connection with the current
events in the Middle East Condoleezza Rice speaks about turbulence;
that is, a new world disorder. As we have already mentioned, when
Condoleezza Rice was the U.S. Secretary of State, she actively made
use of the advice of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Mann, a
prominent political scientist and theorist. This was the same Mann who
was behind the creation of the Santa Fe Institute for researching
complexity and who spent many years formulating theoretical and
practical problems of the use of “manageable chaos” in global politics.

In the end, everything new is something old and well-forgotten. Of
financial, economic, and energy wars speak more than isolated
influential representatives of the American intellectual and political
establishment. All this became the “cookbook” of big business long ago.

The difference between war and competition is thus.

During competition, you lower your costs, increase your
effectiveness, bring your best product to market at a lower price, and
overcome your competitor.

If you engage not in competition, but economic war, (as well as
financial war, energy war, and so on), then the task consists not in the
enhanced effectiveness of your activities, but the lowered effectiveness
of your competitor’s activities. The most varied means are applied for
this — for example, from the organization of tribal conflict on the
territory through which your competitor’s pipelines pass to the direct
sabotage on these territories.

If it is impossible to make the U.S.A. more attractive within the
framework of the game according to the rules of the Modern epoch,
then why not change these rules? And make the competitor less
attractive?
Once again we emphasize that we are talking about ideas germinating in the minds of separate elite groups, and not about the coordinated behavior of all American elites.

There is an expression: “noblesse oblige” (“status obliges”). The status of the sole superpower, power number one, obliges much, including in addition the protection of this position. From here it is one step to the Realpolitik kind of formulation: “the main enemy is the country that is closest to the level upon reaching of which it can challenge my might.” In the U.S. National Security Strategy adopted in 2002 by the Bush Administration, this principle is expressed in the carefully-wrought phrase: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”

This kind of formula can be packaged in one or another ideological wrapper, but the filling has no relation to ideology. If the U.S.S.R. came closest to this dangerous level, then it was danger number one, and that danger could be packaged in the wrapper of the struggle against communism.

But if a country with any other ideology nears this level, then another wrapper will simply be found. The essence will be in the dangerous approximation and the proximity in and of itself.

Particularly dangerous is the creation of alliances, in which allied power increases sharply, approaching the same unacceptable level. The very problematic alliance between China and Japan, as between an industrial and postindustrial power, belong precisely to the number of such alliances. But other alliances are included in this number.

The law of uneven development is irrevocable as soon as we speak of the game according to the rules of the Modern, and prone to conflict between the U.S. and China according to a pattern similar to the conflict between Great Britain and Germany in 1914. But too high a price will be paid in such conflict between nuclear powers. And although the possibility of this conflict, as we know, has been discussed widely (for example, by the famous American group led by Paul Wolfowitz, the B2 Group), alternative strategies to this conflict also cannot fail to be worked out.

Take, for example, the strategy of “manageable chaos”. The Greater South is being heated up, and with that an alliance is being formed, similar to that which was formed in Afghanistan against the U.S.S.R. The Greater South’s expansion energy will be directed towards the Greater Far East: primarily, but not exclusively, towards China.
danger arising from uneven development will decrease... The leading country will obtain a historical delay...

We know that such patterns are discussed by many, including the same Brzezinski. We know that these patterns have been implemented more than once in history. Why is it impossible to suppose (again we emphasize — only to suppose!) that all the strange facts in the blatant non-compliance with former American strategy are somehow related (even if not one hundred percent) to similar constructs, already used repeatedly in history?

Now the creators of the strategy “radical Islam against the U.S.S.R.” already speak of it themselves. Brzezinski and Gates are completely candid. They admit that they began heating up the macro-region, including Afghanistan, six months before the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In addition, Brzezinski says directly that the use of “agitated Muslims” against the main U.S. competitor was not only permissible, but the optimal geopolitical move. Does this not give serious grounds for careful examination of our hypothesis?

From the hypothesis we turn to the model.

If the content of the passing epoch is an all-encompassing singular project — the Modern - without alternatives, then the content of the coming epoch will be multiple projects.

There are at least three projects — the Post-Modern, the Modern, and the Counter-Modern.

Radical Islamism is the Counter-Modern project.

The Modern is reflected in what is happening today in the Greater Far East: in China, India, Vietnam, and so on.

And the Post-Modern is beginning to grow up in the West in the context of Modern’s mounting collapse and in the context of the West’s transformation from a leader of commercial development (industrial or post-industrial) into a leader providing comprehensive services. Financial services, services in the sphere of more delicate activities, entertainment services, and power services (yes, and power, too).

It is impossible to propose that the entire West can be reduced to the sprouts of Post-Modern. But not to feel that the post-modernization of the West is one clear and dangerous trend is also impossible. Moreover, this trend of Post-Modern “for itself” can easily intertwine with the trend Counter-Modern “for others”, acting under the guise of various democratic revolutions carried out according to the principle “democracy without Modern” that we have already discussed.
What if we are talking about the interweaving of these principles? What if the forces interested in their interplay are influencing the world order with the aim of organizing an entirely new world order? With the aim to stack up such a world order out of the cubes of Counter-Modern and Post-Modern? What if it is in this direction that very specific political steps are being carried out?

In this case (again we emphasize that it has a hypothetical, but not groundless nature), the political philosophy of ongoing influence is even more important than pragmatics. In connection with this, we will consider Modern itself in more detail and we recognize that there are two — fundamentally different — Moderns.

The authentic Modern project common to all mankind has an all-encompassing world-historical content. It is fully developed spiritually. Under the leadership of its adherents, humanity is capable of moving to a new ideal. Enemies of this variety of project want to smash not the mode of production giving the highest percentage growth to one or another country (as in today’s China or Vietnam), but the Ideal — Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, as one of modernity’s enemies said.

In Thomas Mann’s *Doctor Faustus*, the protagonist says: “I understood that this should not be.” “What should not be?” “Good and noble, that which is called human. That in the name of which the Bastille was stormed and what the best minds proclaimed, rejoicing; this should not be. I will take it away.” “What do you want to take away?” “The Ninth Symphony.” That is, the ideal of freedom, equality, and fraternity. Not the level of production (8% growth GDP or 6%), but the Ideal — metaphysical and political (freedom, equality, fraternity).

The surrogate, relict, and re-made project of the Modern, having become macro-regional or mosaic, risks losing its full-fledged world-historical content, and transforming from a means of legitimization into a means of optimization, a means of victory in one or another (economic, geopolitical) competition.

If this Modern will be relegated to just satisfaction of the need for material prosperity, then it will be stable only until the moment of achieving this prosperity. And that will already leave a mark on the current phase of its advancement towards the sought-after, strategically-insufficient goal.

In fact, in China, for example, a huge number of people work for relatively low wages, because there is a traditional society in which the standard of living is much lower than the one that provides this salary.
Raising people from traditional society to modernity, they can be given 10 times more and this will still be much less than in Europe and in the U.S. This is called the “furnace of modernity”. Human resources are taken from traditional society, moved to Shanghai, and used there very, very effectively; but up until a certain time – while the worker does not cease to be stimulated by the threat of a return to the poverty of traditional society. As soon as all of traditional society is processed in the “furnace of modernity”, the worker ceases to be stimulated by this threat, and Modern project begins to choke.

In Russia, several major transformations were carried out that are similar in their content to modernization. We are talking about transformations during the time of Peter the Great, the time of Stolypin and Stalin, and even Khrushchev. In Russia, there is no traditional society, and that means there is also no resource for the “furnace of Modernity”.

In India, China, or Vietnam, there is this resource, but it is not limitless. And strategic problems will begin much sooner than this resource will be exhausted.

Once more we emphasize that from the moment when the West left the Modern project, not having offered the world and having not received from the world a new strategic plan combining humanism and development, Modernity lost its world-historical significance.

Having stipulated this, we will briefly discuss so-called the Counter-Modern. We mention in addition that the Counter-Modern is not a return to the world of the ideals of the High Middle Ages (Pre-Modern). Because in this historical epoch, ideals fired-up hearts and drove them onwards. The ideals possessed a world-historical significance. They truly inspired. They brought with them new opportunities for people. They contained a high humanistic content. The Counter-Modern sterilizes all that is sublime from Pre-Modern and leaves only the shell, a form devoid of life-giving content. The Counter-Modern is largely an artificial construct, designed to maintain the life of a part of humanity in a state of fundamental non-development. That is, in the state of a ghetto.

The Counter-Modern develops according to Post-Modern socio-technology – through regression and archaism. The Counter-Modern means a secondary, more sequential, colonization of peripheral nations and return of these people to a state of an eternal periphery. This is a kind of “world village” by the “world city”. No matter in what country of the world the Counter-Modern is implemented, it always strikingly
resembles the Nazi plan Ost for the enslavement of Slavs and other “inferior” peoples.

The process of dismantling the U.S.S.R., which is marked by the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall, affected the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in many ways. There are, among other things, signs of regression, secondary de-modernization, and archaisation; that is, that which is characteristic of the Counter-Modern.

Thus perhaps Abdul-Aziz bin Al-Sheikh, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and the highest-ranking cleric in Islam, does not say in vain that these processes of the so-called “global political awakening” (which is the same as the global democratic revolution, which is the same as “perestroika”-1, -2, -3, and so on) will initiate regression and degradation (and hence, the Counter-Modern) on the territory of the Greater South (or a substantial part of it)?

If the first phase of the shift in global architecture (the collapse of the socialist camp and the breakdown of the U.S.S.R.) generated the first wave of the Counter-Modern, and the second phase generated the second wave of the same Counter-Modern, then is it possible to speak of the contingency of what is happening? How many phases must take place for what is happening to cease to appear to be at least one hundred percent random?

The Counter-Modern in certain parts of the globe – this is what is being driven towards by the elites occupied with creation of a new global architecture, formed on the basis of dismantling Modernity.

Now about the Post-Modern. The Post-Modern is not a cultural fad, but the most powerful and effective method in all of human history for dehumanization and degradation. It rescinds all historical constants, authenticity, significance, and history. It openly insists that even the project “Human” should be fully dismantled; that is, it insists on the annihilation of the unity of the species Homo sapiens and the unity of the human race.

But if the human race is not united, than it can be adjusted by any method, for example, population size. Very serious people discuss extremely radical plans similar to adjustments. But most importantly, the very idea of adjustment is becoming legitimate. If a portion of humanity is “almost human” than why is it impossible to adjust the stock of such “specimens”? Where do these pangs of conscience during similar adjustments come from? After all, these pangs do not disturb stock-breeders, when adjusting their herd of cattle!
Post-Modern is mild, but very effective neo-Nazism. The very neo-Nazism that was suggested to the Jacobins by the famous Marquis de Sade in the epoch of the French Revolution. In his address to the French Convention, Marquis de Sade writes very distinctly about how society must be organized upon the principles of anti-humanism. The Jacobins, as adherents of the authentic Modernity, then decisively rejected the Post-Modern fad of the Marquis. Many of today’s Post-Modernists have declared de Sade their great precursor.

Post-Modernism celebrates victory over the authentic Modern and its Soviet alternative. This challenge of dehumanization is a terrible challenge for all humanity.

Post-Modern is in the nucleus (“world city”) and the Counter-Modern is on the periphery (“world village”) – that’s one of the formulas of the new global architecture. Adoption of this formula would mark the alliance of post-democratic, Post-Modern elite with radical Islamism as a particular manifestation of the Counter-Modern, regression, and archaism.

Until now, the very possibility of such an alliance seemed absolutely wild, because Islamic archaic agitators curse liberalism, the U.S., and the West as a whole. But insofar as the U.S. and the West as a whole do not have an effective means of countering the economic (and hence, political as well) growth of that which I called “surrogate, relict Modern”, in the Far East region in general and in China in particular, then such an alliance can arise simply out of desperation.

Again we emphasize that the precedents for such alliances are evident, and that precisely such an alliance with Islamism has been formed more than once – against the Russian Empire (in Central Asia and in the Caucasus), against the Ottoman Empire (the Wahhabis), against the U.S.S.R. (in Afghanistan), and against India (with Pakistan). What is new is not such an alliance itself, but the extent of its scale and strategic character.

This is the case as we are talking about the historical fate of this same capitalism, to which a speedy end was promised at first, and which was then called optimal and a structure with no alternatives, providing a so-called “end of history”. After 2008, everyone again began to speak of the fate of capitalism.

But the legitimacy of capitalism is completely over-rated by the project Modern. Capitalism is legitimate only within the framework of modernity. When it is located precisely within this framework, it is a
tame and constructive evil. It carries within itself both, this evil and good, the benefit of historical development.

However, capitalism provides historical development only within the framework of an all-encompassing modernity without alternatives. Going beyond the scope of modernity, capitalism loses its ability to provide historical development, and transforms into fascism, Gnosticism, and dismantling of the unity of the human race.

Capitalism began to go beyond the scope of modernity already by the end of the 19th century. It had almost gone beyond this scope during the First World War. It had already begun then. It was foreseen and described by very many, for example, Spengler in his *The Decline of the West*.

But then appeared the Soviet “Red Project” and it as if propped up the sagging beam of the Modern project. The presence of a new message from Russia — with the idea of “new man”, “new humanism” and development — did not allow the project Modern to fall down entirely. Hitler wanted to destroy it, but stumbled upon the Soviet resistance.

This relatively stable architecture lasted 70 years: two worlds — two projects — two systems. Everything hung upon this. After dismantling the “Soviet” world project implemented within the framework of “Perestroika-1”, dismantling of the world project Modern should have inevitably begun (in the framework of “Perestroika-2”).

It is impossible, at that, not to recall that already in 1946 at the meeting of the neo-fascist International in San Remo, it was stated that the main aim was destruction of the two “Yalta predators”: first the Soviet Union, then the U.S.A..

Chapter 11. Prognosis

The Counter-Modern, the Post-Modern, and the surrogate Modern are three world project modules, from which they want to build a new world. The modules are real. They are not conspiracy fictions or utopian fantasy. They are historically realized, huge undertakings continuing in time and embodied in a gigantic number of ideal and material artifacts. It is not that we as interpreters want to impose upon a world living in accordance with other laws. It is the world we really live in now. And the events in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and other places are a great restructuring
from the format of “Modern for all” to the format of a new global architecture consisting of the three “detached” modules listed.

If this tendency vanquishes, then the radical heating-up of the “Greater Islamic arc” from Morocco to Indonesia will end in 2013-2014.

At the same time, heating-up will begin in a number of zones located beyond the “Greater Islamic arc”. This will necessarily affect India, Central Asia, North Caucus, Russia’s Volga region, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. Waves of this heating-up cannot fail to generate bursts of ethno-cultural, political, and economic destabilization across neighboring regions, including Europe and Indochina.

The response to the heating-up of these regions will be a new phase of global destabilization. Multiple destabilizations will lead to a new phase of nuclear proliferation. The leader in this process will most likely be Iran. However, it is impossible to imagine Iran possessing nuclear weapons without the possession of the same weapons by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, destabilization of the entire African continent will take place.

By the years 2015-2016, extreme involvement in the destabilization of Israel will inevitably begin. This simply cannot fail to occur if the entire Greater Middle East continues to drift in the current direction.

In such circumstances, it is impossible to exclude not only nuclear conflict (between Israel and Iran), but also nuclear conflicts (for example, Israel’s “radial” nuclear response to any nuclear attack).

As a result, a jump in oil prices and other energy products will begin. In addition, several American analysts soothe themselves with illusions that the resources the U.S.A. has for energy self-sufficiency will allow the country to “weather the storm”, undermine the economies of its main competitors scarce of energy resources, and ensure America “a head start in the Big Game”. However, there is no doubt that this kind of global transformation will irreversibly destroy both the global economy (including global finance and global trade) and the global political system headed by the UN.

To predict the behavior of oil-dependent powers in these conditions is rather difficult. It’s highly likely that the powers will shift from economic activities to political and military activities. For example, to securing military control over oil and gas producing territories and energy transit routes. Not only the Middle East, the Maghreb, and Central Asia belong to this number, but also Russia.
By 2017-2019, manageable, or controlled, chaos will transform into uncontrollable chaos. The radicalization of political life, elicited by the growth of economic problems and rival claims, may give rise not only to local, but also large-scale nuclear conflicts.

Even if this will be avoided at the cost of the collapse of many small and several of the largest states in different regions of the world, including the Greater Far East and Russia, the world will be deprived of the humanitarian principles that ensured its stability over the course of millennia.

Discussion of this grim prospect and which positions will be occupied by individual nations if this takes place is amoral and counterproductive. Our task consists in preventing this prospect.

Chapter 12. Recommendations

At this point, we can only speak of the initial stage of development of that tendency, which is described in this scenario and prognosis. Only a few prerequisites have been formed, the dynamics are unstable, and the processes are in the beginning phase of unfolding. They (for now!) may be cut short or channeled into another, less threatening direction.

However, the main thing is absent – the readiness itself to discuss the more negative possibilities inherent in the described trends. And without this discussion it is impossible to engage mechanisms to suppress and break up these tendencies.

In risk theory, there is a rule according to which risk is calculated by multiplying the probability of a certain outcome by its danger. Even if the probability of the described development is small, if it is not equal to zero (and excessively many things speak for the fact that it is not equal to zero), than the danger is too great to consider the risk to be negligible. Therefore, the strategic task consists not only and not so much in the analysis of processes capable of leading to the described lamentable results, as in the mobilization of efforts for an adequate strategic international response to this challenge.

It should be remembered that often quite little effort was required to prevent the most dangerous world and political cataclysms. However, this effort was not implemented at the necessary moment.
The world must not experience something similar again.

If the hypothesis advanced by us is valid despite its atypical nature, then the natural question arises: what should be done? After all, if there is no answer to this question, then the consideration of such extreme hypotheses is a “voice crying in the wilderness”, and nothing more. The last thing we want to do is serve this role. Therefore, we propose a fully concrete program of action consisting of several points.

1. The considerations offered by us are no more than a sketch. Each stroke in this sketch must be refined and tested, tested and refined. A huge collective effort is necessary to either confirm (and, it goes without saying, to correct), our hypothesis, or reject it. Let us assume that the hypothesis will be confirmed. What then?

2. Then we must do everything possible so that the model we have transformed into a hypothesis is widely discussed throughout the entire world. This model must not be transformed into esoteric, secret knowledge. It must be presented to the widest range of society; presented in an accessible, intelligible ideological language; and transformed into an agenda that contains both a set of challenges and threats and a collection of answers.

3. A process of unification can begin around such an ideology. There are many social actors of different kinds – public and private – for whom this development process is incompatible with their fundamental interests of both an ideal and pragmatic nature. While the threat (or threats, challenges, and so on) has not been proven, has not been elaborated, has been not presented to society, and has not been not fully framed ideologically, there is no possibility for political unification and the creation of a broad international front of forces.

At this stage, the world view (the threat, the ideology of answers, and so on) transforms into politics. A broad front of social forces is created.

4. The presence of social forces and an alliance of intellectuals who are capable of speaking convincingly about this threat is what should be presented to governmental and other forces as a subject for consideration. This presentation should not have anything in common with extremism and radicalism. As much as possible, it should be as gentle, friendly, and focused on the integration of all those to whom it is important and necessary into a particular coalition of forces and ideas.

5. As a result, an alliance of states may be formed that can prevent the process from sliding into the dangerous course we have examined,
which can be done both through deceleration of dangerous trends and through presentation of alternative trends to society.

6. An alliance of states is important, but not the final step. Before our eyes, to our regret, the United Nations is undergoing those metamorphoses that its predecessor, the League of Nations, underwent before the Second World War. In order not to permit the worst, it must be managed to either strengthen the UN, or to create very large-scale alternative international organizations. We draw attention to the fact that these organizations have already been established de facto, and that the lack of constructive alternatives could make the UN a victim of destructive alternatives.

7. The suggested tools are not a panacea and are not an end in themselves. They are means of global counteraction of global trends. Any ideology — and here we are talking about a new international ideology — is established in order to unite certain forces. Forces are united to direct processes — to divert these processes from a dangerous course and to direct them towards a course that meets the interests of all humanity, as long as humanity has not lost the will to develop and its commitment to the highest humanitarian ideals.
PART II. REALITY, OR WHO AND IN WHAT WAY MEDDLES IN THE PROJECT DESIGNERS’ INTENTIONS

Chapter 1. The Main Contradictions and Conflicts
Defining Specifics of “Islamic Revolutions”

Thus, the explanation of the reasons and content of the current wave of “Islamic revolutions” can by no means be reduced to primitive alternatives: either to the outburst of social and economic indignation by the population suffering under dictatorship, or to the schemes of the “evil Western forces” craving for oil, power, etc. The project of the global restructuring of the world order is at stake here.

However, as was noted long ago, “the devil is in the details”. Moreover, this “devil” is often not alone. Thus, the discussion of our topic cannot do without at least a cursory analysis of these details, concrete and specific for each country.

Libya

Ethno-political Conflicts

The population of the country is predominantly Arab, but 8% consider themselves Berbers, and up to 3% — Tuaregs. Moreover, the Arabs, Berbers, and Tuaregs are still very firmly entrenched in the tribal structure of society (there are over 140 tribes in the country, and in each, as a rule, there are several tribal clans). Loyalty to the clan and tribe both in the Middle Ages and now is valued more (with the exception of the narrow strata of the modernized elite) than loyalty to any rulers — sultan, caliph, king, president, leader of the nation, and so on.

Right up until the era of independence (1951), tribes in Libya were effectively autonomous political, military, and economic units with the relative territory (“watan”) that was secured for each of them. The majority of the population has always led (and to a large degree, still does lead) a nomadic Bedouin lifestyle. The urbanization that has taken
place (primarily under Gaddafi) has weakened, but not abolished the system of clan and tribal identification.\textsuperscript{147}

The main religion is Islam, in the particular form of the Sufi order Senussi, which was founded by Muhammad Ali as-Senussi (from an Arab clan descended from the Prophet Muhammad through the line of his daughter Fatima) in Mecca in 1837, and who “hybridized” Sufism and Wahhabism in the new order with the following objectives:

– the revival of the pure faith and the practice of Islam in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet;
– the unification of all Sufi tariqas into a single order;
– propaganda of Islam on the periphery of the Arab world.

The first Senussi religious center (zawiya) was established in Libya 1843 in al-Bayda (Cyrenaica) and subsequently played a decisive role in the unification of the constantly feuding Libyan tribes. Each tribe created its own zawiya and in this manner, it led the tribes through the lodge members of Senussi under a common “denominational umbrella”. Soon Senussism became a single theocratic banner in the fight for Libya’s independence from the Turks and the Italians. After the receipt of independence, the first king of the Federal Kingdom of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan (present-day Libya, which became a unitary state only in 1963) became the religious, military and political leader of Senussism and the Emir of Cyrenaica Idris as-Senussi (great-grandson of the founder of the Order of the tribe Kharaba), who relied upon the elite of the leading clans of Cyrenaica.\textsuperscript{148}

After huge oil reserves were discovered in Libya in the late 1950s, the autocratic domination of Cyrenaica lead to the rapid deterioration of relations between King Idris I and the sheikhs and even with the lodge members of the majority of tribes and in particular with the tribes of Tripolitania and Fezzan, which were deprived of their rightful share of oil revenues. It was this factor, along with the dissatisfaction with the presence of U.S. and British military bases in Libya, which determined the broad elite and social base of Gaddafi’s military coup that took place in 1969.

On the one hand, Gaddafi brutally suppressed the resistance of the Senussi elite (predominantly from the Kharaba tribe) as well as of the elite of the Warfalla, Obeidat, Magarha, and other tribes that were close to King Idris. On the other hand, being from the relatively weak Gaddafi tribe, he had to contain and stabilize his power by relying on both the elite of the leading tribes and on the Senussi lodge members. The main
tool of his policy became the relatively equitable division of oil revenues among tribes and also attempts to “torpedo” the tribal structure of society with ideas of national unity and pan-Arabism. Gaddafi’s political course became a specific form of “leveling” socialism, economically based on oil revenue rents, plus a legal system based on the rules of the sharia.

At first, Gaddafi also sought to intermarry with the Senussis (which for Bedouin society is practically the equivalent of “to make peace with”). His first wife Fatih Khaled, from the marriage with whom his son Muhammad was born, was from the clan of as-Senussi. But this marriage soon fell apart, and Gaddafi’s second wife became Safia Farkash, from the large Obeidat tribe. Furthermore, Gaddafi quickly incorporated large groups from the elite of the most influential Libyan tribes into power, including the Cyrenaica tribes.

However, already in the first half of the 1970s, an intertribal massacre and revolt began in Libya, fueled by tribal sheikhs and Senussi zawiyas. Gaddafi brutally suppressed the revolts, confiscated a part of the Kharaba clans’ land, and distributed it to other tribes. The majority of the Senussi Kharaba elite, and also a part of the elite of other tribes who participated in the uprisings, fled the country (to London, Egypt, Paris, and so on).

It was after this that Gaddafi began to write his Green Book, which advocates a “third way” between capitalism and socialism as a system of direct popular rule (Jamahiriya) and also a fundamental transformation of the entire system of government. Upon proclamation of the Libyan Jamahiriya in 1977, the Revolutionary Command Council was created instead of a Defense Ministry and a General Staff, and the army was divided into “resistance forces” and “security forces”. At the same time, universal compulsory military service was introduced, women were allowed to be called up for military service, and also the armies of the Local People’s Militia were created, and they included a large part of the country’s population.

The structure of political power turned out to be presented as a system of directly elected people’s congresses, as well as people’s and revolutionary committees. Gaddafi absolved himself from all official posts, leaving himself unofficially in the position of “Leader of the Revolution” and supreme commander.

In the context of a tribal society, this power structure could be maintained only in the absence of strong grassroots protest. Gaddafi
ensured this with rather equitable distribution of revenues from the nationalized oil industry, whose assets were concentrated in the National Petroleum Corporation, and also through the creation (almost along the lines of Norway’s template) of large foreign investment funds that make a profit from oil windfalls on account of investment in several dozen developed and developing countries of the world.

As a result, Libya has the highest human development index level in Africa, free education and healthcare, no unemployment, full literacy, and one of the longest life expectancies in Africa\(^{150}\). Apart from that Gaddafi managed to solve an extremely acute problem for this part of Africa: supplying fresh water to the communities. He spent more than $25 billion in budgetary funds to arrange the extraction of fresh water from the subterranean levels in the Sahara desert and its transportation through a pipeline network that stretches around 4,000 kilometers.

However, a part of the tribal elite never resigned themselves to Gaddafi’s leadership — the leadership of a Bedouin from a tribe that was far from being the most influential. During his reign, there have been several coup attempts and dozens of assassination attempts, the initiators and perpetrators of which Gaddafi has dealt with brutally. It was this exponential brutality (and also the fact that Gaddafi had intermarried through his wife and children with the elite of the majority of the most influential tribes and brought representatives of these tribes into the highest levels of government) that has ensured, in the context of Libyan society’s tribal specificity, the recognition of Gaddafi as the real “leader of the nation”.

Another of Gaddafi’s major problems all these years has been radical Islamic opposition, which has had the strongest influence in the coastal area of Cyrenaica near Egypt (Barka region), including in the former Senussi lands of the Kharaba tribes (Tobruk in the Benghazi zone).

Thus, on March 16, 2011, telegrams of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli dating from 2008 were disclosed on the website WikiLeaks. They reported that the Benghazi region was one of the main ideological and political bases of al-Qaeda, and also one of the main regions for the “world export” of suicide bombers and jihadists\(^{151}\).

On March 25th, the U.S. press published excerpts from an analytical report by the American military academy West Point, composed in 2007 on the basis of personal data from 600 jihadists captured in Iraq\(^{152}\). It was found that 41% of them were from Saudi Arabia, and in second place was the Libyan region of Benghazi- Darnah- Tobruk: the “heart”
of the current uprising against Gaddafi. Moreover, 52 mujahideen arrived in Iraq from tiny Darnah, and from huge Riyadh – 51. The West Point report emphasizes that “Benghazi and Darnah were the center of a large Islamist revolt against Gaddafi in the mid-90’s and are a pivotal base for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which in 2007 formally merged with al-Qaida”. In connection with this, it should be noted that already in February 19, 2011, the press had reported the creation of “Islamic emirates” in this zone of Cyrenaica and in Darnah and al-Bayda. Moreover, in Darnah the emirate was founded by the former Guantanamo detainee Abdelkarim al-Hasadi, and on February 24th, al-Qaeda announced support for the opposition in Libya and promised “to do everything possible to assist it”.

LIFG (aka Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah (JIM), aka Libyan Jamaat), which was established in 1995, which has declared as its goal the overthrow of Gaddafi and the establishment of an Islamic state in Libya, has carried out a number of major terrorist attacks in the country. In 1996, a military operation was conducted against the JIM in the mountainous regions of Libya, in which up to 10 thousand troops were involved. JIM Mujahideen have created infrastructure in different European and Arab countries, as well as forged links with Islamic radicals in other countries of the Maghreb. During the civil war in Algeria, JIM closely cooperated with the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (which is al-Qaeda in the Maghreb). In 2001, the JIM Mujahideen actively participated in military actions in Afghanistan. The spiritual leader of JIM Al-Saadi received the title of “Sheikh of the Arabs in Afghanistan” from the chief of the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar.

In Libya, JIM has created “sleeper cells” all these years. Realizing the threat posed by JIM, the government began talks with them (Gaddafi’s eldest son, Saif al-Islam, was in charge). The authorities guaranteed the organization’s activists latitude in exchange for disavowal of armed hostilities. In September 2009, JIM published a 417-page document criticizing the ideology of al-Qaida and presenting reasons for the abandonment of fighting with Gaddafi’s regime. Moreover, beginning in 2006, around 300 previously arrested members of the JIM were released from prison. Experts point out that in the new political situation, these are quite capable of reviving their “dormant underground”.

The Muslim Brotherhood had low-level activities in Libya until recently. In mid-March, the world’s media reported that Egypt
(moreover, the actors in the operations were not named) was supplying weapons to the Libyan rebels, thereby circumventing the UN embargo. However, military sources indicate that it is this organization that has ferried weapons and volunteers from Egypt into Cyrenaica since the early days of the “new Libyan revolution”. Finally, it should be mentioned that the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, having returned to Egypt in late February after half a century of exile, immediately called for the killing of Qaddafi “for the brutal massacre of demonstrators”.

Experts report that one of the main “external” organizers of the current “uprising” in Libya was the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition, established in London in June 2005 and composed of several groups of exiled members of the royal family, tribal leaders, and former functionaries of the Libyan government. The most influential of these groups is the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the Libyan Constitutional Union, headed by Crown Prince Muhammad as-Senussi, nephew of King Idris, deposed in 1969. It is this London opposition, noted above, that led the “preliminary talks” for rebellion with leaders of Libyan tribal clans, and it was this opposition which imported a huge number of the flags of King Idris’ monarchy (black, red and green with a white crescent and star) into Libya, under which the “rebels” now march. And it is no coincidence that the current “official” leader of this opposition — former Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, having deserted the Gaddafi camp — comes from the pivotal Senussi Kharaba tribe.

Thus, the main political resource of the current uprising against Gaddafi became: firstly, the radical Islamic opposition, integrated with the heirs of the Senussi dynasty; and secondly, some of the sheikhs and lodge members of the tribal elite, who expect to receive a more substantial share of the national “oil export pie” during the course of the redistribution of power. Having promised a piece of this pie to its “grassroots” tribal masses and having provided for the looting of the regional armories established by Gaddafi for the Local People’s Militias, the clan elite procured an “armed people”, which rose up to fight the central government.

However, as reported by the media, a significant part of the most powerful weapons from the looted armories did not end up with the “rebels”. They were immediately confiscated (stolen or bought from the leaders of the uprising) by groups of radical Islamists and sent in large quantities across the southern borders of Libya into the remote
areas of the Sahel (Chad and Mali), where the regional bases of al-Qaida and a number of other Islamist organizations are located. Moreover, some experts do not exclude that al-Qaida could have obtained not only heavy weapons and air defense systems from the looted armories in the eastern and southern part of Libya (which has already been established by the intelligence services of neighboring countries), but also the chemical weapons components possessed by Gaddafi’s regime.

**External “Fault Lines”**

Gaddafi, having accomplished his “socialist Jamahiriya revolution”, antagonized the majority of Persian Gulf monaracies:

– He overthrew the monarchy, which kings and emirs of the Gulf always bear in mind;

– He has established a secular regime of “Islamic socialism” and has shown the entire Arab East that this system in the context of large resource rents provides a much higher level and quality of life for the general public than that which they have at home;

– From the standpoint of these achievements, he not only encouraged other Arab (and more generally Islamic) peoples to effect revolution and live according to his *Green Book*, but also actively interfered in their internal politics, as well as increased his influence in the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Conference;

– He effectively dislodged the Saudi royal house from its position in many regions of Africa, replacing it with his influence both directly and through the African Union created with much of his efforts.

A number of Western leaders have long-standing “historical accounts” with Gaddafi.

The U.S. and Britain remember the decisive expulsion of their military bases from Libya after “Gaddafi’s revolution”, as well as the nationalization of their oil equity.

France has clashed with Gaddafi for many years over influence in French-speaking Africa; moreover, sometimes these clashes have escalated into direct armed conflict (as in Chad).

Italy has always been afraid of unexpected twists in Gaddafi’s policy, which could at any moment “flood” the country with a stream of illegal migrants from Africa.

Not the least role in the West’s animosity towards Gaddafi was played by the consequences of his policy of “exporting revolution”, in the course of which he has supported anti-governmental movements worldwide and
which has also facilitated the departure of his radical Islamist opponents to “hot spots” (farther away from Libya). And although the role of Gaddafi himself or his intelligence services in the terrorist attack in Berlin, as well as the bombings of American and French aircraft has never been definitely proven, it was precisely these enumerated developments that became the primary motives for the introduction of U.N. sanctions against Libya in 1992, as “the main sponsor of global terrorism”.

For Western countries, and most of all for the U.S., Gaddafi was unacceptable both for the reason that he has shown the whole world an example of successful “Arab socialism” and because he has shown extreme economic and political independence. Libya has had no foreign debts and there has been no strata of prominent, powerful oligarchs, who may be influenced by the threat of confiscation of their accounts in Western banks (ostensibly the “assets of the Qaddafi family” are frozen in the West – in reality these assets are principally those of the state National Oil Corporation and state investment funds).

Mitigation of Gaddafi’s policy, his acceptance of Libya’s responsibility (but not guilt) for the above-mentioned terrorist attacks, as well as the payment of compensation to their victims – were important grounds, but not the main reason for withdrawing the international sanctions against Libya in 2004. According to experts, one of the conditions for withdrawing sanctions was a demand from the U.S. and EU countries for the provision of wider access to international oil companies in Libya. It is for this reason that in June 2003 Gaddafi announced at the nationwide congress a new path for the country towards “popular capitalism” and the beginning of the privatization of the oil and gas industry. It is exactly at that point that Gaddafi signed an agreement with Italy on joint control over illegal immigration.

Beginning in 2005, approximately 40 foreign oil companies have returned to work in Libya (primarily under the Production-Sharing Agreements). The amount of “oil rent” (which was previously almost completely accumulated in the national budget and the state investment funds) began to fall as a result. And in 2009, feeling the risk of a collapse of revenues during the crisis and lower oil prices, Gaddafi expressed his reluctance to privatize the National Oil Corporation (on which oil companies, primarily from France, Italy and the U.S.A. had very much been counting). Subsequently, Gaddafi said that agreements with foreign companies for the “equal” distribution of oil produced by them in Libya
was an injustice to the Libyan people and that it would be correct to reduce the share of such companies to 10-15%.

Libya possesses the largest proven oil reserves in Africa (50 billion bbl.) and estimates of its oil reserves are about 100 billion barrels on land and about the same on the shelf (moreover, not more than 30% of the country has been explored). Therefore, these decisions of Gaddafi’s were a very painful blow to the interests of foreign oil “grandees”, especially given the fact that the bulk of Libya’s oil is the most valuable – the light, low sulfur type requiring minimal expenditure on processing.

In addition, the PRC has recently shown increasing activity in obtaining contracts for Libyan oil fields, as well as participation in other Libyan infrastructure and industrial projects. In particular, China’s largest oil corporation CNPC has received a number of promising oil sites in the country for exploration and development. Before the current war, more than 30 thousand Chinese experts and workers had worked in Libya (after the war began, almost all of them were evacuated from the country). The Libyan “Chinese” factor – against the backdrop of the higher activity of Chinese businesses in Africa in general – is considered by knowledgeable experts to be one of the major reasons for the organization of the war against Gaddafi by Western nations.

The sum total of the enumerated “external” and internal motives turned out to be sufficient for Gaddafi, who six months ago was received with great honor in the leading countries of the world, to “suddenly” become a terrible dictator who must be overthrown immediately.

Despite the fact that Gaddafi has repeatedly urged the UN to send an international commission to Libya capable of investigating the situation on the spot and determining the validity of government actions against the insurgency that began in Cyrenaica, instead of a UN Commission, there followed the UN Security Council resolution №1970 and then №1973, which in fact paved the way for the U.S. and NATO war against Tripoli and unconditional direct and indirect support to the rebels, including land-based activities as well as the supply of arms. This became possible due to the fact that Resolution №1973 contained a formulation (again, unprecedentedly vague) of the UN’s given mandate on the admissibility of the use of ANY MEASURE to “protect civilians”, with the exception of military occupation; that is, it made possible the widest field of “interpretations” within the framework of the mandate (which was unprecedented for UN documents).
Soon after the start of the war against Gaddafi, Pentagon Chief Robert Gates and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen recognized at a meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee that after Gaddafi’s departure, a power struggle will certainly unfold in Libya; moreover, Gates cautioned “not to exaggerate the ability of the Americans to influence the political outcome of the events in Libya” after the overthrow of Gaddafi.

Nonetheless, the coalition aircraft and cruise missiles quickly destroyed Gaddafi’s aircraft, and then, insofar as there was nothing more to do where its mandate to “ensure a no-fly zone” was concerned, they began the destruction of Gaddafi’s armored vehicles and troops on the ground, as well as attempted to kill him by bombing the places where he might be located at that moment. Moreover, they used, among other things, attack aircraft AC-130, which are intended solely for the extermination of enemy personnel in the complete absence of air defense resources.

Moreover, it quickly became clear that the only battle-capable troops available among the rebels were about a thousand Islamic militants, who had schooled in war in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq and other hotspots; and that the others simply do not know even how to fight in an organized fashion, let alone how to use the weapons obtained from looted armories. As a result, Gaddafi’s troops consistently and quickly attacked at moments when there are no NATO airplanes and rolled back when the air force carried out strikes against the troops of Tripoli. Moreover, NATO aircraft have repeatedly “by mistake” carried out missile and bomb strikes on tank columns and rebel communications.

However, when the troops of Tripoli were moved from tanks to jeeps with machine guns indistinguishable from the jeeps of the Benghazi rebels, the military situation in Libya reached a deadlock, which in late March or early April was frankly acknowledged by the coalition commanders.

After this, the basic mechanisms of the “world community’s” action against Gaddafi has changed substantially. Qatar – in violation of the commercial and military embargo imposed against Libya by UN Security Council resolution №1970 – began to sell Libyan oil on the world market on behalf of the rebels, as well as supply Benghazi with the most modern (including French) weapons. The U.S.A., Great Britain, and France increased the contingents of their intelligence services among the rebel military. Now “special forces” from these countries not only
aim missiles and coalition aircraft at Gaddafi, but also supply Benghazi with communications equipment and direct battles, as well as hastily train rebel soldiers in modern methods of warfare.\textsuperscript{167}

But most importantly, the disinformation war against the government in Tripoli and Gadhafi personally has sharply increased. These lies started even before the war by stating that the League of Arab States in full force strongly demanded that the UN intervene in the situation in Libya. In fact, only 11 out of 22 countries attended the Arab League meeting, and at first the proposal to appeal to the UN was supported by only 7 members of the Arab League (the 6 Gulf monarchies and Egypt in the person of the current head of the Arab League Amr Moussa). After debates, there were 9 supporters of the resolution, but two countries — Algeria and Syria — still voted against an appeal to the UN.\textsuperscript{168}

Then the “international media” reported that the main “strike force” of Gaddafi’s troops carrying out genocide against the Libyan people are foreign mercenaries from the so-called “Islamic Legion”. However, Human Rights Watch, which has never sympathized with Gaddafi, has acknowledged that its activists in Libya have no data on the participation of fighters from the Legion in the repression and suppression of mass demonstrations in Libyan cities.\textsuperscript{169}

Then the international media began vying with each other to quote Al-Jazeera’s falsifications about the tens of thousands of civilians killed by Gaddafi’s troops, as well as the willingness of almost all of Gaddafi’s associates to betray him and cross over to the side of rebels.\textsuperscript{170} At a summit, a “contact group on Libya” was hastily created, where Qatar again sets the tone, announcing that an indispensable and essential condition for peace in Libya was the immediate and unconditional removal from power of Gaddafi himself, his family members, and close associates.\textsuperscript{171}

The apotheosis of this campaign were two events. On April 15\textsuperscript{th}, the head of the French Defense Ministry Gérard Longuet said that his country, the U.S.A., and Britain intended to go beyond the mandate of the UN Security Council’s Resolution \#1973\textsuperscript{172}. On the same day, all the world’s leading media released a joint statement by Obama, Sarkozy, and Cameron, in which, as a justification for the need to escalate the coalition war in Libya, they repeat the myth that Gaddafi is a killer who started and is waging war against his own civilians and that the haste of the coalition was called for due to “humanitarian purposes” — the need to immediately stop the dictator.\textsuperscript{173}
It is true that shortly before this appeal, Abdel Fattah Younes, Gaddafi’s former Interior Minister and now commander of the armed forces of the rebels, tarnished the noble reputation of the “insurgents”. Younes was indignant about the refusal of NATO forces to bomb Misurata because there are civilians there and said that “where there are Gaddafi’s troops, there are no civilians”.

Then the above-mentioned statement of the three leaders who started the war against Gaddafi was disavowed by the publication of a report by the Human Rights Watch mission to investigate the situation of the victims of Gaddafi’s troops at Misurata (the world’s media has repeated every day that there are many thousands of such victims among civilians in the words of “representatives of the rebels”)175. It turned out that the Human Rights Watch mission counted that in two months of war, 257 were killed and 949 were wounded in Misurata, and among the wounded there were only 22 women. This would have been completely impossible in the event of bombing civilians — in this case among the wounded there would have been many children and roughly an equal number of women and men.

However, what is again remarkable and proves the existence of a coordinated disinformation campaign against the Libyan government is that neither the Human Rights Watch report nor the Boston Globe article appeared in the mainstream press and television. The world’s media in the days that followed just as assiduously repeated the “messages of the Libyan opposition” about the hundreds and thousands of Gaddafi victims among the civilian population.

On April 18th, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton said that the EU countries had agreed to send ground troops to Libya for the protection of humanitarian convoys, “if so requested by the UN”. She stressed that these troops would not participate in hostilities and thus do not violate the UN Security Council resolution176.

On April 19th, coalition aircraft began to carry out missile and bomb strikes on the central areas of Tripoli and other towns under the control of Gaddafi “with the aim to protect civilians”177.

On April 21st, Barack Obama sanctioned the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with missile weapons in operations against Gaddafi178.

On April 22nd, U.S. Senator John McCain arrived in Benghazi and urged the U.S.A. and other countries around the world to immediately recognize the “Transitional National Council” of the rebels as the only
legitimate authority in Libya, to provide it with all the frozen assets of
the Libyan Government, to increase air strikes on Gaddafi, and to
intensify training of insurgents and the supply of weapons to them. On
the same day, the Sarkozy administration announced its intention
to unfreeze “Gaddafi’s assets” and to begin funding the Libyan
opposition with them. Also on the same day, Gaddafi’s troops left
Misurata; moreover Gaddafi invited representatives of the local tribes
to negotiate themselves with the rebels for surrender, or to fight them
themselves.

On April 23rd, fighting in Misurata resumed and NATO aircraft
bombed the central districts and suburbs of Tripoli. On April 24th, NATO
undertook missile and bomb strikes on the Libyan government
administrative complex, Bab al-Azizia, in the heart of Tripoli, which
were the most powerful since the war began. According to reports by
journalists in Tripoli, one of the buildings in the complex was destroyed
and the others were badly damaged. More than 45 people were injured,
15 of them seriously, and all three state TV channels stopped
broadcasting for an hour. Also on the same day, the Italian La Stampa
reported that Rome had sent groups of special forces to Libya to help
the Benghazi rebels as early as a few weeks ago.

On April 30th, both the “the interim government in Benghazi” and
NATO leaders rejected another offer by Gaddafi to negotiate a truce
without preliminary conditions, after which the firing on Misurata
and rebel positions in Western Libya by Gaddafi’s military forces and
the NATO bombing of Gaddafi’s forces continued.

On the night of April 30th to May 1st, as a result of NATO bombing of
one of the residences of Muammar Gaddafi in Tripoli, his 29-year-old
son, Saif al-Arab and Gaddafi’s three young grandchildren were killed:
two year-old Carthage, the daughter of Hannibal Gaddafi; five-year
Macura, daughter of Colonel Gaddafi’s daughter Aisha; and 15-month-
old Saif Muhammad, Muhammad Gaddafi’s son, as well as several
friends and neighbors. It is reported that Maummar Gaddafi himself
and his wife were in the same residence, but were not affected.
Moreover, NATO officials stated that the target in their attack was not
the Libyan leader or his family, but “military targets”.

Mass demonstrations calling for revenge for the death of the Libyan
leader’s son and grandchildren of Libyan leader have taken place on the
Libyan territory controlled by Gaddafi. In Tripoli, the (long-closed)
Embassies of the U.S.A., Britain and Italy were destroyed. Moreover,
the Libyan Deputy Foreign Minister, Khaled Kaim, immediately apologized for the violation of diplomatic rules, saying that the police could not cope with the crowd, outraged by the NATO bombing and the deaths of the relatives of Libyan leader, and announced that the Libyan leadership will assess the damage inflicted on diplomatic missions and carry out repair restoration work.

Against the backdrop of this “war”, a scandal between EU countries is unfolding over the reception of refugees from Libya, which are coming to Italy in a rising tide (mostly to Lampedusa). The matter has gone so far that in connection with the problem, France has initiated a review within the EU to suspend the Schengen agreements, which has been met with understanding and support not only by Italy, but also by Germany and a number of other countries. While the talk is of a “temporary” suspension of the Schengen open borders, some experts are already saying that this “temporary” measure may end up being indefinitely prolonged.

**The main potential consequences of a possible defeat of Gaddafi**

Whatever the outcome of the war in Libya, the redistribution of the power balance in the country cannot be without conflict: even if Gaddafi will not be there, neither the Gaddafi tribe nor his allies will disappear, and they will defend their position arms in hand. In addition, far from all the tribes (including Cyrenaica tribes) of the country are willing to part with the achievements of the “Islamic socialism” they obtained from Gaddafi. Any government that tries to take away those gains will not have sustainability. Furthermore, the vast majority of the population of Libya has never known and do not understand any democracy except for the intertribal democracy of a military leader.

Subsequently, for the unification of any society that has preserved a tribal identity, the presence of a strong charismatic leader who has confidently proven his right to rule is extremely important. Gaddafi has proven this right for many years through both the blood of enemies and comrades-in-arms, as well as with major economic and social results.

So far the opposition clearly does not have such a leader; moreover, some of the members of the National Transitional Council it has created as a “provisional government” have still not been named, allegedly “for security considerations”. This signifies the inevitability of a protracted
civil war until the war (if it is able to) determines such a leader. Moreover, a situation is quite likely in which several such leaders arise in different regions, and none of them can prove their ability to integrate the country as a whole.

Then Libya is doomed to a decline of the state (obviously not a bloodless one, given the uneven distribution of oil fields, most of which are located on Berber lands) into several conflicting quasi-governments (the “Somali” model). Moreover, within each of them, a multitude of conflicting tribal clans will fight with each other. Leading expert on Middle Eastern and African issues of the American Council on Foreign Relations, Robert Danin defined the situation thus: “While Qaddafi’s departure from the scene would be mourned by few, it would also create an enormous power vacuum. Entirely unclear is what glue will hold together this largely decentralized country, in which nationalist identification is low, and tribal and clan affinity are paramount”.

Furthermore, it should be noted that in the course of decolonization, the majority of borders in this region of Africa were drawn according to the lines on maps and they divide related tribes and tribal alliances. This is particularly important in the South (Niger, Chad), but it is also significant in the South East, East (Sudan, Egypt), and West (Algeria). Thus, for example, the large Zaghawa tribal clan alliances live in Libya, Sudan, and Chad.

This is why Gaddafi actively cooperated with tribal leaders (including economic and military aid) in those countries — in order to preserve “tribal peace” at home in Libya. This is how most of those called “African mercenaries” appeared in Libya. They came to Gaddafi not only because the Libyan leader paid fairly generously, but also by the order of their sheikhs: to repay a debt for the help Gaddafi had previously shown to their tribes. This is primarily according to the composition of the Islamic Pan-African Legion — one of Gaddafi’s main pillars of power.

This is why the civil war in Libya cannot fail to fan the fire of intertribal massacres in the vast region of Africa — tribesmen on both sides of the conventional state boundaries will unite and fight.

Finally, we cannot fail to mention that the clan and tribal Libyan radical Islamic opposition is one of the most powerful and organized forces, not only having passed through the “school” of wars in “hot spots”, but also possessing a “supratribal” character to a significant degree. Now this opposition is rapidly gaining strength and arming itself, having merged with the rebels. If political chaos is established in Libya
in the course of the ongoing war, it is al-Qaeda and related groups that could become the only real authority. This gives the Islamic radicals a rather high chance of beginning restoration of the Caliphate with Libya.

**Algeria**

Serious economic difficulties began in Algeria in the 1980s under President Houari Boumediene and his “socialist” commodity economy, primarily related, as in the U.S.S.R., with a sharp decline in world prices of the main export commodity – energy products.

In this period, the Algerian leadership began to seek economic assistance from the Islamic countries of the Gulf (above all from Saudi Arabia); moreover, influential Algerian Muslim leaders became important communicators in the negotiations for aid. The result was a sharp increase in politically ambitious Islam in the country, as well as Islamic radicalization of the rather broad general public.

The slogan of creating a theocratic state in Algeria based on the sharia put forward by the Islamists (above all by the coalition Islamic Salvation Front - ISF) provided them with a convincing victory in the first multiparty elections in 1991. The government’s response was cancellation of the election results and the virtual establishment of a military dictatorship and a state of emergency regime in the country, after which a decade of civil war began in Algeria that took the lives of up to 150 thousand people. Final stabilization of the political situation in the country occurred only after re-election of a “civil” candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to the presidency in 2004, who announced an amnesty for members of the armed rebellion under the condition of their voluntary surrender.

Most of the leaders of Islamic parties and organizations in the country have joined the Charter for Peace and Reconciliation, signed in 2005, except for the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. In 2004, its leader, Abu Musab Abdul Wadud announced the affiliation of his organization with al-Qaeda, after which it received a second name, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).\(^{191}\)

As pointed out by the French expert Claude Monique\(^{192}\), now AQIM in Algeria consists of two interconnected groups. The first operates in the north-east of Algeria, particularly in Kabylie, and specializes in terrorist attacks against representatives of the government and security agencies. The second operates in the extreme south of Algeria, as well as in Mali, Niger, and Mauritania, and specializes in financing the
activities of the first (transit of cocaine from Latin America across the Sahel, as well as kidnapping foreigners for ransom).

Military experts have reported that the AQIM in Algeria greatly intensified activities during the rise in protests actions in countries of the Maghreb in January-March 2011. On January 13th, AQIM leader Abu Musab Abdul Wadud posted a video on the Internet calling for the overthrow of the government in Algeria and Tunisia, and creation of states on the principles of sharia on their territories. The “southern” AQIM group significantly increased its stockpile of weapons and military equipment (it has been established that they were obtained as a result of looting military armories in Libya) and sharply raised the ransom price for abducted foreigners.

Other Islamic groups banned in Algeria increased their activities at the same time. At the beginning of the protests in Tunisia, the leader of the Islamic Salvation Front, Abbas Madani, who lives in exile in Qatar, urged Algerians to take part in the protest actions. Madani’s deputy at the ISF, Ali Belhadji, attempted to organize an Islamic demonstration in the capital’s Bab El Oued quarter, but was immediately arrested on charges of “incitement to armed rebellion”.

It is significant that the legal Berber opposition parties Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie MAK (Berbers in Algeria constitute about 17% of the population) joined in the organization of mass protest demonstrations against the government at the same time. These demonstrations have met tough resistance from the authorities in the capital of Algeria on the basis of “emergency law”, but passed without incident in the capital of Kabylie, Tizi-Ouzou.

On February 12th, despite the legal ban, the opposition National Union for Change and Democracy (NOPD) held a large (up to 10 thousand people) demonstration in the capital, demanding the resignation of President Bouteflika, the abolition of emergency law, the release of arrested participants of earlier demonstrations, as well as a fight against corruption in the state machine. According to French media reports, the government deployed 28 thousand police officers against the demonstrators and approximately 400 people were arrested.

On February 24th, Bouteflika announced the lifting of nearly 20 years of emergency law. However, after this, the police brutally interrupted attempts to organize large opposition protest events in Algeria several times (February 26, March 5, March 25).
According to experts, the risks of destabilizing the political situation in Algeria are linked primarily to the fact that the National People’s Army (NPA) was the main support for the government for many years (presidents of Algeria Boumediene, Bendjedid, and Zeroual were creatures of the NPA and retired military officers hold most key government posts). Under Bouteflika, they began to subsequently be removed from any real power. The actual loyalty of the army leadership to the head of state is largely ensured by Bouteflika’s government’s multi-billion dollar budget expenditure on technological re-equipment of the army and enhancement of its combat effectiveness. However, experts stress that the influence of Islamists is consistently growing in the ranks, as well as in the low-level and middle command structures of the NPA, and that those most loyal to the current regime remain in the police force and the secret services.

Together with this, however, the protest potential in Algeria after the revocation of emergency law cannot fail to grow.

On January 21st, 2011, the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD) alliance was formed from opposition parties and organizations, where one of the leading roles is played by the Berber RCD. Moreover, the political positions of the NCCD were immediately supported by some of the largest representatives of Algerian business (in particular, Issad Rebrab, the owner of a family holding company with a turnover of more than $2.5 billion). The National Alliance for Change (ANC), established by the former prime minister Ahmed Benbitour (1999-2000), is fully capable of becoming another large and influential opposition force. The Islamic parties al-Islah and the Movement for Preaching and Change, the Association of Algerian Ulama, Algeria’s Republican Party, the Party of Algerian Renewal, and a number of trade unions entered into the ANC.

Furthermore, it is impossible not to note the American reaction to the events in Algeria. On February 12th, 2011, a U.S. State Department official urged the Algerian security forces in a strictly official statement to “exercise restraint in respect to the protesters.” This was followed on February 16th by an equally tough response by the party leaders of the ruling coalition. The Secretary General of the National Liberation Front Abdelaziz Belkhadem said: “Some countries ... see in the Arab world an experimental platform for testing models of democracy, which they want to impose on us. These states use the policy of double standards in order to bring our country to take those positions, which they consider to be
The secretary general of the National Democratic Union and the country’s prime minister, Ahmed Ouyahia, added: “They should not expect that we will pay any attention to their orders...”

According to expert assessments of the social situation in Algeria, the majority of the population remembers well the horrors of the recent civil war and is very afraid of the protest actions in the country escalating into armed confrontation. For this reason, the combined protest activity of opposition forces cropping up now is decidedly inadequate to “pump up the situation” to the scale of a political explosion, let alone a mass armed struggle.

Under these conditions, a key risk for Algeria is the possibility of reducing the loyalty to the ruling regime on the part of a rather deeply Islamized army. So far, according to experts, the risk is low. But in a situation of potential crisis-related reduction of energy prices, reduction of the military budget, as well as the growth of grass-roots protests and the growing influence of Islamists in the ranks and junior and middle command of the army, the dubious loyalty of the NPA will make the capabilities of the police and security services (the main part of which is tightly linked to the ruling Bouteflika regime) insufficient to maintain the country’s political stability.

This potential could be even more inadequate in the context of al-Qaida (AQIM)’s increasing activity in neighboring Morocco and especially in Mauritania, as well as in light of the “unfriendly” policies of external centers of influence.

In regards to the latter, we must not fail to note the sharp statements of French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the necessity of dealing with the dictators who violate human rights in the same way as with Gaddafi. These statements, as reported by the Algerian newspaper Al-Khabar, followed the refusal of Algeria to vote in the League of Arab States for an appeal to the UN against Gaddafi, as well as the refusal of President Bouteflika to allow NATO aircraft through Algerian airspace for operations against al-Gaddafi forces in the west of Libya. Moreover, after these statements by Sarkozy, the Berber Party, which is based in Paris and supports the autonomy or even independence of Kabylie from Algeria, sharply intensified its activities.

At the same time, the activity of AQIM and related radical Islamist groups increased in the regions of Mali adjacent to the Algerian border. As a large number of heavy weapons and man-portable air defense systems have fallen into the hands of AQIM troops in this region as the
result of events in Libya, in early April 2011 about 7 thousand policemen and five army battalions with equipment, including military helicopters, were deployed to the south of Algeria. However, major terrorist attacks soon began in Algeria nonetheless.

On April 15th (the day on which President Bouteflika announced upcoming changes to the constitution “with the aim of strengthening democracy in the country”), a group of Islamists killed 13 military officers in an attack on an army checkpoint on the road from the capital to the east. On April 17th, there were two more terrorist attacks, as a result of which six soldiers and one policeman were killed and several military officers were wounded.

Moreover, most experts are convinced that in the event of the defeat of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, the activity of AQIM and related radical (and very well armed and trained) Islamic groups will inevitably increase sharply not only in the Algerian south and south-east, but also in the Berber areas, as well as in the densely populated coastal regions of the country.

**Tunisia**

The policy of State Social-Democracy conducted by the first president Habib Bourguiba since the moment Tunisia gained independence from France in 1956 and continued by his successor Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 1989, has brought the country to one of the leading positions in Africa by level of development. Both leaders of the country have successfully used oil and gas rents for this, and when it ceased to suffice, Ben Ali’s government no less successfully transferred the economy to the effective use of revenues from the export of agricultural products and textiles, as well as from development of the modern infrastructure of international tourism (by the beginning of the 20th century tourism provided 50% of the national budget).

As a result, Tunisia yields in Africa only to the “oil-rich” Libya and Algeria according to GDP per capita, and has provided a steady GDP growth level of over 5% a year for many years, and spends about 20% of GDP on social needs. Less than 4% of the population in the country lives below the poverty level ($3 a day). Moreover, the gap in the level of consumption between the rich and poor in Tunisia is one of the lowest in the world. The share of the “middle class”, which constitutes almost 60% of the population, accounts for 83% of the national consumption of GDP and the poor receive government subsidies.
The level of education in the country is one of the highest not only in Africa, but in the world. On account of mass international tourism, the country is sufficiently wide open to all world trends, including the Internet and the standards of Western “consumer society”. It is the highly educated young people with high status ambitions, not wishing to be employed in low-paying jobs and constituting over a third of Tunisia’s registered unemployed that became the main driving force in the violent protests against Ben Ali’s regime that began in late December 2010 (and were unexpected for both the national authorities and the entire world).

International observers were surprised more than anything by the fact that the organization of protests was not shown serious resistance by either the police or the army almost from the very outset. The police intervened only after the protest actions passed into an acute phase, thereby not quenching, but “inflaming” the protest.

On January 12th, 2011, the Tunisian General Labor Union supported the protest actions, and they swept the capital. Moreover, they were very well and professionally organized: some groups of young people built barricades in the streets, obstructing the approach of police, others ransacked police stations, a third group ransacked the villas and offices of members of the ruling Ben Ali clan, and yet others robbed stores. The police clearly could not deal with the situation, and on January 14th, the Chief of Staff of the Tunisian National Army Rachid Ammar demanded that President Ben Ali leave Tunisia immediately. Thus, it appeared that beneath the mass protests in Tunisia, there was in fact a “palace coup”.

The main reason for the refusal of the largest clans of the country’s elite and their allies in the army and security services to maintain loyalty to President Ben Ali, according to experts, was the policy of the president’s “family” clan. If previously a relative balance of clans was preserved in the country, then beginning with the 2004 presidential election, the clan of Ben Ali and his wife Leila Trabelsi gradually began to edge out other influential clan groups from all profitable spheres of business. By 2010, the Ben Ali-Trabelsi clan occupied essentially all the key positions in the national economy. It was from the spring-summer of 2010 that the majority of the political and economic elite of the country began to clearly distance itself from the ruling clan. Apparently one of “the last straws that broke the camel’s back” was when the sister of President, Hayat Ben Ali, secured a monopoly for her corporation
ENVA for the maintenance of the Tunisian army’s aircraft and other military equipment, thereby taking away one of the largest “feeding troughs” from the Tunisian military.

After the flight of Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia “for treatment”, the responsibilities of the interim president of the country began to be carried out by the former speaker of the lower house of parliament Fouad Mebazaa, and Mohamed Ghannouchi entered the office of interim Prime Minister. However, the transfer of key levers of power to these functionaries of the Constitutional Democratic Rally ruling party and Ben Ali’s recent associates did not satisfy either the elite or the grassroots protesters. Protests and riots (attacks on police stations were especially frequent) continued in both the province and in the capital.

In the beginning of February, rumors spread in Tunisia that the supporters of Ben Ali in the Interior Ministry had specially destabilized the situation in the country, after which the leadership of the Chief Directorate of the National Security Agency of the Ministry of the Interior and the police were completely forced to resign. The decapitated police completely ceased to cope with the situation and the protests only widened.

On February 15th, Mebazaa announced the lifting of the curfew in the country, although he extended the state of emergency. Having obtained the right to issue decrees from the parliament, Mebazaa’s first decree of February 19 announced a general amnesty, after which almost 3 thousand prisoners were released from Tunisian prisons. The protests have again started to grow in the scope and radicalism of their demands (eliminating the remnants of the Ben Ali-Trabelsi clan, fighting corruption, the immediate elimination of unemployment and poverty, etc.).

On February 20th, a mass demonstration was held in the capital demanding the resignation of the interim government of Ghannouchi, and another one on February 25th, the largest since the overthrow of Ben Ali, with the same demands. On February 26th, a demonstration by Ben Ali’s supporters was dispersed by police and the opposition’s demonstration escalated into looting of shops and police stations (more than 20 policemen were injured and five killed).

In order to reduce the heat of protest, the authorities announced an approximate date for general elections (mid-July 2011) and decided to freeze all of Ben Ali’s property and his bank deposits, as well as the expropriation of possessions of 110 relatives and “close associates” of
the former president. However, on February 27th, Ghannouchi said that “unknown forces are trying to derail the success of the revolution in Tunisia” and resigned from his post as head of government. Mebazaa appointed the 84-year old minister Benji Caid Essebi (an associate of the country’s first president Bourguiba) the new prime minister of Tunisia.

Throughout all of this period, a continuous “leapfrog” took place with the appointment and resignation of ministers and heads of key departments, weakening the efficiency of the government. In February, new governors were appointed in all 24 Tunisian provinces. The military, in accordance with the state of emergency, controlled key facilities in the cities and checkpoints at their exit points fairly tightly, but did not intervene in the protests. It was only in March that the wave of protest in Tunisia began to decline. Furthermore, according to UN data, 147 people had been killed in clashes with police during the “jasmine revolution” in December-January alone, another 70 were killed in the course of riots in prisons, and 510 people were wounded.

As experts report, throughout this period the leading economic and military clans of Tunisia quickly divided up the “economic legacy” of the Ben Ali-Trabelsi family. At the same time, the Islamic opposition raised its head cautiously, but steadily.

After Ben Ali came to power in 1990-1991, he almost completely destroyed the Islamic movement An-Nahda, and several smaller groups (Islamic Jihad, Soldier of Allah, Islamic Liberation Party). However, he could not fully destroy the Islamist underground. From December 2003, about 2 thousand Islamic radicals were detained in the country on charges of terrorism. In December 2006-January 2007, armed clashes took place between the army and the militant group Soldiers of Assan Ibn Al Fourat (a branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM) in Tunisia and its suburb Soliman. Furthermore, two more large Tunisian Islamist organizations – the relatively moderate An-Nahda (headquartered in London) and the radical Tunisian Fighting Group (another ally of al-Qaeda) have operated in Europe.

On January 30th, 2011, the chairman of An-Nahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, returned to Tunisia from London and announced he was not going to run for president or enter the government, but “focus on the introduction of democracy into Tunisian political life”207. However, the Secretary General of An-Nahda Hamadi Jebili, having gained in influence, promptly declared that the movement would take part in
future elections for the Chamber of Deputies. In late March, R. Ghannouchi announced that the party had filed the official documents for registration to participate in elections.

Although in April no major protest incidents in Tunisia occurred, some events (in particular, the arrest on April 10th of the brother of former president, Slah Ben Ali\textsuperscript{208}, and the announcement on April 14\textsuperscript{th} of an international search and formal charges against the former president on 18 counts, including murder and conspiracy against the state\textsuperscript{209}, as well as the ban declared April 22\textsuperscript{nd} on believers praying in the streets, which allegedly interferes with traffic\textsuperscript{210}) reported in the Algerian and foreign media notably increased the socio-political tensions in the country; in particular, indignation against the ban on praying in the streets was expressed in many mosques.

An additional factor in the worsening of the socio-political situation is a sharp rise in crime in the country after the overthrow of the ruling Ben Ali-Trabelsi clan. This is connected not only with the overall “revolutionary” social destabilization, but also with the fact that in the course of the revolutionary incidents, more than 11 thousand offenders have escaped or were released from the prisons of Tunisia. The last such events occurred on April 30\textsuperscript{th}, when 522 people escaped a fire that began in a few cells in the prison in the city of Kasserine, and another 300 people fled from the prison in the town of Gafsa in strikes begun by prison staff\textsuperscript{211}. Moreover, local media say that such a massive and organized escape is no coincidence and that among the fugitives there were quite a few radical Islamists.

Experts believe that the influence of Islamists in Tunisia will inevitably rise. According to the data of military analysts, the activity of AQIM is already actively growing in the extreme south of Tunisia, primarily in the field of drug trafficking from Niger and Mali. These analysts do not rule out that the wave of Islamist terrorist attacks which have recently been increasing in Algeria may soon begin sweeping Tunisia.

Estimates of the loss from the protest riots are more than $5 billion. As a result of the crackdown and looting of businesses in the course of the “jasmine revolution”, at least 12-15 thousand jobs were lost. Although the majority of countries has allowed tourist companies to resume sales of tours to Tunisia, the ongoing collapse of the tourism industry deprives the country not only of one more (very important) job sector, but also the main income from a key sector of the economy\textsuperscript{212}. 


\[163\]
The expropriated assets of the former ruling clan, although large, are not commensurate with the country’s GDP and will not be able to support the national budget for a long time.

In connection with this, it is impossible to exclude that by the elections, which are scheduled for July 24, 2011, the country will enter a state of an acute fall in living standards, acute disappointment with the results of the “jasmine revolution”, and a growing ideological vacuum. This may soon predetermine a political choice of Tunisia between “Islamic democracy” and military dictatorship.

Morocco

The Kingdom of Morocco, having gained independence from France in 1956, has been characterized for many years by relatively high domestic political stability. The only major external conflict – the struggle of the Frente Polisario for the return of the territories of former Spanish colony of Western Sahara annexed by the kingdom in 1975 – beginning in the mid-80’s, after construction on the border of Western Sahara of the so-called “Moroccan Wall”, has had no serious impact on the internal political life of the country.

The basis of Morocco’s stability was its sufficiently high foreign exchange earnings from foreign trade (Morocco is the world’s largest exporter of phosphates and widely exports textiles and fishery products) and tourism, as well as the social policy of a “semi-constitutional” monarchy, providing a living standard relatively high for Africa and rather wide access of the general population to medicine and education. Furthermore, specialists stressed that Morocco is one of few countries in which the prerequisites for ethno-tribal conflict between the dominant Arabs and Berbers (constituting about 40% of the population) have been almost completely eliminated. In addition, a significant factor in the political stability of the country constitutes agreements for a strategic alliance with France and the U.S. (in 2004, Morocco received the status of the main U.S. non-NATO ally).

Morocco, however, is a deeply Islamized country (Islam is the state religion and almost 99% of the population consider themselves to be Muslims). For this reason, many experts believe Morocco has become one of the main territories stationing “al-Qaeda in countries of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM). It is noted that during the years of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan and later (from 1979 until at least 2003), the monarchy’s foreign policy was essentially in solidarity with the
“Afghan jihad”, moreover “more than 70% of mosques in the country were not controlled by the Ministry for Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs and they undertook radical Islamist preaching, as well as the distribution of jihadist literature and the reception and distribution of financial resources coming from abroad to support the jihad”\(^{213}\).

Experts stress that the AQIM, increasing its activity in the Maghreb and in countries of the Sahel, conducted virtually no major actions in Morocco itself in all the proceeding years, and thus essentially did not cause the government of the kingdom any political concern.

This concern arose only at the end of 2010, when members of the AQIM, according to Moroccan security forces, began to join in the population’s demonstrations against price increases for priority food products, and when it became clear that the influence of Islamists was growing in the lower class make-up of the army.

In the middle of October 2010, the head of the Moroccan Interior Ministry Taieb Cherkaoui announced the arrest of a group of 34 people involved in drug trafficking and connected to AQIM.

On January 5, 2011, Cherkaoui announced the arrest of a terrorist group of 27 people in the south of the country, which was connected with AQIM and similar groups in Europe. Furthermore, a large arsenal of weapons was captured: 33 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 3 machine guns, 4 grenade launchers RPG-7, an 82-mm mortar gun, a large quantity of ammunition, as well as topographic maps of the area of the Moroccan-Algerian border. On January 6\(^{\text{th}}\), the Moroccan newspaper *The Economist* reported that among those arrested were “an AQIM militant, who was commissioned to create a logistical base in the south of the country, as well as to prepare a plan for terrorist attacks on the territory of the kingdom”, and that four participants of the group were arrested near the border with Algeria, where they intended to cross. On January 12\(^{\text{th}}\), Cherkaoui announced that the Moroccan security forces arrested five soldiers on suspicion of facilitating the import of the above-listed weapons into the country.

These events particularly alarmed the authorities of the kingdom in connection with the nearby Tunisian and then Egyptian examples. However, the protest potential in a country is determined not only by higher food prices (King Mohammed VI has already pledged to allocate almost $23 billion for food subsidies). With the Moroccan population of approximately 35 million people, each year around 500 thousand people finish universities in the country; moreover, of these, no more
than 10% find jobs within a year. This protesting mass is not only socially active and ambitious (the majority of graduates consider themselves worthy of a public servant position, highly paid and provided with additional social benefits). Young people, firstly, use the Internet extensively, and secondly, are mostly deeply Islamized due to the specificity of the national system of higher education.

In connection with this, it should be noted that, along with users of Facebook, the Islamist movement Justice and Piety, which is highly influential in Morocco, immediately joined the protest actions. It welcomed the events in Tunisia and Egypt, demanded immediate democratic reforms from the government, and announced: «It is unfair that the main wealth of the country belongs to the minority».

On January 31st, the cousin of the king, Prince Moulay Hicham (regularly criticizing the royal authority from “social-democratic positions”, and therefore nicknamed the “Red Prince”) said in the Spanish newspaper El País that “Morocco has not yet reached the level of social and political tensions», which instigated large incidents in Tunisia and Egypt; however, he did not rule out that “in the future, the kingdom may follow them”.

The protests continued. On February 14th, M. Hicham said to the Moroccan press that “the people”’s anger has not chosen the monarchy as a target... But young people, despairing of the lack of prospects in life, political games without their participation, the arbitrariness of the special services and rampant corruption, may find reasons for an uprising, which can radicalize quickly, given the complexity of the country”.

On February 20th, two parties of the governing coalition – the Socialist Union of People’s Forces and the Popular Movement – declared that the government should develop a precise calendar of political reforms in the country. On the same day, thousands of demonstrations in Morocco took place with the demands for the revision of the constitution and limitations to royal power, as well as carrying out large-scale socio-economic reforms. In a number of cities, the protesters engaged in clashes with police. According to official figures, 5 people were killed, and 33 government buildings, 24 banks, 50 shops and 66 vehicles were looted or burnt down. In the course of this demonstration, the creation of the opposition “February 20 Movement” was announced, which intends to seek radical constitutional reforms.

On February 21st, King Mohammed VI announced that he was committed to continuing structural reforms and that his ultimate goal was “to ensure conditions for a dignified life for all Moroccans, and
especially the disadvantaged, as well as the realization of comprehensive
development, which allows for the creation of productive jobs for young
people.” However, the same day police violently dispersed a group of
young people staging a sit-in in the heart of Rabat.

After this, as the government began to “pour money” into grassroots
protest, the police and security services tightened control over the
organizers of demonstrations and the wave of protest began to decline.
The U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Burns, who
arrived in Morocco on February 27th, said in Rabat that Morocco is a
successful “model of reform and democratization.”

However, the majority of experts are convinced that this American
assessment of the situation in Morocco is overly optimistic and
premature. Although King Mohammed VI announced on March 9th that
he will initiate political reforms (in particular, it was announced that in
the future the Prime Minister will be elected by Parliament, rather than
appointed by King), soon Nadia Yassine, the daughter of Abdessalam
Yassine, the leader of a very influential Islamist organization in the
country, Justice and Piety, said the reforms announced by King were
“insufficient because it does not call into question the absolute nature of
the monarchy.”

At the same time, the February 20 Movement announced that it
intended to continue the practice of mass protests (peaceful
demonstrations) until such time as constitutional reforms are enacted.
It was against this backdrop that numerous Berber organizations began
to radicalize, which had abruptly intensified their actions immediately
after the monarch’s announcement about the beginning of the
constitutional reforms. The Berbers, in particular, stated that they
reject the existing “Advisory Committee on Regionalization” and will
not recognize the new Constitution in advance, if it does not recognize
the Berber language as an official language.

On March 20th, large protest actions and protesters clashes with police
took place in the capital Rabat and the largest city in the country
Casablanca (again, as before, organized through Facebook).

But at the same time there “surfaced” yet another problem in
Morocco, which has a distinct foreign policy dimension. In the German
Bundestag a scandal arose, associated with the discussion of the issue of
the supply of modern weapons to Morocco.

“Two sides of the coin” were immediately distinguished in this
scandal. The first was that the king ostensibly could use these weapons
to forcefully suppress the democratic opposition. The second concerned the long-ago initiated project of EU countries led by Germany to create giant solar power “fields” in Morocco designed not only to supply with solar energy countries in the region, but also to export electricity to Europe.

In the course of the scandal it became clear that a significant part of the “solar power fields” were planned for the territories of the Western Sahara, which the majority of the EU considers illegally annexed by Morocco. The German deputies immediately suggested that German-supplied weapons might be used by the army of King Mohammed VI for suppressing resistance by the Western Saharan Polisario Front.

Finally, on April 4th, yet another major demonstration was held in Casablanca (again accompanied by clashes with the police) under the slogans “No to Corruption”, “End social injustice”, and “People want to put an end to authoritarianism”. Moreover, as experts report, among the protesters were very many Islamists from the movement Justice and Piety, which demanded the revocation of the 19th article of the constitution, which proclaims the king to be the religious leader of the country.

On April 28th, a terrorist attack occurred in Marrakesh in the café most popular among foreigners, “Agra”, with the use of a remote-controlled bomb, as a result of which 16 foreign tourists were killed and 23 people were wounded. Moreover, the Moroccan Interior Minister Cherkaoui said that the attack, judging by its nature, was committed by AQIM militants.

**Egypt**

After the overthrow of King Farouk I as a result of a military coup in 1952, the government in Egypt has always been controlled by the military. And in this sense, the political regime in the country was — with a kind of “democratic” entourage — perhaps not overly harsh, but a very real military dictatorship.

After a long period of Soviet support for Egypt in the framework of opposition between the “capitalist” and “socialist” blocks, there occurred — already under President Anwar Sadat — a reorientation of the ruling military elite towards the U.S.A. Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, which resulted in extensive economic and military American aid ($1.5 billion annually) cemented the alliance. But at the same time it led to an acute deterioration of relations with the rest of the Arab and
Islamic world, including the suspension of the country from the League of Arab States for many years.

Egypt’s own productive capacity, unlike the majority of countries in the Middle East and the Maghreb, has always been insufficient for conducting an economic policy that ensures relatively high living standards. The valley and delta of the Nile, as well as a few oases, which occupy only 4% of the territory of the country (the rest is desert) are too insignificant a territory for food self-sufficiency, efficient urbanization, and industrial development, even more so in the presence of a traditional Arab society with high birth rates and a mortality rate that sharply declined in the “socialist era”. Hence the low standard of living (according to official figures, 20% of the population live below the poverty line; according to unofficial figures – 30%) and high unemployment (officially – 10%, unofficial estimates – more than 20%), which affects young people especially painfully. Also there is overpopulation of the cities, above all, Cairo and Alexandria (according to unofficial data, the population of Cairo and its suburbs has exceeded 23 million people).

The main items in the national income of Egypt are the service charges and the transit of ships through the Suez Canal, international tourism, and not overly large volumes of oil exports, extracted mainly in Sinai. The export load of the balance of trade, primarily food products (Egypt buys on world markets more than half of the 14 million tons of the wheat consumed annually), is very high and has increased in the context of the crisis-related, opportunistic growth of world prices. This has brought about the increased cost of food essentials in Egypt and further aggravated the socio-economic situation of the “bottom”224, who already were not blessed, among other things because of the very high and almost all-inclusive corruption in society.

The longstanding government of Hosni Mubarak, as in the majority of Eastern societies, has led to the establishment of a clan system of distribution of power and property in the country, in the framework of which the maximum preferences are received by the “influential circles” of the clan leader. Meanwhile, a relatively young “middle class” has grown up in large cities (primarily on account of income from international tourism services).

This middle class was already well acquainted with the outside world both through tourists and through the Internet (Egypt is the center of the main Internet communications for the entire Middle East and large
parts of Africa) and it is quite ambitious, but has had practically no channels for upward social mobility to “make one’s way in life”. It is this class that has become the main “ignition” of the current Egyptian revolution. It was its mass demonstrations that were mobilized and coordinated through Facebook.

The second (and much more real) force of the Egyptian revolution was the Islamic organizations, above all the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). It was near their mosques that the messages sent through Facebook appointed as a gathering place for demonstrators, and it was here that posters were distributed and instructions were given for the protest actions.

The MB, originating in Egypt but subjected to repression in the country and officially banned after a series of major terrorist incidents, including the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, is as before the world’s largest Islamic organization, possessing branches and subsidiaries in 70 countries of the world.

In Egypt, the MB as a party could not officially participate in politics at all from the 1980s and has nominated its candidates in national and local elections either as from other legal parties or as independents. But in social life, especially in the “back country”, MB has played a huge role, organizing training, treatment, charity events, and social services for local residents, and at the same time organizing both their religious indoctrination and obtaining a very high electoral popularity.

Thus, in the parliamentary elections of 2005, the first conducted with some political concessions on the advice of the U.S.A. (see the speech of Condoleezza Rice at Cairo University), the candidates from the MB (as independents or on the lists of legal parties) won almost 20% of the seats in parliament. It is precisely the fear of this success that has led to the return of the ruling elite to the “old” electoral format, where candidates from the Islamic opposition were simply not admitted to the election by administrative methods. As a result, both the MB and the other main opposition party (the bourgeois-democratic New Wafd, which has been in solidarity with MB on many domestic policy issues since the mid-1980”s) simply boycotted the second round of elections.

Experts point out that after the banning and repression of MB in Egypt, it essentially divided into a “radical” and “moderate” wing, or rather, a radical “core” and semi-legal “periphery”.

The core is deeply conspiratorial and deals mainly with strategic issues of the organization both in Egypt and in other countries of the
world, including the creation of terrorist groups that are affiliated, but
officially unrelated to the MB, such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Islamic
Jihad, and Islamic Combatant Group.

The periphery carries out active and sustained mass social policy,
religious indoctrination, and the integration of trained Muslims into
the organization. Furthermore, it is emphasized that it is this “semi-
legal periphery”, which has been the political face of the BM for many
years for the whole world, is deeply infiltrated with Egyptian intelligence
agents.

General Hosni Mubarak, coming to power, was well aware that his
main political support might be only the army. He paid extreme attention
both to the military buildup and the political nurturing of the military
elite. It was under Mubarak that the army became fully a “super class”,
insofar as widely included in it are military officers who come from the
lower social classes. It was under Mubarak that the army finally became
a kind of separate “caste” with a very high status and social positions
(high salary, social and other benefits, and guarantees for a good job
after retirement) and a consolidated corporate spirit.

However, Mubarak understood that such an army, having been able
to unite at the level of generals, is quite capable of overthrowing his clan
in an instant. Therefore he paid much attention to regular “shuffling”
of command staff. But at the same time, he created a kind of alternative
to the army – a powerful system of security services.

This configuration of “strongmen”, it seemed, guaranteed the
sustainability of the power of the ruling clan. Experts are certain that it
could have, if it had wished, suppressed the Egyptian revolution at the
onset, even before the demonstrators entered Cairo’s Tahrir Square. However, this did not happen.

As in Tunisia, the immoderate appetites of the ruling Mubarak clan
long ago had begun to irritate the other major clans (including those
related to the army). The trigger was the decision of the president to
actually establish a dynasty, that is, to make his son, Gamal Mubarak,
his political heir. It was at this moment that some of the generals decided
to “give up” the aging dictator. That is why on January 25, 2011, the
beginning of the Egyptian revolution was permitted.

Hosni Mubarak already knew at the first stage of the revolution that
he would not be allowed to create a dynasty. He announced that he was
ready to begin large-scale political reforms, reshuffled the government
(including the arrest of several of the more corrupt and offensive
ministers), and allocated large sums of budgetary money for subsidizing food prices. Subsequently, he announced he would leave after the end of his legal term and that Gamal (who, according to an Al Jazeera report, allegedly left the country in haste) would not seek the presidency. He also appointed his faithful associate General Omar Suleiman, Head of General Intelligence, to the long-unoccupied post of vice president on January 29th.

Furthermore, Mubarak apparently counted on Suleiman to severely cut-off the Internet as the primary means of organizing the protests; to activate his agents in the ranks of MB; and with the help of the repressive apparatus of the secret police, to quickly suppress the protests. However, events unfolded differently.

Now it is still unclear exactly what kind of power contributed to the series of riots in Egyptian prisons at end of the January, as a result of which more than 15,000 escaped criminals broke loose (in Abu Zabel — 6 thousand; in El Faiyum — 5 thousand; and in Alexandria, Aswan, Damanhur, Wadi al-Natron several more thousand). Some think the riots were organized by agents of the BM, others — by the secret police, and others — by the military. This “criminal army” first smashed police stations and seized weapons. Then it began — against the background of the «democratic revolution» — massive riots, plundering, looting and murder across the country.

The military by no means wanted the branching out of such major incidents “before the eyes of the world,” knowing that it would discredit any — both the present and the future — government. Even more so, they did not want the secret police to become the “beneficiary” of pacification of the insurgency, the chief of which they called in their circle the “head of the CIA in the Middle East”.

But at the same time, they could not fail to listen to signals from Washington, when first Obama and then the head of the Department of State Hillary Clinton and her spokesman Philip Crowley “strongly urged” them not to resort to violence and not to disable the Internet. They could not fail to hear how Western politicians and high-status analysts persistently explained to the entire world that the MB are no kind of Islamic radicals, but charitable organizations engaged in social support for the underprivileged.

The military bided their time for some time and remained neutral. However, it quickly became clear that the police and security forces were powerless, and the criminal situation throughout the country was spiraling
out of control. Then it was the army that began to fight crime in the state of emergency, shooting outlaws and looters at the scene of the crime.

After that, new signals were heard from Washington and Europe — “Mubarak must resign immediately” 228. And it was after that when — again through almost fully open access to the Internet and through mosques — even larger protest actions began to be organized with the same demand for the immediate resignation of the president, as well as the establishment of a political democracy.

On February 11th, President Hosni Mubarak resigned, handing over all his power to the Supreme Military Council headed by the Minister of Defense and Military Production Marshal Mohammed Tantawi229 (but not the head of the lower house of parliament, as established by the constitution).

On February 13th, the parliament was dissolved, the constitution was suspended, the state of emergency was maintained, and urgent consideration of amendments to the constitution and the holding of free elections within 6 months were promised. 43 former and current ministers were barred from leaving the country.

But also on February 11th, the day of Mubarak’s resignation, the MB delegation arrived in the Gaza Strip and together with the heads of Hamas they held a “review of the armed Palestinian forces” 230. On February 12th, speaking to the demonstrators on Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Tantawi stated that “MB deserve at least one portfolio in the future government of Egypt” 231.

This statement by Tantawi was no accident. The huge role of the MB in the “Egyptian revolution” was never in doubt. And even in its first stage, among the demands by protesters from the MB was a call for the release of members of the organization held in prisons, permission for the exiled leaders of the MB to return, as well as the recognition of the illegality of the results of the parliamentary elections held last fall.

These requirements were at least partially fulfilled. The influential preacher Amr Khaled and the cult theorist and long-term ideological leader of the MB Yusuf Qaradawi returned to Egypt, as well as a number of other major figures from the leadership of the MB. Soon the speaker of the lower house of parliament Fathi Surur announced a “correction” of the election results in 2010 (that is, essentially admitted that they had been falsified).

After Mubarak’s resignation, the leader of Egypt’s MB Muhammad Badi became a “media star”. He was continuously interviewed and asked
his predictions for the further development of the situation in the country. Another important functionary in the MB, Ashraf Abdul Gaffar, went on a visit to Turkey on February 15th (its president, Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu actively supported the slogans of “the Egyptian revolution” from the beginning) and appeared on air at a leading public television channel, as well as held talks with his associates from the ruling party of Turkey. On the same day, Badi announced plans to establish a political party, which will participate in future elections, and also gave an extensive “ideological” interview to the leading media. The main idea of the interview was the need for cooperation between the Arab and Islamic countries “to implement projects against colonialism, westernization, and Zionist hegemony”.

The MB’s conception and demands for Egypt’s political reforms were set forth in the mission statement posted on the organization’s website on October 30th, 2009. It proposes adopting “the laws prescribed by Allah as a fundamental concept of reform”. Namely: “to create a Muslim individual, Muslim family, Muslim government, and Muslim nation... which will have ahead of it the creation of Islamic countries, uniting all Muslims”.

On February 22nd, the Supreme Military Council announced the composition of the new government of Egypt headed by Ahmed Shafik, which included several ministers previously appointed by Mubarak. The answer was new major demonstrations on February 25th and 26th with the demands for a trial of the former president, dissolution of the security forces, release of political prisoners, lifting of the state of emergency, and immediate political reform. MB demanded the resignation of the newly established cabinet of ministers, stating that demonstrations would continue as long as the government with the discredited associates of Mubarak did not leave. The Supreme War Council fulfilled this requirement: on March 3rd, it established a new government headed by Essam Sharaf and on March 4th – 6th, a series of attacks on buildings of the Security Service swept through the cities of Egypt (in Cairo, Alexandria, Mersa Matruh, and others) with riots and the confiscation of documents. A number of experts do not rule out that these were the actions of the MB, who seized and destroyed their agent cards on members of the organization.

On March 19th, a referendum on amendments to the constitution was held in Egypt, prepared by the interim constitutional council “for the transitional period.”
The suggested amendments raised a number of protests from religious communities and secular parties. The MB protested against the preservation of Article 5 without changes, which prohibits religious-based partisan and political activity. Copts and secular parties protested in connection with the absence of the priority for the norms of international law in the Basic Law, as well as the recognition of sharia norms as the basis for national legislation. In addition, the majority of political forces are unhappy with the preservation of nearly all of the president’s “super powers”. However, all believe that after the elections and the restoration of the Constitutional Court, Egypt will be obliged to return to these matters.

On March 28th, the Supreme Military Council announced that the general parliamentary elections will be held in September 2011, and the presidential elections will be in October or November, and they promised that the state of emergency will be lifted before the elections. However, on April 1st, a demonstration of many thousands took place at Cairo’s Tahrir Square under the slogan “Save the Revolution”, organized by the newly established Revolution Youth Coalition. The demands of the square are to lift the state of emergency, to stop illegal arrests of citizens, and to immediately try Mubarak’s close associates, without putting off the start of political and social reforms.

On April 8, the largest manifestation since Mubarak’s resignation took place at Tahrir Square. The protesters with the active participation of MB demanded the immediate arrest and trial of Mubarak. It was for the first time that the appeals for resignation of the Supreme Military Council were heard during this manifestation. After curfew (at 02:00), police dispersed the rest of the protestors remaining on the square by means of shots into the air, batons, and stun guns; dozens of people were arrested.

On April 9, Mubarak appeared in public for the first time following his resignation. He gave an interview to the Al Arabia TV channel. Declaring that he always honestly served his country and resigned because the interests of Egyptian people are higher for him than his own, he stated that he does not possess any property or bank accounts abroad. He also expressed confidence that an impartial investigation would prove that the financial assets of his sons and wife were acquired by honest means.

On April 10, Mubarak and his sons were summoned to the prosecutor’s office for interrogation, suspected of having arranged the
assault at the rally Marchers\textsuperscript{9236}. On April 13, the Prosecutor General’s office reported through its Facebook page that Hosni Mubarak and two of his sons had been arrested for 15 days\textsuperscript{537}.

On April 16 the Highest administrative court of Egypt ruled that the National Democratic Party should be disbanded and all its assets, including its financial resources, real estate and other property should be turned over to the State\textsuperscript{238}. The decision could not be contested. On the same day, one more manifestation took place at Tahrir Square with demands for immediate political and economic reforms in the country.

But it is far from the most suitable time for reforms in Egypt. Direct and indirect damage from the «revolution» has exceeded $9 billion and continues to grow. The tourism business has collapsed and will not recover soon (amid continuing mass incidents), hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost, and the credit rating has fallen. The return to Egypt of the assets of Mubarak’s clan arrested in the West is unlikely to happen before (if it ever happens) the fall elections of a legitimate government, and there is nothing to cover the budget deficit. Therefore, by the elections the country’s socio-economic situation will probably only get worse.

In these conditions, the small-scale parties of the “middle class” rebelling at Tahrir Square (April 6 Movement, al-Ghad, Kefaya cannot lead the electorate even in the presence of such significant figures as the former IAEA head ElBaradei and the head of the Arab League Amr Moussa. The National Democratic Party, having ruled under Hosni Mubarak for many years, is now dissolved. That means that there are no real and consolidated political forces left in Egypt, and it is impossible to build any by the forthcoming elections. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood (even if they do not run on party lists, but as independent candidates) has a real chance for political victory by means of a fully democratic route.

This places very acute questions both before Egyptian society and the Egyptian military, and before the whole world.

Not only the Coptic community (and Coptic Christians make up 9% of the population of the country and occupy a relatively strong position in the economy of Egypt), but also a significant part of the relatively modernized Islamic population do not want to live according to sharia law. Even more so, the deeply westernized Egyptian generals do not want this.

But to the military it is clear that after the current “revolution”, it is impossible to suppress the MB as Mubarak’s secret services suppressed
them. To impose military dictatorship would not only be dangerous (in the course of numerous “rotations” in the army the commanding officers’ minds have been to a certain extent permeated by MB ideology) but almost inevitably result in all-round political and economic isolation. Thus, it cannot be excluded that the Egyptian generals will be forced — at least for a time — to occupy a much weakened position in the elite and the leadership of the country, similar to which the military in Turkey hold after the election victories of the Islamic Justice and Development Party over the Kemalists.

And the big question is, can the military continue to hold such positions?

Too much in Egypt speaks of the “process having already started”.

After the head of the interim military government Tantawi ordered the release on April 11th of 20 Muslims arrested before the new year on suspicion of blowing up the Coptic Cathedral in Alexandria, the incidents against the Copts in Egypt became more frequent; moreover, against the backdrop of the growing role of the MB in the weekly protest “vigil” at Cairo’s Tahrir Square. In the most radical Islamic provinces in the south of Egypt these incidents are increasingly bloody. After several clashes in the southern state of Qena, where radical Salafi groups with the support of the MB have literally launched a war against the appointment of Copt Emad Mikhail as Governor, and on April 22nd, emergency rule was introduced in Qena.

On April 27th, it was announced in Cairo that through the mediation of Egypt, the leaders of the warring Palestinian movements Fatah and Hamas reached an agreement on establishing an interim transitional government, the merging of their security forces into a single Higher Security Committee, the reform of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the release of all political prisoners, and elections in 8 months for the President of the Palestinian National Authority and for the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Moreover, observers indicate that a crucial role in this agreement was played by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and that the strategic goals of restoring Palestinian unity are the fight against Israel both in the UN and in the Palestinian territories.

Also on April 27th, the pipeline that supplies natural gas to Israel and Jordan was blown up in the Egyptian province of North Sinai as a result of armed attacks on pumping stations and gas supplies have been stopped for an indefinite period.
On April 29th, the Muslim Brotherhood announced the creation of a new political party, the Party of Freedom and Justice, to be headed by Mohammed Mursi, and which expects to receive up to 50% of the seats in the National Assembly in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Moreover, the leaders of the MB emphasized that the party will not be theocratic, but civilian in nature, although its political course will be determined by the MB.

Thus in Egypt itself, and in the “international community”, it is worth remembering that many radical Islamists have studied at the Cairo Al-Azhar University (even under the very harsh reprisals against the MB by the Mubarak regime), in essence “nourished” (taken under their wing) surreptitiously by the Muslim Brotherhood behind the scenes for many years.

Syria

After gaining independence and a brief (1958–1961) respite in a union with Egypt, Syria entered a period of military coups. It was in connection with these coups that the country entered a state of emergency in 1963, which has remained to this day.

In 1966, as a result of the last of these mentioned coups, Hafez al-Assad, who comes from a large and influential Syrian Alawite community (a particular sect of Shiite Islam), came to power as the head of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath).

Syria embarked on a “socialist path of development” and acquired the status of the main ally of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East. With this, it also acquired ongoing and sufficiently broad Soviet economic and military aid, among other things, in the struggle of Arab countries against the “unsinkable aircraft carrier of the U.S.A. in the region” – Israel. It is with this image of U.S.S.R.’s ally Syria participated in the Six Day War in 1967 (in which Israel occupied the Golan Heights as a result of the defeat of Arab troops) and in the equally unsuccessful Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Amid developing civil war between ethnic and religious communities in Lebanon, Syrian troops entered the country in 1976 “at the request of the government” and remained there until 1990. The support of Lebanese Shiites and Christians against the Sunnis in Lebanon, as well as the support of Shiite Iran against Iraq in the war between these countries (1980–1988) predetermined the deeply-rooted conflict of all the Sunni monarchies in the Gulf with Syria. Furthermore, it strained
Damascus’ relations with Iraq, with which Syria has had intense competition within the framework of the same type of ruling Baathist regimes.

As Alawites are a confessional minority in the country (the vast majority of the population is Sunni, 10% are Christians, and Shiites account for about 25%, with the Alawites constituting only part of that share), Syria was one of the first to suffer the blows of radical Sunni terrorism. After militants of the Muslim Brotherhood massacred cadets at a military school in Aleppo in 1979 and staged a mass slaughter of representatives of government agencies in Hama in 1982, al-Assad’s military and security services razed the structure of MB in the country and the radical Sunni groups associated with them virtually to their foundations.

Although Syria is a republic, its political regime can be characterized as “super-presidential” or “semi-monarchical”. The President possesses very broad powers as the secretary general of the ruling party (this is the Baath party according to the constitution, which exercises decisive influence on the formation of the government), and as the Supreme Commander, and as the head (and “appointer” of other members) of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the president can be elected to an unlimited number of terms. After the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, his successor became his son, Bashar al-Assad.

Although the Constitution formally confirms the sharia as the basis of the legal system in the country, in reality its norms govern only the lower courts, which examine different kinds of family conflicts and “domestic” offences. The principal courts actually operate on the basis of the Napoleonic Code, adopted by Syria from its former parent state, France.

In Syria, the government sector has retained dominance in the economy (up to 75% of industrial production) until now (even after the “moderate market” reforms of Bashar al-Assad), especially in heavy industry. Agriculture and trade are almost entirely in private hands, and they employ up to 60% of the active population.

In Syria, there is six-year compulsory free education and substantial government subsidies for a full secondary and higher education (the literacy rate of the population is 86% among men and 74% among women), nearly 2 million Internet users (in 2010), thoroughly modern medicine, and a relatively high average life expectancy (more than 70 years).
At the same time, since there are no large resources of exportable raw materials in the country, the standard of living of the majority of the population is low. In recent years, especially in connection with the global crisis, the already high unemployment in the country (about 20%, and among young people up to 30%) is growing, as well as problems with the food supply, due to an insufficiency of water supplies in many areas (especially in the south) for carrying out agriculture. Additional grounds for the population’s discontent have been created by abuses on the part of the security forces in the context of the state of emergency, as well as widespread (as in any eastern clan system) bureaucratic corruption.

However, the strong and well-armed army and powerful intelligence services, according to military experts, are a fairly reliable power base for the Alawite ruling clan.

Today’s “revolutionary unrest” in Syria began March 18th after residents took to the streets in Dara’a on the border with Jordan, demanding the release of several students arrested on March 15th who had written anti-government slogans on the walls. This demonstration was dispersed by the police; however, official Syrian sources report that over the course of the crackdown a few shots were fired at the policeman by demonstrators, and then as a consequence troops were deployed in Dara’a. In the following days, March 19th–20th, “armed people”, acted against police and troops and in fact combat activities began with many dead and wounded on both sides. The protesters burned several government buildings, including the Baath headquarters and the Palace of Justice, and demanded the resignation of the government, the lifting of the state of emergency in the country, as well as the trial of those guilty of shooting at the demonstrations. On March 20th, similar protest actions (although initially without “armed people”) began in the capital Damascus, as well as in Aleppo and several other cities.

Since in Syria in the context of a continuing state of emergency and the active work of intelligence agencies to identify potential threats to the political regime there could be no “armed people” in principle, the Syrian government immediately declared that the appearance of weapons in Dara’a and the provocation with gunshots at the demonstraters was the handiwork of terrorist groups coming from abroad: either from Jordan or from Lebanon (where a Sunni clan headed by Saad Hariri has accused Syria of killing former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri), or from Iraq, where there are many Sunni radical militants who consider Syria
and the al-Assad regime to be their mortal enemies. Moreover, the latter is more likely – in the Iraqi region of Fallujah neighboring Dara’a, there lives another part of the same Sunni Bedouin tribe, which was the most vehement in its resistance of coalition forces during the occupation of Iraq and then later fought the Shiite government in the country.

After the incidents in Dara’a, Bashar al-Assad immediately recognized the incompetence of such a harsh use of force by the police and troops, expressed his condolences to the families of those killed and injured, fired the governor of the province Dara’a, and created a commission to investigate the incidents and punish those guilty. At the same time, the police and gendarmes were strictly ordered not to shoot to kill at demonstrators.

At that, the Syrian intelligence services point out that after the victory of the “date revolution” in Egypt, clandestine Muslim Brotherhood cells in Syria have greatly increased their activity, and several attempts to break through by groups of Sunni militants and convoys of weapons from Iraq have been prevented. As Islamic radicals emigrating from Syria have received good preparation and strong political positions in the combat units of Islamists (including in the al-Qaeda) in different countries – from Iraq and Bosnia to Afghanistan – the rising wave of protest (and, more importantly, its armed component) could not fail to alarm the ruling regime.

On March 24th, Bouthaina Shaaban, an advisor to President al-Assad, announced that in the near future major political and economic reforms will be carried out in the country. Among these have been cited the preparation for lifting the state of emergency, release of political prisoners, acceptance of a democratic media law, and a system of measures to combat corruption. In addition, a substantial increase in the salaries of civil servants was promised, as well as a program to create additional jobs. On March 26th, as a sign of the beginning of implementation of these promises, 260 political prisoners were released, most of them arrested on charges of assisting Islamic terrorists.

It is noteworthy, that even the Qatari television channel Al-Jazeera, which is the most aggressive in its attitude towards Syria, while listing demonstrations in Dara’a, Damascus, and other cities with the demands to expand political freedoms, combat corruption, and improve the quality of life, admitted that almost nowhere at the initial stage had the demonstrators put forth slogans for overthrowing the existing government system or Bashar al-Assad personally. Although the
opposition, organized into a new “15 March Revolution” movement, attempted to circulate appeals for protest Marches and their transformation into a nationwide protest “Day of Dignity” through Facebook and other websites, almost no one responded to their appeals, at the same time as tens of thousands of people with portraits of President al-Assad came out to pro-government demonstrations. Moreover, at times it came to fighting between supporters and detractors of the opposition, which the police had to separate.

Observers point out that most of these pro-government demonstrations in the given circumstances can hardly be inspired by Baathists or intelligence agencies. They have nothing to do with love for the president, as the official media of the country write. Simply before the eyes of the Syrians there is too vivid an example of neighboring Iraq, where the “democratization” carried out by U.S. and British troops has led to unending sectarian slaughter and civil war, hundreds of thousands killed, and a sharp decline in living standards in comparison to the time of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. At the same time, it has led to a flow of Iraqi refugees into Syria, which has had a very painful impact on the socio-economic situation of the country (it is estimated that there are currently up to 1.4 million Iraqi and up to 400 thousand Palestinian refugees in Syria).

On March 22nd, an opposition rally in Latakia was attended by hundreds of armed men who looted and burnt administrative buildings, fire trucks, and schools. They staged a manhunt for the police and security officers on the streets, quite professionally employing the guerrilla tactics of urban partisan warfare. In accordance with an order by the President, they were answered only with water cannons and tear gas. In the end, 10 security officers and several police officers were killed, and nearly a hundred wounded police officers ended up in the hospitals of Latakia. Later, demonstrations by “armed people” also began in other cities.

When investigations revealed that some of the victims (allegedly police) in the suppression of the demonstrations were killed by sniper shots (in particular, in Aleppo), and when the Syrian Navy began detaining ships at sea with cargos of weapons sailing from Lebanon to Latakia, al-Assad ordered the army to enter the “rebelling” cities.

On March 26th, a call for a “popular uprising” was distributed through the networking site Facebook in the name of a newly-formed group Revolution in Syria 2011. This appeal, citing “sources in the
opposition”, was printed all over the world by correspondents from a number of international media outlets. The same day, the Syrian Information Ministry deprived the bureau chief of Reuters, Khaled Oweis, of accreditation “for the transfer of non-professional and distorted reports of the situation in Syria”.

On March 29th, President al-Assad announced the resignation of Mohammed Naji al-Otari’s government, which the opposition demanded. On the same day, large demonstrations in support of the acting government took place throughout Syria. On the same day, the U.S. State Department reported that three citizens of the United States were arrested earlier in Syria and demanded that Damascus allow U.S. consular officers access to them.

On March 30th, al-Assad at an extraordinary session of parliament in a public speech (the first since the beginning of the incidents) specified and elaborated on the program of political and economic reforms that had previously been expressed as general principles by his aid B. Shaaban: the creation of a special commission to prepare an action plan to combat corruption, increasing the salaries of civil servants, the distribution of subsidies in the sphere of health care and job creation for Syrian youth. Al-Assad acknowledged that “the country’s leadership has not met the expectations of many people”.

Al-Assad strongly hinted that at a time when the country had become a “subject of an international armed conspiracy”, and when 60 people from among peaceful civilians, police, and gendarmes had already been killed, it was unacceptable to hastily repeal the state of emergency under pressure from armed rebels: “Reforms mean to move forward, not to escape or still less to run away from someone... The enemies are working to undermine the security of Syria, but they picked the wrong country.” At the same time, al-Assad invited the sheikhs of Syria’s tribes and influential leaders of all ethnic and religious communities in the country to the negotiating table to discuss political and economic reforms.

The same day, Syrian naval boats seized another ship with weapons that sailed from the Lebanese port of Tripoli to Latakia. As before, Damascus announced the possible involvement in the secret supply of weapons to Syria by the radical Lebanese Sunni movement, al-Mustaqbal of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon Saad Hariri.

On the same day, March 30th, the U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner made an official statement: “...Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must meet the demands of the people”. On the same day, Republican
John McCain and independent Senator Joe Lieberman in an address to the U.S. president said that Obama’s attempts to move closer, rather than distance himself from Syria have yielded no results, and that “it is time to support the people, opposing the al-Assad regime”. On the same day, the news agency SANA reported that a trailer loaded with arms and ammunition, including a large number of sniper rifles, was intercepted on the Iraqi border going into Syria.

On March 31st, the Syrian President announced the establishment of a legal committee to study the possibility of lifting the state of emergency, as well as announced Friday, April 1st, to be a working day.

But on April 1st, protest actions were once again held in many cities across the country. Moreover, “armed people” again appeared at these protest actions in Homs and Damascus suburb of Duma and engaged in gunfight with the police. As a result, 8 people were killed and dozens were injured. On April 2nd, unidentified gunmen on motorcycles opened fire on columns of civilians on the outskirts of Homs – an industrial city in central Syria. In Duma, 15 km north of Damascus, several people were killed and dozens wounded, according to SANA. There, snipers shot at the city streets from rooftops.

On April 3rd, Bashar al-Assad ordered the former Agriculture Minister Adel Safar to form a new government. On the same day, as well as on April 5th and 6th, several peaceful anti-government and pro-government demonstrations took place in Syria.

On April 7th, President al-Assad has announced the initiation of provision of Syrian nationality to Kurds in the north-eastern province of al-Hasakah (until then in Syria they were still counted as illegal migrants from Turkey). Around 300 thousand people will receive citizenship. Experts consider this to be a very important step designed to sharply reduce ethnic tensions in the country and the risk of a rather powerful “Kurdish factor” joining the armed struggle against the government, especially taking into account the fact that the al-Assad regime repressed a major Kurdish revolt in the region with difficulty in 2004.

But on April 8th, the peaceful course of demonstrations after Friday prayers in Dara’a and several other places (Duma, Homs, Tartous) was interrupted by another interference of “armed people”. In Dara’a, they destroyed a statue of the Syrian president’s brother on the central square, ransacked the Baath party office, and set on fire the local jail. The police and gendarmes, armed only with tear gas (army troops had been withdrawn from the city a week earlier) could not oppose the shooting
from the roofs and windows of houses. As a result, 19 law enforcement officers were killed and 75 wounded in Darna’a alone259. A total of 24 people were killed in protest incidents in the country that day260.

On April 12th, the U.S.A. in an official statement condemned “the actions of the Government of Syria to suppress peaceful demonstrations” and stated that “the increased repression by the Government of Syria is outrageous... President al-Assad and his Cabinet Ministers should respect the rights of Syrian citizens who rightly claim for themselves fundamental freedoms”261. On April 14th, State Department Acting Deputy Spokesman Mark Toner said that “We believe there is credible information that Iran is assisting [the Syrian government] in quelling protesters”262.

Beginning from April 15th, a number of international mass media outlets published excerpts from the U.S. diplomatic documents released by the website WikiLeaks proving that the U.S. State Department has financed and supported Syria’s political opposition forces by various means since 2005, including the London-based anti-government satellite TV channel BARADA TV263.

On April 15th, a few peaceful demonstrations took place after Friday prayers in all major Syrian cities, but the tone of these rallies was essentially a new one: the demonstrators chanted anti-government slogans and demands the overthrow B. al-Assad. Police used tear gas in one case – when a column of opponents and supporters of the government entered into a clash in Damascus on the way to Abbassiyyin Square.

On April 17th, the authorities reported that on April 15th, a cargo vehicle with machine guns and grenades was detained on the border with Lebanon, and on April 17th – a large batch of weapons at a checkpoint in et-Tenefe on the border with Iraq. Experts point out that the latter operation with the supply of weapons from Iraq could hardly have be carried out without the knowledge or condonation of the U.S. military and intelligence officers that remain in the country.

On the same day (the 65th anniversary of the independence of Syria), there were small but violent demonstrations in Dara’a, Baniyas, Jebleh, Aleppo, and a number of other cities in the country. In the suburb of Homs, Tablise, armed militants attacked police and soldiers. One policeman and three militants were killed and 16 policemen and soldiers were wounded, as well as 15 militants264.

On April 18th, armed opposition uprisings began throughout the country. Syria’s Interior Ministry issued a statement saying that “Syria
has faced armed rebellion organized by Salafis... in several provinces at once acts of sabotage and attacks on policemen and soldiers have been committed. The main foci of attacks by Salafists were Baniyas and Homs, where they openly called for jihad and the creation of an Islamic emirates.265

On April 19th, Homs was surrounded by troops where protesters took over the central Bab al-Saha Square and set up tents there. The TV channel Al-Jazeera reported that the security forces called on tribal elders to persuade the crowds to go home before they begin to disperse demonstrators in the square. However, in response, the call to jihad came from the minarets and then shooting began in the city266.

The same day, the Syrian government approved a draft decree on the termination of the emergency law and the abolition of the Supreme State Security Court, as well as the introduction of a new law on the procedure of carrying out peaceful demonstrations267.

Despite the fact that on April 21st, after President al-Assad signed new legislation that entered into force on that day, radical protests again broke out in the country. Although the Interior Ministry stated that unauthorized demonstrations were prohibited “to restore peace in the country”, the site Facebook was filled with appeals to arrange a “Great Friday” protest in Syria, and the leaders of the March 15 Revolution movement and the Islamists began to lead people onto the streets. Moreover, many demonstrations, following the appeals on Facebook came under the “pre-revolutionary» (i.e. anti-Baathist) green-white-black flags.

On the same day, Syria was rocked by two brutal murders. In Homs, General Abo al-Tellawi and his two teenage sons were shot dead at his home and cut into pieces, and then General Iyad Harfoush and his three children were killed in the same manner. The Syrian media Syria accused radical Islamists in organizing of these brutal murders, but the opposition said it was provocation by the authorities268.

On April 22nd, protest demonstrations in many parts of the country were accompanied by armed attacks on government offices and offices of the ruling Baath Party, as well as police officers; the police and army responded to the protesters with fire. Among the dead and wounded in the provinces of Homs, Damascus, and Idlib were 11 police officers. The Syrian authorities reported that, among other things, an “armed gang that attacked police cars and army patrols with Molotov cocktails” was operating in Ezra269. According to various sources, at least 70 people
were killed in Syria that day, which has already been named “Bloody Friday”.

On April 23rd, the funerals of those killed the previous day turned into new radical protests with new victims. Two deputies of Parliament from constituencies Dara’a resigned in a sign of protest against the suppression of demonstrations by troops.

On the same day, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and U.S. President Barack Obama issued statements condemning the acts of violence in Syria. Ban Ki-moon demanded “immediate cessation of violence in Syria”, as well as an “independent and open investigation of all killings”. But Obama went much further. He said that “this outrageous use of violence to quell protests must come to an end now”, that after the abolition of emergency law authorities “continued violent repression”, that “America has repeatedly encouraged Assad and the Syrian government to implement meaningful reforms, but they refuse to respect the rights of the Syrian people”, and that “Instead of listening to their own people, President Assad is blaming outsiders while seeking Iranian assistance in repressing Syria’s citizens through the same brutal tactics that have been used by his Iranian allies”.

Moreover, neither Ban Ki-moon, nor Obama were concerned with the question of where did “armed people” in such quantities come from in a country with a dictatorial government and emergency rule, to whose opinion they call on to be heard. The essence of Obama’s rhetoric was quite obvious: to blame for what is happening in Syria is solely and exclusively the dictator al-Assad, as well as Iran, which is supporting al-Assad’s repressions against his own people.

On April 24th, al-Assad ordered the closure of the border with Jordan and introduced troops into the cities of the Dara’a province, including armored vehicles.

On April 26th, the U.S. State Department announced that it was evacuating the majority of its embassy staff and their families from Syria. After this, the U.S.A. announced it would impose sanctions against the Assad family, as well as a number of senior officials in the Syrian government and leaders of the “defense and law enforcement agencies”: all U.S. citizens were prohibited from undertaking any transactions with any of them, no matter who they were. Moreover, the attempt of the U.S.A. and other countries pass a resolution imposing sanctions against Syria in the UN Security Council on April 27th failed: both Russia and China vetoed it. On the same day, the Syrian ambassadors were
summoned to the offices of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Spain, and “strong protest at the escalating violence in Syria” was expressed to them.75

On Friday, April 29th, the MB, remaining as before under ban in Syria, for the first time openly called upon people for mass demonstrations against the government under the slogan “You were born free, so do not allow a tyrant to enslave you.”276 In Dera’a, Latakia, Baniyas, Rastan, and a number of other cities, subsequent large protest demonstrations took place with clashes with the police and casualties. On April 28th-29th, nearly 230 functionaries of the Baath party from Dera’a and about 50 from Rastan announced their resignation from the ruling party.

Also on April 29th, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the “use of force by the Syrian authorities against peaceful demonstrators.” 26 countries voted for the resolution, 9 countries opposed it (including Russia, China, Pakistan, Cuba, and Ecuador), and 7 other countries (including Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) abstained or simply did not attend the Council meeting. Moreover, the representatives of Russia and China said that the adoption of this resolution was an “invitation to civil war” and yet more proof that the UN Human Rights Council conducts a policy of double standards.277

On May 2nd, Syrian troops blockaded the city of Baniyas (it was announced this was to suppress an armed insurrection by the Salafis). In the Sunni quarter of al-Baida, the primary hotbed of resistance, mass arrests took place.278

Thus, the acuteness of the political and terrorist situation in Syria is consistently growing. Moreover, not only al-Assad’s ruling Alawite clan, but also the representatives of all other religious and ethnic groups including Christians and Kurds, as well as the relatively large and internationalized business that has grown up in the country, understand that the fall of the current political regime (even without U.S. bombing) will call forth a long and bloody chaos in the country, similar to that in Iraq.

Insofar as the Pentagon Chief Robert Gates has already repeated many times that in the Middle East there remain only three totalitarian dictatorships: Libya, Syria, and Iran279, the Syrians are already aware that with further weakening of the existing government and increasing chaos and attempts of the al-Assad clan to brutally “freeze” the situation (for example, by introducing martial law into the country) may full well result in bombing.
Furthermore, we can assume with high probability that the collapse of the al-Assad clan’s power in Syria will “explode” neighboring Lebanon and quite possibly Jordan, as well as inevitably sharply raise the scale of civil war going in Iraq. Almost predetermined in this case is the Sunni Islamic radicalization in Turkey, which in recent years has established “friendly” communications with Damascus and Tehran with great difficulty. It is also obvious that the radical Sunni transformation of the government in Syria (and there can be no other transformation, by definition) will transform relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv from a regime of “no peace” to a regime of “full-out war”.

If the uncertainty of the development of the situation in Egypt is taken into account, as a result Israel may obtain a “united jihad front” in the north, east, and south; moreover, one equipped with powerful Egyptian and Syrian weapons (including heavy weapons, missiles, and possibly chemical weapons). This makes it the prospect of the beginning of a large war (moreover, quite possibly a nuclear-missile war) in the Middle East not at all speculative.

**Yemen**

The notional political unity of Yemen existed until recently only within the Ottoman Empire. North Yemen gained independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and became a monarchy, and in 1962 it was transformed into the Yemen Arab Republic as a result of a military coup that overthrew the royal government. South Yemen was a British protectorate from the middle of the 19th century, gained independence from Britain in 1967, soon adopted a “pro-Soviet” orientation (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Southern Yemen/PDRY), and became one of the most important military and political bases of the U.S.S.R. in the region.

Relations between these two “semi-state” parts of a general dispersion of Bedouin tribes were extremely contentious up to the era of disintegration of “the Soviet bloc”. In 1990, tribal sheikhs and leaders of the political parties that already existed at that time decided to unite the country in the Republic of Yemen. However, already in 1994, former leaders of PDRY raised a revolt in the south and declared independence. The uprising was brutally suppressed by troops from North Yemen.

Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab world. Almost all the territory is occupied by deserts and the population is growing rapidly due to high fertility: of the 23 million residents, 44% are younger than
15 years. There are few exportable natural resource reserves (oil) and there is an acute shortage of fresh water. Unemployment exceeds 35% of the working age population and more than 45% of citizens live below the poverty line. The huge labor emigration (up to 2 million people, mostly to Gulf countries) is not stable and depends on the economic and political situation.

To these problems are added the historical contradictions between North and South, as well as between followers of different Islamic schools of doctrine – Shiite Zaidis and Sunni Shafis. After the reunification of the country, key positions in all spheres of life, including politics and economy, were taken by the Zaidi northerners, strongly infringing upon the position of the Shafi southerners. In addition, the political situation in Yemen is complicated by conflicts between the major tribal alliances, as well as the separatism of the Shiite northern Hashid clans and tribes.

The current period of growing unrest started in Yemen in April 2009 (during the anniversary of the suppression of the South’s revolt by the North in 1994) and the slogans of the southern division revived again. Insofar as the country literally “bristles” with weapons, this unrest immediately turned into bloody clashes with many killed and wounded. Even then, the authorities (the Zaidi regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh ruling the country since 1974,) said that the insurgency was instigated by Saudi and Qatari money from the former rulers of South Yemen, Ali Nasser Muhammad and Ali Salim al-Beidh, who live in Saudi Arabia.

There is a basis for these charges. Yemen’s relations with the Gulf countries have been strained since the overthrow of the monarchy in the country. In addition, only recently has the boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Yemen been officially established, but a number of tribal sheikhs consider it unfair. Finally, it became clear at once that in South Yemen the Abyan rebellion was raised by the leader of irreconcilable Islamist leader Tariq al-Fadhli (a descendant of the emirs of Abyan and a former fighter in Afghanistan, he is closely associated with al-Qaeda and receives financial support from the Saudis).

It was during this period in 2009 that a sharp intensification of the largest “non-radical” opposition in the country took place – the block al-Liqa al-Mushtaraka (General Meeting), headed by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and the movement of Al-Islah, created in 1990 by the Muslim Brotherhood. It is noteworthy that already at this point, many former associates of President Saleh from the ruling party General People’s Congress had joined the opposition.
In December 2009, the next large incidents took place in Yemen, this time in the north, where a charismatic leader of the Shiite Hashid tribe, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi (the Hashid are in favor of recreation of a Zaidi Imamate in the region, headed by a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) was killed by a localized airstrike. Responsibility was claimed by Saudi Arabia (although knowledgeable experts believe that such a strike with homing in on a mobile phone signal could be executed only by U.S. planes), after which not only the predominantly Shiite north, but the whole of Yemen began to perceive their Saudi neighbors as an aggressor who had started a war.

In this period, the U.S.A. and Saudi Arabia shown unity in their assessments of the necessity to remove President Saleh from power, but disagreed on who should replace him. The U.S.A. hedged their bet on the former head of South Yemen, Ali Nasser Muhammad, who lives in emigration, is very dependent on Washington, and according to a number of expert assessments, is closely cooperating with the CIA. The Saudis have set their stakes on a major businessman in Yemen, the head of the largest Yemeni tribal association Hashid, as well as one of the leaders of the Islamic party Al-Islah and the united opposition al-Liqa al-Mushtarak, Hamid al-Ahmar, who is very closely linked to Saudi business projects.

In October 2010, the Deputy Secretary of State William Burns visited Yemen. On the one hand, he highly praised the success of the country in the fight against international terrorism in an official statement. This for many specialists appeared backhanded, since for several years Yemen has been the main «rear base» and one of the main suppliers of trained fighters for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; moreover, shortly before Burns’ visit, A. Saleh established a Council of Ulama, which was headed by Sheikh az-Zindani – one of the most radical ideologues of global jihad.

But at the same time Burns hinted to A. Saleh that the U.S.A. expects an immediate commencement of negotiations from him with the opposition on reforms in the electoral system, after which must take place “an honest and open general election”. Moreover, the same day Burns met with leaders of the al-Liqa al-Mushtarak and expressed support for their demands for electoral reform and new elections ahead of schedule.

However, Burns’ companion, the British ambassador in Yemen, Tim Torlott, went the further at this visit. He said “Yemen's future is impossible
without giving broad autonomy to the different areas of the country, implying a possible and probable transition to the confederation system of government”\(^{283}\).

Moreover, many experts believe that T orlott actually voiced the diplomatic position of the EU, where they assume that it is only possible to stop the internal military opposition in Yemen by providing the broadest possible autonomy, not only to the historically “alien” South, but also northern territories occupied by the Hashid tribes.

On January 12\(^{th}\), 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made an unexpected visit to the Yemeni capital Sana’a. After having a conversation with Saleh and promising him American support for an international “fund assistance for Yemen”, Clinton later met with the leaders of the al-Liqa al-Mushtaraka and strongly supported their “desire to democratize the country”\(^{284}\).

It was at this moment that it was reported in world media, that Saleh intended to transfer power “by inheritance” to his son. And it was from precisely this moment that the current violent phase of opposition protests and armed confrontations with the authorities in Yemen began.

On February 2\(^{nd}\), Saleh said he did not plan on running for the next presidential term, as well as would not transfer power to his son Ahmed. This immediately sharply exacerbated the struggle between the numerous potential contenders for the presidency in both opposition and within his own presidential “family” clan.

From February 3\(^{rd}\), large opposition demonstrations began in Yemen in the capital Sana’a (demanding the immediate resignation of Saleh), in both the South and the North (under anti-governmental and separatist slogans). With a delay of 2-3 days, again across Yemen began mass alternative demonstrations in support of the president.

On February 7\(^{th}\), there was an assassination attempt on the leader of the Al-Islah party Hamid al-Ahmar (al-Ahmar was not harmed). On February 15\(^{th}\), the Shiite leader of the North, A. M. al-Hashid urged Yemenis “to use this historic moment for fundamental change and overthrow the government of criminals”.

On February 17\(^{th}\), representatives of the Council of Ulama and a number of other major religious authorities announced the need to create a “government of national unity” able to end the chaos in the country and for six months to ensure conditions for a peaceful transfer of power\(^{285}\). At the same time, al-Liqa al-Mushtaraka proposed a national consensus conference of the main political forces in the country, including the Shiite rebels and the separatists Southerners.
20th, A. Saleh declared his readiness to begin negotiations with opponents of the regime.

However, the scale of demonstrations continued to grow, and the number of victims of the collision of their participants with the police also increased. On February 26th, two major tribal alliances, Hashid and Bakil (most of the sheikhs who tacitly supported by Saudi Arabia), as well as several smaller tribal alliances announced their refusal to support the president and transfer to the side of the opposition announced. On March 2nd, the head of the Council of Ulama, Sheikh A. M. Zindani, came to the leaders of al-Liqa al-Mushtarak to “discuss the rules of civilized departure of Saleh.” As a result, President Saleh was given on behalf of the united opposition a “road map” of political change, the central questions in which was the departure of the president by resignation before the end of the year.

However, Saleh rejected these demands and ordered to pull the most combat-ready troops out of South Yemen back to the capital. On March 10th, he convened a rally of his supporters in Sana’a, where he announced that he offered until the end of the year to determine in a national referendum the form of government in the country (presidential or parliamentary republic). In addition, Saleh announced provision of the provinces with broad economic autonomy, which would reduce the tax burden on local businesses (that is, he fulfilled a long-standing demand of al-Liqa al-Mushtarak).

However, on March 9th, the mayor of the northern Saad, Faris Manna, said that almost all the ruling party in the leadership of the province (200 people) had decided to withdraw from the party. Moreover, according to al-Liqa al-Mushtarak, Saleh at this point retained the support of no more than 15% of the ulama and tribal sheikhs.

On March 11th-13th, large protest demonstrations took place in Sana’a and the industrial center of the south-west of the country Taiz, during which several people were killed and several hundred were injured in clashes with the police. The European Union issued a sharp condemnation of actions of Saleh’s regime. However, the U.S. ambassador in Sana’a G. Feierstein said that the U.S. considers the protest demonstrations to be dangerous and “not meeting the interests of the Yemeni people” and called for “solving the crisis solely through negotiations.”

From this moment on (the experts assert it was on the orders of tribal sheikhs) tens of thousands of unarmed youth began to gather in an organized way in Sana’a, making the demonstrations round the clock
and perpetual. The leadership of al-Liqa al-Mushtaraka sent a statement to the embassy of the U.S. and many other countries, including EU countries, renouncing any contacts and talks with Saleh if they would not discuss the procedure for his renunciation of power\textsuperscript{288}.

On March 19\textsuperscript{th}, a major incident took place in the capital, in which “unknown snipers” opened fire on protesters, killing about 40 people. On the same day, Saleh declared a state of emergency in the country\textsuperscript{289}.

From that moment, the final fracture in the situation occurred in Yemen in favor of the opposition. The commanders of the largest divisions of the army switched to the camp of Saleh’s opposition, including Saleh’s half-brother, Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the Northern Military District and the First Armored Division) and the commanders of the garrisons in major Southern Yemen cities, including the “financial center” of the country, Hadramaut. Furthermore, several key ministers, some of the high functionaries of the Foreign Ministry, including the ambassadors to Libya, Switzerland, and the United Nations, as well as the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce announced their switch to the side of the opposition. Essentially, of the most influential figures of the ruling elite, only his two sons and two nephews who commanded the Republican Guard and special forces troops remained on the president’s side\textsuperscript{290}.

Thus, the opposition obtained a decisive political and military advantage in the country. However, they did not dare to take military measures, knowing that they would lead to significant bloodshed and catastrophically discredit the opposition leaders taking such steps both to the West and before some of the tribal sheikhs.

On March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, the Yemeni authorities closed the offices of the Qatari television channel Al-Jazeera in Sana’a and confiscated transmission equipment, insofar as the television channel constantly broadcast the appeals of the opposition in various Arab countries, including Yemen, for the overthrow of the ruling regimes.

From March 25\textsuperscript{th}, there began a “positional pause” in Yemen, during which both Saleh and his opponents attempted to “outbid” the influential leaders of the opposite side with promises of high positions in the future government. At this time, a process of “developing self-government”, has gradually gone throughout the entire country, and is especially explicit in the provinces of the rebellious North. Here Saad and al-Jawf came under the full control of the Hashid, essentially transferring to regime of autonomy from Sana’a\textsuperscript{291}.  

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This extremely alarmed both Washington and Riyadh, which consider these rebellious Shiite territories to be a potential “fuse” for Iranian revolution in neighboring countries. They strongly increased both the support for the opposition and their pressure on Saleh to immediately leave the presidency.

Experts report that on March 26th, a meeting took place between opposition leaders, the U.S. ambassador, and representatives of Saleh at the U.S. embassy in Sana’a. As a result (moreover, the end of the meeting took place in the presence of Saleh), an agreement was reached that the president would resign within a week, temporarily transferring power to his zamu Abd Rabo (the right hand of the U.S. creature, former leader of South Yemen, Ali Nasser Muhammad), and receive a guarantee from the opposition for the security of his family and the inviolability of his financial assets and property. The country was to be headed by Abd Rabbo until the elections (at the end of this year or early next year).

Moreover, the U.S.A, which trained and financed the officers of the security forces and special operations forces (as well as carried out “sensitive” special operations with their assistance), with an eye on their struggle with the Islamists, and primarily with al-Qaida, insisted that the entire leadership of these intelligence agencies remain at their posts. Some analysts believe that the main reason is that this category of persons “knew too much about the most sensitive special operations”, and if offended, were fully capable of making a scandalous “Arab WikiLeaks”.

During the described meeting, Saleh promised to make a televised address to the nation within a week and announce his resignation. However, returning to the palace, instead of the announcement of his resignation, he put forward an ultimatum to his half-brother, Mohsen, and his troops to surrender and hand over their weapons, and in the event of refusal he threatened aircraft bombing of military bases and squares in Sana’a filled with protesters.

On March 27th, al-Qaeda militants captured the port city of Jaar in southern Yemen, as well as the city factory for the production of ammunition (primarily Kalashnikov rounds) located nearby. In the course of looting of the plant, and explosion took place, which killed about 150 people.

On April 1st, President Saleh turned to the youth, community and political leaders, and tribal elders in Sana’a with the appeal to create a political party and work out their demands, rather than remain “a
prisoner of the agenda” of the opposition al-Liqa al-Mushtaraka. The opposition responded with mass protests.

On April 4th, the former National Security Advisor to the U.S. President James Jones said in a CNN commentary on the situation in the Middle East and North Africa that the further destabilization of Yemen “could lead to the Yemeni territory becoming an al-Qaeda base.”

On the same day in Taiz, there was a large clash between demonstrations of opponents and supporters of Saleh; 16 people were killed, and over a hundred were injured. On the same day, The New York Times reported that the U.S.A. has undertaken secret talks with President Saleh for a week about his “departure from power and the transfer of power to the vice-president in the interests of subsequent carrying out of elections and political reform.” On April 5th-7th, the clash of supporters and opponents of Saleh continued with the participation of police both in Taiz and in Sana’a.

On April 8th, President Saleh appeared before supporters in the central square in Sana’a with a response to the proposal of the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf States (GCC) declared on April 7th to immediately leave the government in exchange for the inviolability of himself and his family from prosecution. Saleh announced he was ready to negotiate with the opposition, but rejected any mediation from other countries as gross interference in national politics: “We received our power from the power of our great nation, and not from Qatar or anyone else ...” On the same day in Taiz, 4 were killed and nearly 400 demonstrators were wounded in the course of a crackdown on the opposition by those loyal to Saleh, which initiated even more powerful opposition demonstrations on across the country on April 9th.

On April 11th, the Office of the President of Yemen issued a statement that expressed A. Saleh’s agreement with the GCC plan: he would transfer power to the vice-president and the opposition would form the government. However, this time protest was expressed by the opposition, which was not satisfied with the point of the plan to assure Saleh immunity from prosecution.

“Local fighting” took place the next ten days in Yemen between forces loyal to Saleh and the troops and individual fighters of the opposition. Simultaneously, “shuttle” negotiations between the opposition and Saleh took place with the mediation of the GCC and the U.S.A.

As a result, seven leading opposition parties issued a joint statement that they agree on the implementation of the “road map” proposed by the GCC, in which in exchange for curtailing opposition protests and
providing Saleh and his family immunity from prosecution, within 30 days the president would transfer his powers to Vice President General Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi and form a “national unity government” headed by opposition leaders. Saleh was given until April 22 to decide in this statement.

On April 22nd, President Saleh and the ruling General People’s Congress announced that they would accept the roadmap. But at the same time, a number of radical opposition parties and alliances reported that they would recognize no judicial immunity for Saleh and his family and that Saleh must stand trial without fail.

Then on April 24th, Saleh said in an interview with BBC that he does not see anyone in the country to whom he could transfer power and who can end the chaos; that he does not intend to transfer power to the rebels; and that, therefore, he was prepared to leave only after nationwide democratic elections were held in Yemen, in accordance with the Constitution, for which he was prepared to invite international observers. After this, once again full-scale “military actions” broke out between the forces of Saleh and opposition groups in Yemen. And up until April 30th, there were reports from the country every day of major firefights and multiple victims.

On May 1st, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf announced that the ceremony scheduled on this day in Riyadh for signing the agreement to transfer power from the President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh according to the GCC’s “road map” was postponed due to Saleh’s refusal to sign the document.

Even if Saleh really goes away, this does not mean near-term prospects for resolving the political crisis in Yemen. To create a stable government that satisfies all the conflicting clans in the country is fundamentally impossible – there will be many disgruntled leaders, and each of them has not only great ambitions, but also a strong group of influential and well-armed supporters; moreover, supporters who know how to fight and are ready to fight anyone and anywhere for a very reasonable price.

In addition, Yemen is one of the world’s largest markets for illegal trade in weapons, moreover, not only handguns, but heavy weapons. Almost all of the leaders of the tribal clans and the provincial governors are engaged in this business, and a change of power in the country will probably mean major conflicts for the redistribution of the arms market. Finally, southern Yemen is not only the main area of activity for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, but also an important area for the
control of sea lanes through the Gulf of Aden, the Babel-Mandeb strait, and the Red Sea, through which passes about 50% of global dry bulk transit, around 30% of global container traffic, and nearly a quarter of marine tanker transportation of oil.

Breakaway of the rebellious provinces of the North cannot fail to initiate Shiite protests both in Saudi Arabia and in other Gulf countries, especially if Iran will contribute to increasing this protest.

The breakaway of the Shafi provinces of the South will inevitably strengthen the already very strong presence of al-Qaeda and related radical organizations. On the one hand, this will abruptly raise the scale of “export” of militants from the region to all global “fronts of jihad”, and on the other hand, it will extend the already well-established links with Yemeni Islamic radicals and their counterparts in the Horn of Africa (in Somalia and Eritrea). This means it is quite likely that they will impart an entirely new “terrorist” dimension to the current Somali piracy in this region of the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea.

**Turkey**

Turkey embarked on the path of “political Islamization” before other countries, and for purely domestic reasons, without significant external influences. Moreover, this Islamization, which was pursued after almost a century of secular Kemalism, is not at all radical, but implemented with an eye to the constraining factors of the military elite’s influence, modernizing secular nationalism, and pan-Turkic ideology. For these reasons, the current “revolutionary incidents” that have gripped most of the Islamic world have left the country virtually unscathed.

The road for the political Islamization of Turkey was opened by the increasingly dubious prospects for realizing the Kemalist policy for inclusion into the European Union. This is one of the major reasons why Turkey fairly unambiguously took a stance (granted, together with Germany) against the majority of NATO member countries in the case of military operations against Libya.

Moreover, Turkey is becoming more and more actively involved in the process of finding a compromise and a political settlement in Libya, and in this sense quite distinctly opposing the “Doha” contact group on Libya, the main role in which is played by Qatar, and at the same time rather adamantly opposing Saudi Arabia and the “pool” of Western countries in their efforts to bring the anti-government protest actions in Syria to a revolution of the “Egyptian format.”
The succession of “Islamic revolutions” poses acute strategic questions for Ankara. In the context of a Sunni radical onslaught, which is almost inevitable after the “Islamic revolutions”, semi-secular Turkey has almost no chance for ideological leadership in the Islamic world. At the same time, the new distribution of orientations in the global Umma (above all, the sharp increase in the degree of conflict of the Sunni majority with Shiite Iran and semi-Shiite Syria) problematizes the alliance with Tehran and Damascus Ankara has established in recent years and elicits additional difficulties in solving “the Kurdish problem”.

(We note that after the latest mass Kurdish uprisings in the east of the country and in Istanbul, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board decided on April 22 to allow the Kurds to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections in June 2011307).

The foreign policy section of the ruling Justice and Development Party’s program for 2023, which Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan unveiled on April 16th for the upcoming elections, has a telling title “The Leader State”308. The JDP’s foreign policy priorities are named in the program as accession to the EU and particular attention to the problems of Turks and related peoples living in Europe; helping them integrate into European society, but “preventing assimilation”; strengthening cooperation with the U.S.A.; “satisfaction of legitimate claims of peoples of the Middle East and the Balkans” by means of diplomacy and negotiation; development a positive dynamic in relations with Russia; and the creation of a new format of relations with the Turkic republics309.

In regard to the “Western” and “Islamic” directions of this foreign policy strategy, the possibility of their success in the new world context raises certain doubts. In this context, one cannot exclude that one of the main accents in the foreign policy of Turkey could become the resumption of competition with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for the “Islamic pastoral care” of Russia and the former Soviet Turkic areal. This cannot fail to affect the vital interests of Russia; moreover, in the most immediate and painful way.

Iran

The attempts for “Twitter rebellions” in Iran that have been carried out for over a year have as of yet elicited no major political headway in the country, although opposition protests in the country have taken on a quite a regular character since the beginning of the “revolutions” in Tunisia and Egypt.
Large demonstrations took place on Feb. 15\textsuperscript{th} in Tehran (the authorities claim the armed participation of the outlawed People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran) with two dead, including a policeman, and many wounded\textsuperscript{310}. Subsequent attempts to organize large protest marches through Facebook on February 22\textsuperscript{nd} and March 4\textsuperscript{th} were suppressed by police.

The authorities responded to street protests with the usual harshness, although consistently retained all the basic formal attributes of a secular democratic state.

Moreover, protest demonstrations in the Gulf countries in recent months have been accompanied by growing charges from Tehran of interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf monarchies on the part of GCC and the U.S.A. Therefore, Pentagon Chief Robert Gates admitted during a visit to Bahrain on March 12\textsuperscript{th} that the U.S.A. is not aware of the facts of such interference\textsuperscript{311}. But on April 15\textsuperscript{th}, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that Iran is trying to capitalize on the uprisings in the Arab countries and to use the unrest for its own interests. On April 18\textsuperscript{th}, the GCC urged the UN Security Council in an official statement “to stop Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of member organizations”\textsuperscript{312}.

The strengthening of the alliance between the “militaristic” part of the elite represented by the leaders of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the influential groups of the clergy of Qom constitutes a relatively new process (which some experts claim has been clearly manifested in Iran in recent times against the backdrop of these allegations). It is argued that both these and others categorically reject both attempts to expand democracy in the Western spirit and the attempts of Orthodox ayatollahs to fully determine domestic and foreign policy in the sense of rigorous observance of the sharia norms, hampering the country’s technological and economic modernization.

In connection with this, it is impossible not to draw attention to the fact that a number of members of the Iranian parliament announced the initiation of impeachment procedures against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The British press considers the reason to be the escalating conflict between the president and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, connected with the dissatisfaction of Khamenei with Ahmadinejad’s personnel policy\textsuperscript{313}. However, knowledgeable experts are convinced that the nature of this conflict is the substantially different views about the main trends and prospects for the country’s development in various fractions of Iran’s “core” religious elite.
Iraq

The series of “revolutions” in Tunisia, Egypt, and so on, instantaneously and abruptly intensified the political and terrorist situation in Iraq. Large-scale protest actions with socio-economic and political demands are spreading in the “Sunni triangle”, in the regions of the Shiite majority, and in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The statements last autumn by the U.S. leadership on the fundamental reduction of terrorist activity in the country as the main basis for the final withdrawal of coalition troops from Iraq were answered by the opposition with a wave of terrorist attacks comparable in scale and consequences to the most acute period of terrorism three to four years ago. One of the largest incidents was the capture of the city administration building in Tikrit on March 29th by terrorists from local al-Qaeda groups, as a result of which 65 people were killed and more than 100 wounded.

At the same time, divisions within the Iraqi government intensified, which already casts doubts about the stability of the country’s government (established very recently and with great difficulty).

Pentagon Chief Robert Gates arrived in Baghdad on April 7th after consultations in Riyadh, and he put before al-Maliki’s government the possibility of extending the U.S. military presence in Iraq beyond 2011. Gates received a careful, but an unequivocal refusal: the Iraqi leadership stated that “in the developing circumstances, they could not take this step”. On April 27th, the Prime Minister of Iraq al-Maliki gave the following answer to an offer to sign an additional contract with the U.S.A. to extend the American military presence in the country: “We have today only one agreement with the United States, and no new agreements, including the extension of U.S. military presence in Iraq, are planned.”

If another political crisis with a change in government does not take place in Baghdad in the time frame of the next few months, this decision by the Iraqi government will mean the withdrawal of coalition forces in conditions when the achievement of the main declared goals of the war that lasted many years has met a “smashing defeat”. This will be perceived as a defeat of the “infidels” (primarily the U.S.A.) and the victory of Islam by all religious groups of the worldwide Muslim Umma without exception and all the political powers based on it, including neighboring Iran.
Afghanistan

After recent attempts by the American leadership of the coalition to facilitate the reconciliation of Hamid Karzai’s government with the unruly governors of provinces and warlords by way of declaring the Taliban, in contrast to al-Qaeda, to be reasonable partners whom the government could negotiate with, military and terrorist operations in Afghanistan sharply intensified in sync with the Arab “revolutions”.

According to NATO commanders, casualties among the civilian population in south-eastern Afghanistan in February-March 2011 increased 4.3 times in comparison with the same period in 2010[^317]. Moreover, the terrorist activity of the opposition in Afghanistan increased sharply after the provocation that occurred in the U.S.A. on March 20th, when Florida Pastor Wayne Sapp carried out his long-publicized public rally with the burning of the Koran[^318].

On March 29th, Taliban fighters numbering 300 seized Vaigal district in Nuristan province after a short battle with the police[^319].

On April 2nd, in what was previously one of the quietest spots in the country – the city of Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh province) – demonstrators attacked the U.N. mission, killing 7 employees (moreover, two of them had their heads cut off) and wounding another 12[^320]. On this and subsequent days of large protest demonstrations “against the infidels, sneering at the sanctity of Islam” took place in Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and other cities in the country, with shooting and numerous victims.

RIA Novosti reported that as a result, the number of victims in the riots exceeded 100 people in Kandahar alone and that many wounded, including children, have ended up in hospitals.

Nevertheless, on April 15th U.S. President Barack Obama officially confirmed plans for the withdrawal of a significant part of the NATO’s military commitment from Afghanistan as soon as July 2011[^321].

However, on April 16th another major suicide bombing in Afghanistan took place at the headquarters of coalition forces in Nangarhar in the east of the country[^322]. On April 18th, a large group of the Taliban tried to storm a building of the Ministry of Defense in Kabul with heavy weapons and small arms, where negotiations were taking place between the Defense Ministers of Afghanistan and France and U.S. generals, and 2 and Afghan soldiers were killed and 7 wounded[^323].
On April 21st in a mine explosion under an armored car, one French soldier was killed and nine wounded. On the same day in an explosion in the center of Jalalabala, three police academy instructors were killed and six wounded. On April 22nd, militants burned a column of fuel tankers supplying NATO troops in the north of the country. On April 23rd, the Taliban fired missiles at a NATO military base at the airport Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan province. On the same day, they shot down a NATO helicopter in Kapisa province, and then engaged in combat with the retrieval team enemy that arrived on the scene of the crash.

On April 25th, nearly 540 inmates escaped from a prison in Kandahar through a tunnel a length of 320 meters, including over a hundred of warlords and Taliban militants. On April 27th at the Kabul airport, Afghan military pilot Ahmad Gul shot nine U.S. NATO troops; moreover, the Taliban immediately announced that Gul was a member of their movement, which has long sought an opportunity to get close to the invaders and to exact revenge upon them.

On April 30th, the Taliban announced that from May 1st it would begin its “spring offensive” against the NATO forces, national security services, and government officials. In the statement, the Taliban advised ordinary Afghans to avoid events held by the government and not to be located near the objects of the coalition forces, so as not to suffer in the course of the planned attacks. On May 2nd, after the killing of bin Laden was announced, the Taliban declared that they would take savage revenge upon the non-believers for this action.

In these conditions, the majority of experts consider the confirmation of the coalition command’s plans to being withdrawing troops from Afghanistan to be a symptom of another failure of U.S. global policy, culminating in flight. There is no doubt that such an outcome of years of war (a major defeat of the “Great Satan” as the U.S.A. is referred to by Islamic radicals, following the previous defeat here of the Soviet “Small Satan”) will elicit an extremely powerful burst of “victorious” political activity in the Islamic world.

And insofar as in Afghanistan this activity is “nourished” namely by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, having long ago established stable communication with Islamic radicals in the Ferghana Valley and in Chinese Xinjiang, attempts to “pass the torch of Islamic revolution” to the regions of the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia and China as early as this coming summer are fully likely.
Pakistan

The removal, according to the U.S. initiative “for the sake of establishing democracy”, of Pervez Musharraf’s government, which had strong support from the army and security services, as well as having fought carefully, yet rather actively and deliberately with the radical Islamic opposition and rebel tribes, destabilized and acutely complicated the political situation in Pakistan. The weak (and, experts say, even more corrupt than the former) government of Ali Zardari turned out to be much less effective in respect to confronting the radical Islamist threat.

As a result, all the more frequently among coalition forces in Afghanistan there has begun to arise both problems with supply (militant attacks on cargo caravans on the supply routes from Karachi to Afghanistan) and problems with penetration of militants from Pakistan’s Waziristan into Afghanistan.

At the same time, the increasingly frequent attacks of U.S. drones on Islamic radicals’ bases in Pakistan dispose both the elite and the mass population in Pakistan to be all the more anti-American — both because it is a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the country and because a significant portion of these attacks are carried out on peaceful citizens “by mistake”.

The turning point in this deterioration of relations between Islamabad and Washington was an incident on January 27th, 2011, when an American citizen, Raymond Davis, upon seeing two Pakistani motorcyclists by his car on a street in Lahore shot them with a pistol — allegedly suspecting that they wanted to rob him. When Davis was arrested, it emerged that he had entered Pakistan on a tourist visa, although he called himself an officer of the Consular Department of the U.S.A. Moreover, during a search weapons had been found on him, detailed maps of the regions and cities in Pakistan, photographs of a number of madrassas on the border with Afghanistan where preparation of fighters took place, as well as mobile phones on which there had been recent calls to people in South Waziristan. The investigation conducted by the police and intelligence agencies revealed that he was a so-called “CIA contractor”, and that Davis and his team had over 600 contacts with students of madrassas in the Pashtun tribal zone bordering Afghanistan, especially with terrorists belonging to the movement Taliban of Pakistan.

The Government of Pakistan categorically refused the demands of the U.S.A. to immediately release Davis and allow him to leave the
country. Particular mass indignation was aroused by the fact that the U.S. embassy tried, as a basis for these claims, to issue Davis a “backdated” diplomatic passport, and that in the end Davis was released to the U.S.A. after all.

This indignation reached its height when in March more than 40 civilians who had come to a jirga – a meeting of local tribal elders – were killed during another U.S. drone attack on a village in the north-west of the country.

However, the “straw that broke the camel’s back” was the appearance in early April of the U.S. State Department report to Congress in which it was stated that the Pakistani authorities did not exhibit sufficient activity in the fight against the Taliban and elimination of al-Qaida militants from the country’s territory. Insofar as in Pakistan after the incident with Davis many people became certain that it is the American agents who are engaged in “feeding” the Taliban and al-Qaida, after release of the given report, the leadership of the Pakistan Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) declared a “temporary freeze” in its interaction with the CIA.

Moreover, immediately after this “break” with the Americans, Pakistani troops conducted a successful operation against Taliban fighters in an area bordering Afghanistan, destroying 54 terrorists with the air support of helicopters and airplanes, and at the same time losing only three soldiers. Thus, it is as if to show that the war on terror goes much better “without the dubious support of the U.S.A. and the CIA”.

On April 11th, British Prime Minister David Cameron, accompanied by Chief of the Defense Staff D. Richards and head of MI6 J. Sawers, flew to “reconcile” the JCIB with the CIA. Cameron stated that “We have no higher shared priority than tackling terrorism together... That means challenging the extremist ideology that fuels it and ensuring effective operational co-operation between our police and intelligence agencies”.

On April 12th, Leon Panetta received JCIB Ahmad Shuja Pasha at the CIA headquarters in Langley.

The future will show whether these negotiations will be successful and how much they are able to restore relations between Washington and Islamabad, insofar as, as The New York Times reported, Pakistani intelligence officers have demanded the Americans limit the use of combat drones and reduce the scale of intelligence operations in Pakistan by 25-40%, as well as remove 335 CIA officers from the country.
Meanwhile, coalition troops in Afghanistan are experiencing more and more difficulties with supply and material support passing in transit through Pakistan (the NATO appeal to Russia and the republics of Central Asia with the request to provide an alternative “northern” transit of coalition shipments is no coincidence).

On April 23rd, the U.S.A. gave Pakistan another reason for indignation — a U.S. military drone missile strike in North Waziristan killed 25 people, including two women and three children336. On the same day, a suicide bomber blew himself up near the car of the head of the local militia to fight the Taliban, Malik Khan. Khan himself and four of his company were killed and 5 people were wounded337.

On April 25th, unknown bikers burned 15 people alive, including women and children, in a tourist bus parked outside the hotel in the city of Sibi in Balochistan. On April 26th in Karachi, two buses with Pakistan Navy servicemen were bombed, killing three people and injuring more than 30338.

Simultaneously, the “Pakistani street” has gradually been inspired by the example of the “Arab revolution” and is increasingly radicalizing in an anti-American and Islamist direction.

A new and extremely powerful impetus to the process was given by the U.S. special forces operation to destroy Osama bin Laden, carried out on May 1st in secret from the leadership of Pakistan, literally in the center of the country, in Abbottabad near Karachi. A very acute protest growing in mass is swelling across Pakistan after this operation, with the typical slogans “Death to America” and the burning of American flags339. Moreover, according to a number of experts, this process is more and more deeply affecting the army.

This has already seriously concerned many in the world. Only in March-April 2011 did the Pakistan Army successfully test two types of ballistic missiles, the short-range Hatf-11 and Hatf-9, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. On April 30th in Islamabad, it was announced that they had successfully carried out another test — of a cruise missile air-launched Hatf-8, which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to a range of up to 350 miles and skirting uneven terrain on ultra-low altitudes that are inaccessible for the detection of ground-based radars340.

The aforementioned facts are increasingly a concern for many of Pakistan’s “close and distant neighbors”, insofar as simultaneously with the Islamic radicalization of the army in the country a system of inter-
governmental conflicts is building between the administrative and judiciary, army and intelligence services, and in addition to the problems in the always rebellious “tribal areas”, the activity of Islamic radicals in Punjab is increasing, as well as that of separatists in Balochistan and Sindh.

Everyone who is carefully following the situation understand how serious the implications are, which go far beyond the purely regional framework, and which could cause a reduction of the systemic stability of Pakistan’s statehood, provoked by the processes described.

Sudan

Sudan is under international sanctions regime “for the genocide in Darfur”, which was recognized by the “international community” according to a model almost the same as in Libya; that is, by the voices of the opposition, human rights activists, and Western media, without serious objective consideration. This has greatly complicated the socio-economic situation in the country in the context of a global rise in food prices.

On January 30th, a demonstration of university students demanding the resignation of the government took place in Khartoum, which was quickly dispersed by the police. Other major opposition demonstrations in the country against the backdrop of the “Arab revolutions” did not take place. Moreover, President Omar al-Bashir welcomed the “protest of the Egyptian people against the corrupt Mubarak regime” at Tahrir Square in Cairo – although at the same time he once again ordered the “preventive” arrest of his former ally and chairman of the parliament, Hassan Al-Turabi, now the chief radical Islamic opponent.

However, the severity of internal political separatist conflicts in Sudan has not disappeared because of this.

The confrontation in Darfur continues, where within the framework of the so-called “Doha process of reconciliation”, clan and tribal leaders of several “liberation armies” struggle (including by military means) for power and for the future configuration of the region’s division between their tribes into provinces. The intensity of this struggle in recent months has drastically increased, insofar as the government has withdrawn a significant part of its troops from the region in connection with problems in south Sudan, and in connection with the looting of armories in Libya by the Cyrene rebels and, large quantities of arms and ammunition have begun to arrive in Darfur.
At that, the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur is only being exacerbated, as the situation in refugee camps under the auspices of the UN humanitarian mission UNAMID has been steadily deteriorating and becoming criminalized. In particular, the refugees are carrying out reciprocal bandit raids and kidnapping of UN staff, as well as essentially creating their own “administration and police” of criminal tribal authorities in the camps who manage the distribution of humanitarian aid and who sometimes simply do not allow officials from the UN to access these “temporary refugee cities”.

Even more acute is the situation in South Sudan. There, almost 100% of participants voted for independence in the referendum carried out in January 2011, the conclusive announcement of which is scheduled for July 9th. However, before this time it is necessary to resolve several critical issues:

– to determine the division of a few “controversial” provinces at the junction of North and South Sudan (Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan) and the question of the nationality of the population of the divided parts of Sudan during the transitional period;
– to agree on the division of revenues from crude oil exports in the region (over 70% of proven oil reserves in the country — about 6 billion bbl. — are in South Sudan), as well as the division of government debt;
– to stop the civil war between armed groups of political forces and the tribes of the South that began immediately after the referendum.

The latter is apparently the most difficult task. The situation is that one of the most oil-rich territories in the region, Abyei, is an area of longstanding contention between a number of tribes, the main ones of which are the Negroid Dinka and Arab Misseriya. Moreover, a year before the referendum, the political leaders of the South in its capital of Juba began to summon hundreds of thousands of Dinka living and working in the North to the territory. The central government in Khartoum responded with the construction of many villages in Abyei (usually near the oil fields) for the nomadic Misseriya.

In early March, over 70 people were killed in two days of fighting between Misseriya and Dinka militias. In these same days, about 40 soldiers of South Sudan’s army died in the southern province of Jonglei in fighting with the rebels of General George Athor, who lost in the elections. And in these same days, more than 70 people were killed in fighting between South Sudan’s army and rebels in the Upper Nile province.
The Government of Southern Sudan accused Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir of provoking all of these uprisings, and on March 12th it announced that it would suspend negotiations with Khartoum on the division of the country.

On March 17th, Juba reported that major military clashes between the rebels and the regular army had begun in the oil region of Myom in Unity State as well as in the Upper Nile province, and during this 70 rebels and 35 government soldiers were killed.

On March 29th, the authorities in Juba reported that several rebel movements had simultaneously begun a “land mine war” against government troops. On March 30th, the Commander of the UN mission in Sudan, General Moses Obi, said that the Mission had evidence that both Khartoum and Juba are supplying weapons to “friendly” groups in Abyei, and that the situation in the province “could become critical at any time”.

However, many experts believe that the situation has become “supercritical”, and not only in the state of Abyei. Minor skirmishes in South Sudan between the various tribal groups and “fragments” of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) occur almost every day, and major fighting – at least once a week. Thus, in a battle in the state of al-Wahda State on April 20th, 31 people were killed and several dozen were wounded. And in the course of last week alone, before 27 April, another 180 people were killed in internecine battles in South Sudan.

Moreover, the emphasis of the conflict in April shifted to Southern Kordofan, where last year’s elections were postponed due to a conflict between the tribes of the Nuba and Misseriya (they should begin on May 5th). The election campaign was orchestrated with burned villages and dozens of victims, in which the parties accuse not only each other but also the “hand of Khartoum”.

In addition in South Sudan arose yet another military-political force – the group of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), headed by one of the heroes and veterans of the liberation war against Khartoum, General Peter Yak. Several top generals of the South Sudanese army and influential politicians have already endorsed the political agenda of SLA, which Yak unveiled on April 11th (the program demands the overthrow of President of South Sudan Salva Kiir and the creation of a new coalition government with the participation of all parties).

As a result, from mid-April the South Sudanese army has been fighting with the seven rebel groups at once (three of them are quite
large and are headed by influential and popular generals), regularly accusing Khartoum of their creation. The number of victims of this war is estimated at a minimum of several hundred people. Moreover, with each passing day it becomes clearer that it is not the “sinister hand of Khartoum” (which, of course, uses the South Sudanese strife for its own purposes), but the growing inter-clan conflicts within the “core” of the newly formed state of Dinka tribal groups.

At the same time, there are already increasingly fierce debates between Khartoum and Juba about whether to preserve the old principle of distribution of income from oil exports “50/50” after the partition of the country, or, as demanded by South Sudan, it will receive the “lion’s share”. At the same time, it was announced in Juba that they plan to attract foreign investment to build a series of hydroelectric complexes on the White Nile for their own electricity supply, as well as for export. But this will certainly greatly reduce the stream flow of the Nile both in Sudan and in Egypt located further downstream, which will catastrophically worsen the water shortage problem in these desert countries, which is already a very painful issue for Khartoum and Cairo, especially considering that Ethiopia plans to develop similar programs for major hydroelectric construction on the Blue Nile in the near future.

Finally, another “tectonic shift” in the region is connected with the fact that China, which controls nearly half the oil fields in South Sudan and receives about 6% of its total oil imports from them, is already discussing the issue of laying a pipeline through Kenya as an alternative to the existing pipeline to Port Sudan. As this could be a nearly fatal blow to the economy of Sudan, in attempting to implement such a project, South Sudan and Kenya would probably launch the next “oil war”. This could not fail to affect the southern neighbors of Sudan – Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (by “tribal kinship” of the relevant parties on both sides of the border) and is capable of provoking new armed conflicts here.

It is quite possible in the course of the enumerated processes that the destabilization of Sudan will inevitably once again draw “to the surface” Omar al-Bashir’s traditional radical Islamic political and autocratic opponents from al-Qaida and the Sufi orders. Superimposed on the tribal war and separatism in the south, the west (Darfur) and east of the country, as well as the quite likely Islamic radicalization of Egypt and Libya, it cannot fail to elicit a “domino” destabilization not only in deeply Islamized Chad, but also in Christian Ethiopia.
In any case, the described processes in Sudan, upon further development, are fully capable of triggering major new militant terrorist “conflagrations” in a huge (and permanently conflictual) region of Africa.

**Somalia**

For nearly 20 years after its collapse in 1991, Somalia has essentially been a “failed state”, continually torn apart by wars between the major tribal clans and sub-clans. The only relatively successful attempt to restore the Somali state occurred in 2005-2006, when the religious leaders of one of the largest tribes, the Hawiye, declared the authoritative institution to be Islamic courts governing society according to sharia law. Then they quickly stopped the lawless “chaos” of clan militias using the courts’ military forces and essentially united all of the central and southern territories, except for the breakaway, self-proclaimed Somaliland and Puntland in the north. They established a single political power in the form of the Union of Islamic Courts.

Moreover, the relatively moderate leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts Union strongly rejected, with a few exceptions, the support of foreign Islamic radicals, including al-Qaida. However, they laid claim not only to the “breakaway” North, but also to the territory of neighboring Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis. As a result, in December 2006 the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia with U.S. support, routed the lightly-armed troops of the Union of Islamic Courts, and set up a puppet government in Mogadishu, which, in the absence of real political authority, quickly drove the country into its former chaos of a clan “war of all against all”.

Then in Somalia, amid growing hatred of the Christian Ethiopian invaders in the Muslim country, the most radical Islamic leaders have come into the political limelight, such as the head of al-Shabab, Sheikh Aden Hashi Ayro, who quickly established ties with al-Qaeda. Moreover, if the first major collaboration was with the Yemeni al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and then with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, then soon al-Shabab, according to military sources, re-oriented towards al-Qaeda in Pakistan to a substantial degree. It is precisely in this period that the activity of Somali maritime piracy around the Horn of Africa abruptly increased.

Now the central government of Somalia in reality controls only isolated districts of the capital Mogadishu. The South and South-West
of the country are under the authority of Islamic militant groups from al-Shabab and yet another radical group associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but in recent years practically uniting with al-Shabab — Hizbul Islam. Fighting against them on the government side are about 8,000 soldiers and peacekeepers from the African Union Mission (AMISOM) (mainly from Uganda and Burundi), forces of the Sufi movement Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa, as well as small detachments of tribal militias.

Until recently, there remained a relative military parity between these two opposing forces, under which they regularly first won then lost regions and cities, with neither of the forces obtaining a decisive advantage. In October 2010, the African Union demanded a UN resolution for a sea and air blockade of Somalia, which was supposed to stop al-Shabab’s smuggling through the port of Kismayo, as well as stop the shipments of weapons and ammunition to Islamic militants. However, this UN resolution was not adopted. From November 2010, the influence of the central government in Mogadishu decreased even more sharply as a result of the appointment of Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, having both Somali and U.S. citizenship.

Since the beginning of 2011, against the backdrop of domino “Islamic revolutions”, a weakening of the capacity of AMISOM troops in Somalia has been observed (including disruption in its financing and supply) during a simultaneous increase in the flow of weapons from Yemen to al-Shabab.

In late January 2011 at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa, the AU Commission chairman Jean Ping acknowledged the failure of the mission of the Somali Transitional Government, which has been “…unable to establish national authority. It has not been able to effectively deliver on its governmental obligations.”

On February 14th, the spiritual leader of al-Shabab, Sheikh Jama Abdusalam, urged Somalis to rise up against the government supported by the West, according to the example of Tunisia and Egypt.

On February 20th, several skirmishes between al-Shabab troops and AMISOM forces took place in the capital Mogadishu. Peacekeepers have announced the deaths of more than 20 people — civilians and two of their soldiers, as well as six Islamic militants from Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Kenya, and India.

On February 28th, al-Shabab threatened a strike in Kenya, accusing it of preparing troops for the Somali government in Mogadishu.
In March, as a result of fighting in the central regions of Somalia, al-Shabab significantly expanded its zone of control in the country.

On April 3rd, 2011, the emergence of yet another new state, Azania, on the territory of Somalia was solemnly announced in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. The state was created in the southern provinces of Somalia on the border with Kenya and is intended to be a kind of "buffer" for Kenya from direct contact with Somali Islamic radicals. The President of Azania was declared to be the former Somali Defense Minister Mohammed Abdi Gandi, who immediately declared the goal of fighting al-Shabab.

At that, it can be assumed that the creation of Azania is not only in the interest of Kenya (which was obvious from the procedure of the emergence of the new state), but also China, which intends to protect its own Kenyan investment projects from the pressure of Islamic militants from the north: above all the planned oil pipeline from southern Sudan to the Kenyan coast.

However, experts already know that al-Shabab has placed increasingly severe pressure on a group of Somali sea pirates subordinate to tribal clan leaders, demanding a "share" of proceeds from the pirate trade (in exchange for a supply of intelligence information about passing ships, weapons, and equipment). Moreover, that pressure has intensified in April in connection with the failure of attempts of the government in Mogadishu and its international military support from AMISOM to reduce the scope of al-Shabab’s territorial control in the country.

This most likely means that soon the “Somali pirate problem” will much more acutely and seriously affect not only China, India, Japan, and South Korea, which fulfill their basic demand for imported oil by tanker transit through the north-western part of the Indian Ocean, but also the entire system of world maritime trade.

**Jordan**

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan occupies a special place among the monarchies of the Middle East.

The other Gulf monarchies consider this most ancient Hashemite dynasty in the region (the kings of Jordan are descended from the Prophet Muhammad’s grandfather) with a certain jealousy, which is sometimes far from friendly, especially after Jordan implicitly supported Baghdad during the international coalition’s war against Iraq in 1991, contrary to the general position of the other Gulf monarchies.
Jordan, unlike the majority of other monarchies in the Gulf, is poor in natural resources (with the exception of phosphate) and is therefore not able to provide a high living standard for the population on account of resource rents. Given the large number of immigrants, about 25% of the population lives below the poverty line and about 30% of the population are actually unemployed.

In its domestic and foreign policy, Jordan experiences the maximal load of problems in the region associated with Israeli-Palestinian relations (after the Israeli-Arab wars, the Palestinian Arabs and their descendants were the country’s largest ethnic group, accounting for about 60% of the population of approximately 6 million people). Finally, up to 300 thousand Iraqi refugees have settled in Jordan since 2003 over the course of the coalition war in Iraq, and over the course of the Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006 — tens of thousands more refugees from Lebanon.

The stability of the Jordanian government, which survived an actual coup attempt on the part of the Palestinians in the late 1960s–early 1970s, is primarily supported by the “semi-absolutist” nature of the constitutional monarchy. According to the constitution, the king is the supreme commander; he also appoints the Council of Ministers, provincial governors, and all the judges, as well as the Upper Chamber of the National Assembly; and signs all adopted laws (his veto can be overcome only by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Parliament).

The king’s second pillar of power is the indigenous Jordanian Bedouin tribes, whose representatives occupy the majority of administrative and government positions in the country (and receive, in comparison to the “outsider” Palestinians, certain political and economic preferences), and who would in no way be satisfied with a transfer of power in the country to a “democracy of the Palestinian majority”. Finally, the third pillar of power in Jordan is the army and security forces, the “backbone” of which is composed of Bedouin Jordanians, as well as Circassians and Chechens who emigrated from Russia to the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century.

The first protest demonstrations in various parts of Jordan took place in mid-January 2011 simultaneously with the start of other “Arab revolutions”. The protests began in the province (and initially primarily the Jordanian tribal minority participated in them), but then quickly spread to the capital Amman and other cities (Zarqa, Irbid, Ma’an, Ajloun).
Initially, the basic demands of the protesters were economic (under the influence of the global crisis, remittances from Jordanians working abroad had declined and the influx of foreign tourists and investment had decreased, but the government, conducting economic reforms of a “monetarist” character, did not see fit to support the population’s fall in living standards with the previously common price subsidies). The demonstrators expressed outrage at the rising cost of food and fuel, as well as unemployment, and demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai.

By the end of January, the demonstrations had become more large-scale and with more radical demands. The protesters carried the slogans “prosecute corrupt officials”, “Rifai go away”. The demonstrations continued although the government pledged $550 million in subsidies for fuel and basic foodstuffs for the population, as well as raised the salary of civil servants.

On February 1st, King Abdullah II dissolved the government, appointed the former head of security Marouf al-Bakhit as the new prime minister, and offered ministerial posts to representatives of the opposition, including his main political opponents from the Islamic bloc IAF. However, the opposition refused to join the government, stating that they would be willing to do so only after the king carried out political reform and nationwide elections.

Soon the King received a brusque collective letter by 36 heads of Bedouin tribes and clans, in which the economic reforms carried out by the government were criticized, as well as the spouse of Abdullah II, Queen Rania Yassin – in connection with her Palestinian ancestry and her economic and political activities contrary to the traditional values of the country’s population. The authors of the letter explicitly warned that ignoring their demands could push the country into a Tunisian or Egyptian scenario of development of events.

In the course of the ensuing demonstrations in Jordan, major clashes between opponents and supporters of the government began; moreover, with each subsequent Friday “day of rage”, the demands of the protesters took on an increasingly acute political nature and in general essentially adopted the main slogans of the Islamists. On February 25th, the opposition insisted on holding early elections and amending the constitution to restrict royal power, but beginning from March 4th, one of the basic demands of the demonstrators became “reforming the regime” with its transformation into a fully-fledged constitutional monarchy.
On March 24th, the opposition set up an encampment in the center of Amman on Gamal Abdel Nasser Square, announced the creation of a new political March 24 Movement, and demanded the resignation of Prime Minister al-Bakhit, curbing of corruption, a stop to political repression, and the implementation of extensive political reforms. However, after several hours the camp was attacked by supporters of the King and a fight broke out, during which one person was killed and more than 100 were injured.

On March 25th, the police demolished the opposition camp, and Prime Minister al-Bakhit blamed the riots and the victims on the Islamists in a televised speech to the nation: “What happened today is definitely the start of chaos and it is unacceptable and I warn of the consequences... I ask you, where are you taking Jordan?”

But in April, protests and clashes between protestors and supporters of the current government continued. Thus, on April 15th, clashes took place in the cities of Zarqa and Russiefa between several hundred protesting Salafi Islamists and supporters of the monarchy, whom had to be separated by law enforcement forces. Commandant of the Royal Guards Hussein al-Majali said that the Salafis attacked the police ranks first, brandishing daggers and steel bars, as a result of which 83 police officers were wounded and four were in serious condition.

From this moment, Jordanian Sunni radicals have been actively connected to the rise in the protest tensions in Syria, according to military experts, primarily by means of supplying armed militants to Syria. However, not only this. Anti-Syrian (or rather, anti-Bashar) propaganda has intensified in mosques in Jordan. Furthermore, the severity of the charges by Jordanian Islamists against al-Assad’s government and the Baath Party has increased for the “infringement of the legitimate interests of the Jordanian people.” Perhaps it was due to the pressure of demands “from below” of the Islamists that the Jordanian representative of the JVA water protection agency Saad Abu Hammour announced the need for revision in favor of Jordan’s old agreement with Syria on division of the water of the Yarmouk River.

In 1945, the great-grandfather of King Abdullah II had allowed the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to establish a branch of the organization in what was then Transjordan. In the 1950s–1970s, the grandfather of the current monarch, King Hussein, successfully collaborated with the MB in opposing the political pressure of the nationalist and secular parties, and there were no major conflicts between the MB and the government.
But in the late 1970s — early 1980s, against the backdrop of the “Islamic revolution” in Iran and the establishment of cooperative relations with Israel and the West, the relationship between the MB and the monarchy began to become strained.

In 1989, in relatively free parliamentary elections the MB obtained 22 out of 80 seats in the lower house of parliament using radical anti-Western and anti-Israeli slogans, which could not fail to alarm the monarchy. It responded with a change to election laws, significantly limiting the MB’s opportunities.

In 1992, the MB created and officially registered the political party Islamic Action Front (IAF), which incorporated the majority of Jordanian political parties and organizations with nationalistic-Islamic programs, and which quickly became the main opposition force in the country. IAF launched large charities and Islamic education programs in Jordan (the “trademark” policy of the MB) and began to receive increasingly wide support from the population, primarily from Jordanian Palestinians.

The program unveiled by the IAF in 2005, against the backdrop of the success of the MB in the elections in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, announced demands to transform the basis of the legal system of the country to the sharia and change electoral law$^{36}$, as well as to ensure the accountability of the executive power before the legislature (including dissolution of the upper chamber of the National Assembly, whose members are appointed by the king, and the formation of a “majority government” on the basis of universal fair elections).

King Abdullah II responded with a substantial expansion of the security services’ powers and a new law requiring the authorization of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to carry out preaching and to teach the Koran in mosques.

The IAF simply boycotted the parliamentary elections in November 2010, but in January 2011, it was involved in supporting and organizing anti-government protests, and by February it essentially led the protest demonstrations almost everywhere and handed its party slogans to the participants.

Thus, the situation in Jordan now is an unstable balance between two main forces: the Palestinian majority, the bulk of whom support the demands of the IAF (i.e., MB), and Jordan’s indigenous minority, which demands more stringent “containment” of the Palestinians from the king.
For now, the army and security forces are firmly on the side of the indigenous population and a strong royal government. However, King Abdullah II in the present situation cannot decisively set the repressive apparatus in motion, knowing that it inherent in this would be a full-scale civil war, in which it is the Palestinians who are most likely to receive broad international (not just Arab) support. But at the same time, the king cannot make concessions to the Islamists, because it would mean the loss of support of tribal sheikhs and the Jordanian military elite; that is, a possible (and hardly bloodless) loss of power.

However, the Jordanian Islamists’ current offensive against the government is the most decisive and uncompromising in many years. At a time when the entire “civilized West” is very closely following the transitions occurring in the zone of the “Arab revolutions” and demanding “democratic reforms” from the Arab world, it cannot be excluded that the king will be forced to begin such reforms; that is, gradually concede real power to the Islamists.

This will not only extremely aggravate the domestic political situation in Jordan. One of the harshest accusations against the king brought by the IAF is the recognition of Israel and the “conciliatory” policy in dealing with this “state that has no right to exist”. Therefore, it can be assumed with great likelihood that the strengthening of the Islamists in Jordan will almost automatically lead it into first a state of “cold” and then “hot” war with Israel.

If the Islamists are victorious in Egypt, there is no doubt that this war will be waged actively and in coordination with the Egyptian, Palestinian (Hamas) and Jordanian (IAF) Muslim Brotherhood. This cannot fail to inflame the military conflagration in the Middle East.

**Saudi Arabia**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is an absolute theocratic monarchy, governed on the basis of extremely strict sharia law by a royal family that has swollen over the centuries to several thousand, as well as by officers appointed of the king from the elite tribes and the Salafi clergy.

After the discovery in the country and further exploration of the planet’s largest oil reserves (according to recent estimates, they now constitute about 260 billion bbls.), there were no and are no economic problems in the KSA. The main political problems of the government in the KSA, as in any absolute monarchy, were until recently a complex system of alliances and conflicts within the royal family.
However, the unique position of indigenous Saudi Arabs, able to comfortably live with full state support (free education and large government subsidies) has led to the fact that all the real “dirty work” in the country is done by foreign workers (from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, etc.). The number of migrants is about 7 million out of the 28 million populations, and neither the rights nor privileges of full-fledged citizens of the KSA are extended to them. Yet another major political problem for the ruling dynasty is the Shiite minority, concentrated mostly in the very oil-rich Eastern Province and almost fully excluded from the Salafi system of government at all levels.

The first protest actions occurred in the KSA on January 29th in Jeddah, where several hundred people demanded that the authorities promptly rebuild city infrastructure and housing damaged by flooding. The police immediately dispersed the protest and arrested about 50 protesters.

“A second protest call” was sounded in early February, when a group of religious activists announced on the Internet the creation of a new political organization in the KSA – the Umma Islamic Party, called for political reforms in the country “on the basis of Islamic values”, and appealed to King Abdullah with the request to recognize their organization. Within a few days, all the founding leaders of the new party were arrested by security forces.

However, as among those arrested were more than a few well-known Islamic figures and intellectuals, this elicited an amplification of the protests, onto which almost immediately were superimposed both the economic demands of the Arab “lower classes” and the foreign, non-citizen workers, as well as political demands for access to power from the side of the Shiite organizations in the Eastern Province.

On February 23rd, King Abdullah, having returned to the KSA after several months of treatment abroad, announced the launch of a package of fiscal measures worth $36 billion, designed to remove socio-economic tensions in the country. Among these measures was a 15% increase in the salaries of civil servants, benefits and subsidies to unemployed youth and Saudi students studying abroad, as well as a program to help young families secure affordable housing. In addition, for the first time in the history of the kingdom, it was announced that the unemployed would be paid mandatory benefits.

However, protest actions continued; moreover, the opposition announced on the Internet that Friday, March 11th, was designated a
“day of anger”. The response of the authorities was to bring the units of the army and National Guard to operational readiness, to ban from March 5\textsuperscript{th} any rallies and demonstrations as contrary to the sharia, and to provide the police with special powers to suppress them.

We note that the authorities and the clergy of KSA, who have always sponsored radical Islamic forces in “secular” Islamic countries organizationally and financially\textsuperscript{376}, initially actively engaged in support of the “jasmine” and other Arab revolutions. So it was this time — as long as talk was of the destabilization and potential overthrow of the secular non-monarchical regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Algeria. In this initial period, the KSA-funded satellite television channel Al-Arabiya, based in the UAE, was only slightly less active than the Qatari Al-Jazeera channel in its informational warfare against the authorities of these countries.

However, when the sense of revolution began in earnest in the Kingdom of Morocco and the Islamic monarchical regimes in the Gulf, the Saudi government became seriously concerned. A number of sources reported it even tried to initiate negotiations to purchase — and with a very large overpayment — the main “provocative” Internet resource of these revolutions, the company Facebook, from Mark Zuckerberg\textsuperscript{371}.

On March 3\textsuperscript{rd}, Shiite protests took place in the east of KSA (the cities Katif and Awwamiya), who demanded the release of their relatives from prison and the creation of new jobs in the province, as well as provision of rights to Shiites equal to those of Sunnis. On March 5\textsuperscript{th}, these protests expanded and engulfed another town — Hofuf. In the course of the protests, the police arrested 26 Shiite activists and a transfer to the Eastern Province of additional security forces numbering 10 thousand people was initiated.

Nevertheless, the demonstrations continued in the Eastern Province. On March 10\textsuperscript{th}-11\textsuperscript{th}, police used gunfire into the air and stun grenades to break up the protests of Shiites in Qatif; several demonstrators were wounded, and many were arrested. On March 16\textsuperscript{th}, new Shiite protests took place in the cities of the Eastern Province, and on March 20\textsuperscript{th}, several dozens of people went to a protest near the Interior Ministry building in Riyadh demanding the release of political prisoners. A part of the demonstrators were immediately arrested.

After the entry of KSA and UAE troops into Bahrain in the middle of March for the suppression of the Shiite protests, the fervor of the demonstrations in the Eastern Province rose sharply. Furthermore, the
Shiite protest began to resonate with the protests of foreigners, the poor, and “intellectual reformers” in other provinces (particularly in Hejaz in the north-west of the country), which very seriously concerned the KSA government.

On March 18th in a televised address to the nation, King Abdullah expressed his gratitude to his subjects “for loyalty and national unity” against the backdrop of popular unrest in other Arab countries. Furthermore, he stated that 60 thousand new jobs would be created in the country, the levels of social welfare subsidies and scholarships would be significantly increased, and state employees would receive “a gift” of two months’ salary, as well as large state funds would be allocated for the development of housing construction and the support for health care. In addition, Abdullah, reacting to accusations that the royal government was permeated with corruption (which are sounded, among others, by some members of the royal family), announced the establishment of a special “anti-corruption commission”, headed by an official with ministerial powers.

In early April at a special summit of the Cooperation Council for the Gulf States of the Gulf (GCC) held on the initiative of the KSA, Iran was declared the “main culprit” of the conspiracy to undermine stability and national security in the Gulf countries.

Nevertheless, not only protest actions have continued in the country (mainly in the Eastern Province). The Internet has begun to expand the publications not only of criticism of the royal family as the primary “holder” of secular power, but also criticism of the monarchy’s attempts to influence the spiritual authorities in the country or not to listen to its recommendations (including accusations of involvement with the Saudis in political international events directed against fellow Muslims in other countries).

As a result, in late April in Saudi Arabia at least 20 people were arrested, including two well-known bloggers. On the last day of April, King Abdullah issued a decree on the sharp tightening of media censorship. Journalists under threat of huge fines (up to 133 thousand dollars) are forbidden from publishing any material contrary to the sharia or that “threatens national security”.

Insofar as the sole entity in the country determining what exactly constitutes “a threat to national security” is the king and his inner circle, this decree by Abdullah, along with accusations of an Iranian “conspiracy” (i.e., the rationale for a particular political regime “to fight
the conspiracy”) essentially opens the way for total control of the media and virtually any reprisals.

The elderly King Abdullah understands that the main pillar of his authority, along with a very powerful and well-armed army (and, most importantly, comparable in size with the army of the National Guard), is the loyalty of the radical Salafi (Wahhabi) clergy. The indicated gestures to Iran (which, of course, does not remain aloof from the protest events in the Gulf countries), as well as the blocking of the possibility for the appearance of any protest demonstrations in the media are intended to ensure the support of the clergy and the principal social masses they control through the mosques; the support primarily against not the Shiites (for this, the police, army, and intelligence services are quite sufficient), but against the “pro-Western” part of the Saudi elite (including opponents within his own royal family, in particular, the King’s cousin, Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz), which during the protests in recent months has declared all the louder the need for political reforms in the direction of transformation of the power into a constitutional monarchy.

Kuwait

According to the constitution adopted in 1962, Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy headed by the emir. However, in reality almost all power belongs to the monarch. The only “non-monarchist” body, the unicameral National Assembly, is formed jointly by the government (on the monarch’s authority – 15 members) and elections (50 members) for 4-year term. But the emir has the priority right of legislative initiative, approves all bills, and may at any time dissolve the parliament.

The small country (about 2.8 million people) possesses one of the world’s largest oil reserves (about 100 billion bbl.) and is one of the largest oil exporters. Kuwait has fully recovered economically and in terms of infrastructure from the repercussions of war with Iraq in 1991, and at the current time there are no serious economic problems in the country.

The main political problem in Kuwait is nationality. According to the constitution, the country’s citizens are Arabs who were able to documentarily prove their “Kuwaiti origin”; that is, who lived in the country before 1920. Among the population there are a little over 40% of such.

The remainder of the population – both local Arabs and immigrants from other Arab countries, Pakistan, India, Iran, and others – fall into the category of non-citizen “Bedoun” and accordingly are generally
devoid of any civil rights. Among this part of the population (mainly represented by Bedouin nomads) are a huge number of foreign workers temporarily resident in the country, who have absolutely no access to even a small part of the socio-economic benefits from the export and resource rents coming into the country and do all sorts of “dirty work” for minimal pay. Moreover, the Bedoun problem is complicated by the fact that a substantial part of the foreign workers are Shiites.

The Bedoun have taken to protest demonstrations against this state of affairs more than once. In particular, very large Bedoun disturbances took place in Kuwait in 1999, when nearly 300 thousand Egyptian workers became involved in them. In February 2011, mass unrest in the country also began with Bedoun protests.

On February 18th, more than a thousand Bedoun attended demonstrations in Al-Jahra (province in the north-west of Kuwait) with the demand for citizenship and access to jobs in the public sector, as well as to free healthcare and education (moreover, the organization of the demonstrations took place through the Internet, as in other countries of the current “Islamic revolutions”). The protesters refused to obey police demands to disperse, and 30 people were injured and about 140 people were arrested in clashes with police.

The next day, large Bedoun demonstrations were held in Sulaibiya, a suburb of the capital Kuwait City. Security forces and police, concentrated earlier around the demonstration site, made use of tear gas and water cannons. In the course of the riots, 7 people were wounded.

On February 22nd, Emir Sabah al-Sabah, knowing that youth from fully legitimate citizens of the country were beginning to join the unrest, took unprecedented steps to “douse the protest with money”. In honor of the anniversary of his reign, the emir announced that he would present each of his subjects, including infants, with an “Amiri grant” — a one-time payment of about $3500, as well as the right to receive free food from the beginning of February 2011 until the end of March 2012. In addition, scholarships for students were drastically increased — for bachelors they were raised by double to $700, and for married up to $1,200. Salaries and social benefits for the military, police, and firefighters were raised an average of two times, and the same benefits were promised to other civil servants. Finally, the emir announced that all citizens would be provided with free electricity, water, and telephone services.
This gift, which in only one month cost the emirate’s treasury about $10 billion, partially dampened the scale of the protests, almost completely eliminating the citizens from them, inspired by the generosity of the monarch. But for the same reason, there appeared even more stringent political demands in the demonstrations of the stateless Bedouin. On March 8th, demonstrations of Bedouin youth took to the streets of the capital, demanding political reforms (primarily amendments to the constitution relating to citizenship and the electoral system), as well as the resignation of the Prime Minister (nephew of the Emir, Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammad Al-Sabah). The next demonstration with the same demands took place in the capital Kuwait City on March 11th, and both demonstrations were dispersed by the police using tear gas and water cannons.

Furthermore, despite the appeals to continue the protests that constantly sounded on Internet sites, the wave of opposition in the emirate began to decline. Given that the “petrodollar surpluses” of Kuwait’s balance of payments so far only continue to grow, it can be assumed that the Emir can “douse the protests with money” and disperse Bedouin with police forces for a long time.

However, still in mid-March, the elected deputies of the National Assembly presented a petition to the Emir—a request to summon the Ministers of Economy, Foreign Affairs, and Information (all members of the royal family) for explanation on the suspicion of corruption, as well as professional incompetence. In the political tradition of the emirate, this kind of petition is a sign of the highest manifestation of distrust towards the executive branch.

As a result, on March 31st, the Kuwaiti authorities submitted their resignation in order to avoid questioning of the ministers by the deputies, which the Emir promptly accepted.

But from the beginning of April, articles began to emerge on the Internet in which Emir Sabah al-Sabah and his family were essentially accused of abandoning Islamic values and the sharia, as well as being in collusion with the irreconcilable enemies of Islam—the U.S.A. and Israel. Moreover, this theme was repeatedly reproduced in April (as the “opinions” of certain political and religious figures) by the television station Al-Jazeera, all of the Kuwait offices of which were closed by the Emir’s decree in mid-December 2010.
Qatar

The Emirate of Qatar is an absolute theocratic monarchy according to the constitution of 2003. The emir’s power is limited only by sharia law. The current monarch, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, has ruled since 1995, when he overthrew his father in a palace coup.

Arabs make up only 40% of the emirate’s 1.6 million population. Apart from them, 18% are natives of India and Pakistan, 10% from Iran, and another 14% from other countries live in the country, primarily in the capacity of temporary workers and professionals. Almost 80% of the population is Muslim and about 8% is Christian. One of the most pressing problems facing the country concerns gender. Since among immigrants, only invited experts are permitted to bring their families with them, there are almost three times as many men as women in Qatar.

The export of oil and especially natural gas has made Qatar the second country in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Moreover, the emirate’s domestic policy for payment of immigrant workers is quite benign, unlike most of the neighboring monarchies of the Gulf, and has not led to massive protest demonstrations.

A serious threat to the ruling regime in Qatar, as in other absolute monarchies, comes primarily from within their own family and the closest circle of the government and elite.

The first “summons” in this sphere were sounded in early February 2011, experts report, when several influential sheikhs of Qatari tribes, members of the Emir Hamad bin Khalifa’s own family, as well as the high-status Islamic leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia expressed dissatisfaction with the informational policy of the satellite channel Al-Jazeera, financed by the Emir and controlled by his cousin, Hamad bin Thamer. They pointed out that the channel broadcasts misinformation that undermines the stability of Arab countries friendly to Qatar the credibility of the Emirate in the Arab world. At the same time, accusations against the Emir were voiced (far from the first time) that opposition leaders from many Islamic countries, including neighboring Arab countries allied with Qatar, have concentrated in Qatar and been active against their governments for many years.

On March 3rd, an Arab online newspaper reported that the Emir of Qatar was able to avert an attempted coup organized by a group of senior army officers and the Emir’s personal guard, headed by the country’s Chief of General Staff, Major-General Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah;
moreover, among the conspirators were several members of the Emir’s family. Thirty conspirators were arrested and a cleansing of the Army and National Guard command was conducted.383

Immediately thereafter, a number of Arab media and Internet sites circulated a statement with 66 signatures by Qatar’s influential tribal sheikhs of Qatar and a number of the Emir’s family members, in which he was accused of having ties with Israel and the U.S.A. for the goal of destabilizing the situation in the Arab world and undermining Arab unity; as well as of corruption in which not only the Emir was involved, but his family members; and social oppression of the subjects of the country; and tyranny. Simultaneously, the statement said that the wife of Emir Sheikha Mozha bint Nasser al-Missned is accused of the use and misuse of local media for selfish purposes, the monopolization of power and using government leverage to intimidate the population.

Later new revelations followed in the Arab (including the Palestinian) media and on Internet sites. Their authors assert that several of the Egyptian opposition figures who took part in a campaign to overthrow Hosni Mubarak underwent training in the capital of Qatar, Doha, under the leadership of American and Israeli instructors.384

It is possible that recent revelations have certain grounds, although they are largely designed for a specific Islamic audience. Certainly the Emir has extensive American ties. However, it seems both for Al-Jazeera and for the Emir’s closest associates, very different “political ties” have a much greater significance.

It is well known that the backbone of journalistic crew of the television channel established in 1996 was composed of former BBC journalists, transferring to Al-Jazeera from the British television channel BC Arabic TV which was closed that same year also in Doha. Al-Jazeera from the outset began to grant airtime on a regular basis to foreign exiled opposition leaders who had sought shelter in Qatar and who essentially conducted political agitation against their governments through the channel. Moreover, very soon one of Al-Jazeera’s main “talking heads” (its staff televangelist) became the leading authority and spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Youssef al-Qaradawi, whom London has always treated with respect and sympathy.

In addition, experts claim that it is in London that Emir Hamad bin Khalifa and his family have their key financial interests and connections, and that the Qatar’s very active policy in the Arab and Muslim world (particularly in Africa, Yemen, and Central Asia) – often significantly
divergent from the policies of other Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia – is based not only the huge family fortune collected from the revenues of oil and gas exports, but also this system of British connections.

Thus, the Emir of Qatar successfully averted another (far from the first) attempt at a palace coup. However, the policy of Hamad bin Khalifa elicits growing anger and resentment not only among prominent circles of the Qatari elite, but also among a very substantial part of the Muslim world, including major and influential Islamic authorities. Therefore, it can be expected that in the course of the current “Islamic revolutions”, Qatar will find itself in an increasingly profound political isolation in the Arabic and Islamic world. In view of its very small population and huge share of foreign immigrants, this is far from politically safe for the emirate.

Bahrain

The Kingdom of Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy on an island in the Persian Gulf, in reality has a “semi-absolutist” character. Only the lower house of parliament is elected, the government and upper house of parliament (the Consultative Council) are appointed by the monarch (at present, Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa), and the creation of political parties is prohibited.

The history of Bahrain has seen inclusion in the Arab Caliphate, Iran, and in the Federation of Arab Principalities of the Persian Gulf. From 1881, was a protectorate of Great Britain (essentially a colony) for nearly a century (the British administration for the Gulf region has been housed in Bahrain’s capital Manama since 1946), and gained independence only in 1971.

Since Bahrain gained its independence, the U.S.A. has begun to actively supplant Great Britain in the country, and since the early 1990s, Bahrain has been a key point for ensuring the military and political interests of the U.S.A. in the Gulf region. Here is based the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and the largest radar station in the region for monitoring air and sea space (directed primarily at Iran), as well as a number of logistical bases for the supply and deployment of the U.S. armed forces (including military airfields). Accordingly, it is the U.S.A. that has primarily armed and trained the kingdom’s fully modern and powerful army and police.

Oil and gas rents, the role of a major regional financial and logistics center (Manama is one of three free trade zones in the Gulf), as well as international tourism provides Bahrain with a sufficiently high income
for socio-economic development. The country has well-developed secondary and tertiary education (secondary education is free of charge) and medical care, and one of the highest levels of access to the Internet in the region.

The kingdom’s main domestic problem is the composition of the population. Of just over 700 thousand people living in Bahrain, about half are immigrant workers, mostly from Iran. In addition, under a ruling Sunni dynasty, no less than 70% of the indigenous Islamic population of the country is Shiite, who are essentially strictly isolated from the levers of administrative and political power. Their share in government bodies is on average no more than 15%, the Royal Court, the National Guard, and the national security and intelligence services are composed only of Sunnis (the principle of “Sunni only”); Shiites make up only 3% of the personnel of the Ministry of Interior and the Army of Bahrain. In addition, Bahrain’s Shiite community is outraged by the fact that during hiring for jobs, both the authorities and local businessmen give preference to Sunni immigrants over “indigenous” Shiites.

Moreover, the population of Bahrain, as in most countries of the region, is very young (the average age just over 28 years) and socially active, but there is a high unemployment rate in the country (officially – about 15%, unofficially – about 25%; moreover, unemployment is particularly high among youth).

Political tension in Bahrain has grown since the summer of 2010, when before the regular elections to the lower house of parliament, the kingdom’s Sunni leadership announced that a “Shiite conspiracy” had been exposed in the country, and thereby deprived the Shiites of the right to vote. Nevertheless, there were no signs of serious political incidents in the country until mid-February 2011. In mid-January, U.S. President Obama even named Bahrain as an example of a country which “successfully carries out democratic reforms.”

The protest demonstrations that began in Bahrain on February 14th, 2011, at first almost did not touch upon the foundations of royal power. The protestors’ demands included a change of government (first of all, the king’s uncle, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who has occupied the post of prime minister for 40 years), as well as the release of political prisoners, granting more rights to the Shiite majority, strengthening the fight against corruption, and holding early parliamentary elections. However, a demonstrator was killed on this day during the dispersal of the rally by the police.
The King decided, like other sovereigns in the region, “to douse the protest with money” and announced that every family in the country “as a sign of royal appreciation for the people of Bahrain” will receive 1,000 dinars (nearly $2,700), as well as promised to expand the rights of the local media.

But on February 15th, the protesters increased the scale of protests, occupying the central Pearl Square of Manama and pitching a tent encampment there. On the night of February 17th, the army and police forced the demonstrators from the area using heavy equipment and military weapons; moreover, 5 people were killed and dozens were wounded in clashes with troops. On the same day, an emergency summit in Manama was attended by the foreign ministers of the Gulf monarchies, who expressed support for Bahrain, as well as the inadmissibility of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the kingdom (obviously alluding to Iran).

On February 18th, the protesters again gathered in the square, now with much more stringent political slogans for the immediate resignation of the prime minister and changing the constitution. Security forces again used weapons against the protesters, and more than 60 people were wounded.

On February 19th, the King ordered troops to withdraw from the central area of Manama, and charged the Crown Prince Salman Al Khalifa with beginning negotiations with the opposition. However, the protesters announced they would agree to talks only after the resignation of the prime minister and again occupied Pearl Square, pitching tents there.

On February 23rd, the opposition’s largest demonstration took place in Manama (up to 200 thousand people, almost one third of the population). The king granted amnesty to the leader of the leftist Islamic movement al-Haq (Right) Hassan Mashaima and allowed him to return home, as well as ordered the release of 50 prisoners from prison, including 23 Shiite opposition activists. But protesters said that this was a half-measure, as about another 600 people remained in prison.

On February 24th, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen visited Bahrain, and announced that the Kingdom remains one of Washington’s key allies in the region.

On February 25th, the King dismissed four ministers, but left his uncle, the Prime Minister, in office, sparking new indignation from the protesters.
Nonetheless, the main opposition forces led by the Shiite Islamic National Accord Association announced its readiness to begin dialogue with the authorities; however, they announced in a letter to Crown Prince Al Khalifa their intention to seek the resignation of the current Cabinet and convening of a constituent assembly to draft a new basic legislature for country. After this, for the first time since the protests began, there were clashes between Shiites and Sunnis university students in Bahrain. The Shiite opposition leaders immediately condemned the violence and called for reconciliation between the two religious communities.

But on March 5th, the interior minister of Bahrain announced that the ministry plans to recruit an additional 20 thousand people in their institutions. After this, three radical Shiite groups headed by the movement al-Haq formed a coalition, announcing their goal to overthrow the monarchy and establish itself as a “democratic republican system” in the country.

On March 12th, Pentagon chief Robert Gates arrived in Bahrain. He held talks with King H. Al Khalifa, expressed his support for the efforts of the Bahraini leadership aimed at achieving national reconciliation and urged the opposition to engage in dialogue with the authorities. Moreover, the U.S. Secretary of Defense admitted that the Americans have no evidence that “Iran started any of these popular revolutions or demonstrations” in the Arab world.

On March 13th, the police again demolished the opposition’s tent city in Pearl Square in Manama. Moreover, at this moment the troops and armored vehicles of the UAE (500 people) Saudi Arabia (1000 people) and Qatar (according to various information, up to a battalion) were already moving on the bridge connecting Bahrain to the mainland territory, sent by Bahrain’s neighbors among the Gulf Cooperation Council at the request of King H. Al Khalifa “to maintain order and security in accordance with the charter of the GCC”.

On March 15th, 6 demonstrators were killed and up to 200 people wounded in Manama in the course of clashes with security forces, after which the King H. Al-Khalifa introduced a state of emergency for a period of three months and ordered arrests of activists of the opposition movements to be carried out. Moreover, the BBC quoted U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who said that Bahrain and its allies in the Persian Gulf, “went down the wrong path” in agreeing to send troops to maintain order. The opposition called the entry of foreign troops into the country an occupation.
and refused to recognize the state of emergency, and on March 18\textsuperscript{th} its demonstrations again took place in Manama.

After this, when the U.S. troops on the island were brought to combat readiness and basic positions on highways and key infrastructure and industry sites were occupied by GCC troops.

On March 20\textsuperscript{th}, the curfew was lifted in Manama, and the government announced its agreement to “resume national dialogue”. The opposition, although it withdrew some of its preconditions for the initiation of talks with the government, demanded withdrawal of the security forces from the center of Manama, as well as removal of foreign troops from the country and a stop to hostile government propaganda against the Shiites.

Moreover, the U.S.A. said they did not consider the deployment of GCC troops to Bahrain to be an “occupation”, although at the same time they expressed “deep concern over the violence” and “the need for maximum restraint”. On March 21\textsuperscript{st}, the King of Bahrain stated that the rebellion in the country was the result of an international conspiracy, which external (unnamed) forces had been preparing for 20 years\textsuperscript{398}. The Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi spoke in this regard of the inadmissibility of an “intervention of the foreign military forces to suppress protesters” in Bahrain, as well as appealed to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon with the request immediately to look into the critical development of situation in the country\textsuperscript{399}.

On March 25\textsuperscript{th}, new protests in Bahrain took place despite the ban, which were violently suppressed by security forces and the GCC troops. As reported by Bahraini human rights activist Nabeel Rajab in an interview with BBC, the troops directed machine-gun fire at the protesters from helicopters and tanks; moreover, the opposition could not send the injured to hospitals, which were seized by the military\textsuperscript{400}. As a result, in early April the U.S. State Department “condemned the arrests of opposition supporters in Bahrain and discrimination against the Shiite population”\textsuperscript{401}.

However, political opposition protests in the kingdom continue. On April 18\textsuperscript{th}, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain announced that the troops from GCC countries would remain on the territory of the country until the threat to monarchical regime posed by Iran was eliminated. At the same time it has been reported that Manama’s military tribunal has begun the first trials against seven opposition figures accused of killings “and other serious crimes”\textsuperscript{402}.
Over the course of the crisis in Bahrain, a question was often posed in the international media: why did the “international community”, including the U.S.A., react so violently to the actions of Gaddafi, who initiated the suppression of an armed rebellion in his own country, yet regarded the shooting of the opposition in Bahrain by their own and the foreign troops so leniently (or even sympathetically)? In these same publications an answer was given: the fact of the matter is that Bahrain is the “key” to the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil is supplied to foreign markets from oil fields in the Gulf.

In addition, Bahrain is of particular importance for the U.S.A., and precisely from a military point of view (it was not by chance that in the midst of the protests Senator MacCain and Robert Gates came here in succession). The U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet warship base operates from the territory of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean – America’s primary naval resource in the region, on the expansion of which nearly $600 million has been directed in the last two years alone. From here aviation and radar monitoring of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is also carried out, as well as a substantial part of the preparation of U.S. special operations in the Gulf region.

Therefore, “softly condemning” the king and his administration for “excessive use of force” against demonstrators and encouraging “democratic reforms”, the “world community” tries not to speak too loudly about either the scandalous shootings of opposition members or the flagrant violations of the human rights of the confessional majority in Bahrain. Moreover, they prefer to “close the topic”, accepting the extremely dubious and unconvincing explanation expressed by the King of Bahrain and the GCC that the incidents in the country are an “Iranian conspiracy”.

But there are certain doubts that the case will be hushed up.

On April 22nd, the British The Independent published the results of the medical organization Physicians for Human Rights’ investigation into the crackdown against protest actions in Bahrain by the police and military.

In the investigation, it is reported that police seized ambulances on the streets, threw doctors out of them, and dressed in their uniforms to get close to the protesters.

Doctors were kidnapped directly while operating on the wounded and the soldiers of the “GCC peacekeeping contingent” tortured and threatened injured demonstrators with rape and murder in hospitals,
demanding that they admit that they were carrying weapons at the
demonstration and were planning to go to Iran for military training.
Shiite physicians were particular impacted upon during the repression,
and more than 30 physicians are under arrest and cannot contact their
relatives.

Obviously these revelations not only give new impetus to the protests
in Bahrain, but also in no way allow the U.S.A. to restrict advisory
appeals to the Emir of Bahrain and the Gulf monarchies to “initiate
democratic reforms.”

**United Arab Emirates**

The UAE is a federation of seven absolute emirate monarchies: Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman and Umm
Al Quwain. The rank of the emirates within the federation is determined
by their “economic weight” and above all by their oil reserves.
Accordingly, the President of the UAE is the Emir of the largest emirate
of Abu Dhabi (and the city Abu Dhabi is the capital of UAE), and the
Prime Minister of the UAE is the Emir of Dubai.

At the beginning of the 20th century, under pressure from the military
expeditions of the British East India Company, the emirs and sheikhs of
the Bedouin tribes inhabiting the principalities in this region came under
the political influence of London and in 1820 they signed the General
Maritime Treaty with Britain for a British protectorate over the territory,
which was called Trucial Oman.

In 1964, the League of Arab States demanded that all countries of
the region be given their independence, and the seven emirates created
the federation of the UAE in 1971-1972.

In the initial period of the UAE’s existence, the basis of their
economy was the export of oil. However, further investment of oil
revenues into other industries led to diversification of the UAE’s
economy, and now oil provides less than 10% of GDP and the main
items of the federation’s revenues are international trade (including re-
export trade through the ports), financial services (Dubai is one of the
largest financial centers of the East), as well as numerous free economic
zones and well-developed infrastructure for international tourism.

The population of UAE is now about 4.8 million people, of which
the indigenous population constitutes only 11%, and the rest are
immigrant workers from Arab countries (Yemen, Egypt, Morocco,
Oman), as well as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and other countries in
South East Asia. UAE nationals constitute only about 15% of the population of the Emirates and they are almost all Muslim (Sunni 85%, Shiite 15%). About 55% of immigrants are also Muslim, but the other religious communities among them are very substantial (25% - Hindus, 10% - Christians, 5% - Buddhists).

Nonetheless, despite the virtual lack of rights among the majority of the country’s population (non-citizens), the comparatively high level of pay and tolerable living conditions in the very rich Emirates ensure relative social stability here. The last large-scale uprisings in the UAE were in March 2008, when about 1500 immigrant workers in the Sharjah staged riots, demanding higher wages.

However, now all the monarchs of the Emirates are very concerned by the protest incidents in neighboring Bahrain and particularly those in the north-western border regions of Oman (see below). It is no coincidence that the UAE was one of the first Gulf countries to offer to send troops to quell protests in Bahrain. In addition, military experts point out that the emissaries of the UAE have already made enquiries among the associates of Omani Sultan Qaboos about whether similar external military aid is required to suppress protests in Oman.

Abu Dhabi, by all appearances, seems to be preparing for such a development. According to a number of reports, several international recruitment corporations have already begun hiring soldiers in Pakistan to serve in the army of the Emirates. It cannot be ruled out that the other Gulf monarchies may soon also resort to this same procedure. After all, Dubai is the most important regional financial center through which the majority of the Arab world’s commercial accounts are carried out and which accumulates a substantial part of the “petrodollar” assets of the region.

The U.S.A. also cannot remain uninvolved in any manifestations of domestic political tension in the UAE; it supports and is expanding one of the largest air bases in the region in the UAE. Likewise for many countries in Europe and Asia, the oil imports from the Gulf that “hang” upon the UAE are an essential requirement for the power supply of their national economies.

Oman

As early as the first half of the 20th century, Oman was the region’s largest pirate empire, which controlled the islands of the Persian Gulf, the coast of Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the coast of East
Africa as far south as Mozambique. But then both the Asian and African parts of Oman, separated by the sultan’s sons into the Sultanate of Muscat and the Imamate of Oman, agreed to become a British protectorate.

After World War II, Oman was separated from the African part of the former pirate empire and ruled by Sultan Said bin Taimur. In 1970, he was overthrown in a palace coup by his son, Qaboos bin Said, who has been the Sultan of Oman until this time.

Oman is formally a constitutional monarchy, but in reality it is an absolute theocratic monarchy. Moreover, the sultan is the supreme spiritual leader (Imam) of its singular state religion, ibadism – a sect within Islam that differs both from Sunnism and Shiitism and is characterized by very rigid intolerance of other faiths.

Thanks to its oil fields and a relatively small population (about 3 million people including immigrants), the GDP per capita in Oman is fairly high – more than $24 thousand.

The main indigenous population (80%) are Arabs who are divided into “pure” descendants of the tribes that once came to the country from Yemen and the “mixed” that came to the region later from other places in the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, in view of the historical specificity of the country, much of the population has Negroid anthropological traits or exhibits mulatto traits.

The sultanate’s government policy and comparatively high raw materials revenues allow the majority of the indigenous population not to work, content with government allowances, or to work in non-burdensome public service. Accordingly, on the one hand, almost two-thirds of the country’s working population are immigrants from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and so on; on the other hand, there is rather high unemployment in the country (among young people – up to 25-30%).

Until recently, Oman was considered one of the most peaceful and conservative countries in the region. The first uprisings in 2011 began here on February 26th-27th in the southern province of Dhofar near the border with Yemen. Latent separatism has existed here for a long time (in the early 1970s, there were major separatist demonstrations in Dhofar, which British troops helped the Sultan suppress); however, now it has been “recollected” again – apparently in reaction to the simultaneous separatist incidents in the neighboring Yemeni province of Saada. It is noteworthy that the demonstrators in Dhofar immediately
incorporated into their demands not only combating unemployment and corruption, but also holding “constitutional” political reform in the Sultanate.

The Sultan immediately reacted to the protests, understanding full well the dangerous significance the “tribal kinship” that had persisted between Yemen’s population and the “indigenous” Arabs of Oman had for his authority. He forbade the entry of foreign journalists into the country (however, this prohibition was soon repealed) and set police troops with armored vehicles against the protesters. As a result, several protesters were killed and the protests spread to the northern provinces, including the major sea port and primary industrial center of the country, Sohar, as well as the oasis of Al Buraimi on the border with the UAE. In Sohar, the demonstrators — primarily the unemployed — set fire to the police station and mayor’s office and two people were killed in clashes with police.

Qaboos carried out an urgent reshuffling of the government (6 new ministers were appointed), as well as announced a program for the creation of 50 thousand new jobs (of which 10 thousand are in the police and 15 thousand in the private sector), the increase of unemployment benefits, and the establishment of price monitoring for basic foodstuffs in retail chains. However, uprisings continued, and on March 1st, the media reported that 6 people were killed in in Sohar and more than 20 were wounded.

Despite the fact that the Sultan has further promised every unemployed person an allowance of $390 a month, the unrest in both the north and the south of the country has grown. On March 13th, Sultan Qaboos issued a decree establishing a committee to work on amendments to the country’s constitution.

On March 14th, the GCC decided to allocate Oman a subsidy of $10 billion over 10 years to finance social projects and combat unemployment. Immediately thereafter, Sultan Qaboos announced the beginning of the country’s pension reform.

However, all these economic measures have not helped and demonstrations have continued, retaining their political demands.

On March 28th, a major demonstration again began at the central square in Sohar, which the protesters have named the “Midan al-Islah” (Reform Square). On March 29th, this demonstration was brutally dispersed by troops; there were wounded and several organizers ended up in jail. The Prosecutor General of Oman announced that an investigation had been launched against them.
In April, protest actions have continued. Another major demonstration was dispersed on April 2nd in Sohar again, although on April 3rd the Sultan ordered the release of 57 demonstrators arrested the eve before. On April 18th, Sultan Qaboos announced that the government would allocate 1 billion rials (about $2.6 billion) to improve citizens’ living standards, in particular for the payment of subsidies and repayment of housing loans.

But at the end of April protests in Oman continued, and knowledgeable experts have expressed doubts that these “social financial infusions” will be able to quell protests in the country. As far as Oman, as well as both Bahrain and the UAE, is one of the most important “control zones” in a key global “oil artery” leading from the Persian Gulf, experts do not exclude that in the case of continuing or, moreover, growing protests in the country, the GCC will also try to act according to the “Bahraini variant” here, deploying troops.

The “informational basis” for such an operation is already being prepared by both the GCC and the “world community”, who regularly repeat that Iran is “shaking” the political stability of the Gulf monarchies.

Chapter 2. Others

Nigeria

The “revolutionary” events in the Middle East and the Maghreb cannot be considered in isolation from other regions of the world, as it now often happens.

The April incidents in Nigeria in this sense even more clearly and prominently demonstrate the same basic processes and tendencies.

Nigeria, having gained independence in 1960, cannot escape its historical legacy in the form of the settlement of more than 250 tribes (Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Kamberi, Berom, Gokana, Edo, Boushi, etc.) on a very limited area, as well as the confessional “stratification” of the country’s Muslims, Christians and animists.

After the division of Africa among colonial powers at the Berlin Conference of 1885, the main part of Nigerian territory was under British control. Moreover, in the initial opening up of the coastal areas of the country, the English to a large degree imparted Anglican Christianity to
the local tribes (primarily the Igbo and Yoruba). The northern territories far from the coast, where the dominant tribes were the Hausa and Fulani (who back in the 15th century established powerful city-states here), remained true to Islam, which they had accepted in the early Middle Ages. Currently out of a population of approximately 150 million, 50% are Muslim, 40% are Christian, and about 10% believe in the local animist cults and other religions.

Since the very beginning of the country’s independent existence, the specifics of a deeply tribalized and religiously divided society have provided for a rigid centralized power as the only possibility for ensuring at least relative political stability. It is no coincidence that almost all the rulers of an independent Nigeria were either officers who came to power as a result of a military coup, or retired military officers who ran for presidency after having become “civilians”. The primary political contestation (including the formation of political parties) has gone along tribal (Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa) and sectarian (Christian-Muslim) dividing lines.

This has predetermined a permanent political and socio-religious state of conflict in the country both at governmental and societal level, which has always been most severe in the geographically diffuse “central” zone of contact between the Christian south and south-west of the Yoruba and Igbo and the Muslim north and the north–east of the Hausa and Fulani. Moreover, an independent legal system based on the sharia was essentially adopted by the Islamic north back in 2000.

Extraction in the country and the export of large quantities of oil (Nigeria’s proven reserves constitute more than 30 billion bbls. and it has largest-scale production in Africa – about 2.2 million bbls./day) provides the ruling confessional and tribal clan with very large revenues, which further aggravates the struggle for power. (Nigeria is one of the key sources of oil imports to European countries and the supplier of more than 9% of the U.S.A.’s imported oil).

But at the same time, more than 70% of the population lives below the poverty level, there are very high levels of corruption and crime in the country, and Nigeria’s role as a producer and transit country (from Latin America and Asia) for drugs is rapidly growing. Oil production in the Niger Delta and offshore is often interrupted by pipeline explosions and attacks by terrorist groups on surface facilities and oil platforms by various tribal opposition alliances such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. These incidents have recently been compounded by attacks on ships in the Gulf of Guinea by bands of maritime pirates.
All this is supplemented by chronic inter-tribal and inter-confessional bloody clashes.

Thus, in July 2006, protest demonstrations in the city Maiduguri in the Muslim north associated with the appearance of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish media resulted in the burning of Christian churches and numerous attacks on Christians, who were beaten to death and burned alive directly on the street (including a priest and children) 411.

In November 2008, after the conclusion of parliamentary elections in the city of Jos in Plateau State, nearly 400 people were killed in the course of clashes between supporters of the winning Christians and the losing Muslims, hundreds of homes and many churches and mosques were burned, and more than 7 thousand people became refugees, fleeing from violence of the raging crowds412.

In January 2010, again in the city of Jos as a result of clashes between Christians and Muslims (who tried to build a mosque in a predominantly Christian quarter) 26 people were killed and over 300 wounded and many houses and cars were burned413. In March 2010, here again there were other, even larger clashes between the communities, in which nearly 500 people were killed.

In December 2010, during the Catholic Christmas, the radical Islamist group Followers of the Teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and the Jihad Fighters carried out a series of terrorist attacks in a village near Jos, as a result of which 86 people were killed and 189 people were wounded414.

In January 2011, 13 people were killed as the result of an attack on a Christian village in the central part of Nigeria415; moreover, the local police linked the terrorist attack to the activities of another Nigerian radical Islamist group, Boko Haram (in translation: Education is Prohibited), which has declared itself an ally of al-Qaida.

The current escalation of the situation in Nigeria began in 2010 when the Federal Court of the country handed over power to the Christian Vice President Goodluck Jonathan in January in connection with the prolonged illness of Muslim President Umaru Yar’Adua, residing in Saudi Arabia for treatment, and after the death of Umaru Yar’Adua in May, confirmed Jonathan as president until the next general election in early 2011.

In the presidential election, which took place on April 16th, 2011, the primary struggle was between Goodluck Jonathan and the candidate from the Islamic north, the former military dictator of the country, General Muhammadu Buhari. The announcement of preliminary
election results (57% of the votes for Jonathan, and 31% for Buhari) elicited a statement by Buhari refusing to concede defeat and a strong wave of protests on the part of the Muslims, who, despite the assertions of international observers from many countries around the world to the unquestionable veracity and openness of the elections, were convinced that the numerical dominance of Muslims in the country’s population was indisputable proof of electoral fraud.

As a result, mass inter-confessional and inter-tribal clashes and riots began throughout Nigeria, but above all in the Islamic north. According to data from the International Red Cross, on April 20th there was already talk of hundreds dead, thousands wounded, and many tens of thousands of refugees to other regions of the country and neighboring countries.

As the “conflagration” of interfaith and inter-tribal conflict in the country is only just heating up, no one attempts grounded forecasts for its solution. However, dire predictions are already surfacing, foretelling the collapse of Nigeria into the Islamic north-east, the Christian south-west, and the animist south-east, according to the zones of dispersion of the largest tribal alliances. There is already a precedent in the history of the country, and relatively recent one. This is the breakaway of the South-East of Christian and animist Igbo from the rest of Nigeria with the creation of the “independent state of Biafra” and the civil war in 1967–1970, which killed, according to various estimates, from 0.8 to 2 million people.

However, even if this – the most dangerous scenario – is not realized, everybody understands that the “price tag” on the President of Nigeria is now very high. High at least because this country, with the largest population in Africa, is now the de facto leader of the main international organization in the region — the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the regional armed force ECOWAS.

During the Western coalition’s war against Libya, the significance of Nigeria has further increased in light of the reduction of the political role of the African Union created by Gaddafi. Thus the weakening or strengthening of the political, military and social stability in a vast part of the African continent is to a very high degree dependent on who exactly will lead Nigeria and what policy will be pursued by this country.

Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire is a presidential republic in Western Africa, the characteristics of which largely reiterate the specifics of Nigeria. The former French colony, which gained its independence in 1960, is inhabited
by a multitude of tribal peoples and ethnic tribal groups, also divided along denominational barriers.

The largest of the ethnic tribal groups are the Anyi-Asante (Baule, Anyi, and Brong tribes), the Kru (Bete and Gere tribes), the Mande (Malinke and Dioula tribes), as well as the Senufo, Dan, and Guro. About 40% of the country’s population are Muslim (most prevalent in the Mande and Senufo, living in the north and north-west), 25% are Christians (living mainly in the south), and the rest are animists. Over 30% of a population of approximately 18 million are foreigners, the majority of which came from Mali and Burkina Faso to be hired for agricultural work.

The country is relatively poor (GDP per capita less than $1000 per year). Until recently, the main revenues were derived from the production of cocoa, coffee, cotton, bananas, and mahogany for export, as well as canned fish (tuna). The majority of economic positions are occupied by foreign (primarily French) capital, which also control wholesale and foreign trade. After the discovery of significant oil and gas deposits (mostly offshore) in the 1990s, the fuel and energy complex began to play an increasingly significant role in the economy. The development of oil fields, as well as refining oil is carried out by the Western corporations Shell, Total, Mobil, Texaco, and others; most recently Russia’s Lukoil has attempted to join them.

From the moment that independence was declared until 1993, the continuous president of the country was the leader of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boingy. In 1990, at the first multiparty elections, the leader of the Ivorian Popular Front, Laurent Gbagbo, lost to Houphouët-Boingy. At this time an amendment to the constitution was adopted for the introduction of a prime minister to the country, for which Alassane Ouattara was appointed, as well as a law according to which in event of the death of Houphouët-Boigny, his position as president would be taken by close associate and tribesman of the late President, Henri Bédié. After the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, both Gbagbo and Ouattara opposed the transfer of power to Bédié, but France immediately recognized Bédié as the legitimate president.

At the next presidential election in 1995, Ouattara was removed from the candidates, since according to the constitution, only a native citizen of the country who had lived in the Côte d’Ivoire for the last 5 years could stand in the elections, and Bédié again became president. Ouattara formed his own centrist party, Rally of the Republicans and then the opposition bloc Republican Front, which became the main political rival of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire.
The current crisis and the next stage of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire are associated with a new round of the long-standing political battle of former associates Laurent Gbagbo (Ivorian Popular Front) and Alassane Ouattara (Rally of the Republicans).

Gbagbo comes from a family of indigenous Ivorian people of the Bete ethnic group; he is a graduate of a Catholic seminary and a historian who received his doctorate at the Sorbonne. He ran for the presidency of the country back in 1990 and obtained the post as a result of the 2000 election.

In September 2002, during Gbagbo’s visit to Italy, soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire (at that time predominantly the Muslim - Malinke, Senufo, and Lobi) revolted, soon turning the mutiny into a full-scale civil war between North and South.

France at that time was completely on the side of Gbagbo. In August 2003, Paris announced the exposure of plot with the aim of a coup and the assassination of Gbagbo and 18 conspirators were arrested in France on this charge. But in November 2004, when Gbagbo’s forces launched a campaign against rebels of the North, they mistakenly bombed the base of the French peacekeepers. In response, by order of French President Jacques Chirac, French aircraft completely destroyed Gbagbo’s air force.

The civil war in the country ended only in March 2007 after the appointment of the rebel leader Guillaume Soro as Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire. However, by this time the rebels controlled more than half of the country’s territory (and have essentially retained control without a formal declaration of independence right up through the current “presidential crisis”).

After the destruction of his aircraft by the French, and especially after they refused to help him defeat the insurgency, Gbagbo quickly cooled towards Paris, and experts report that he has even begun to discriminate against French business in the country.

Alassane Ouattara is from a family that arrived in Côte d’Ivoire from Burkina Faso. He studied in the U.S.A. (University of Pennsylvania), headed the African Department of the IMF in 1984-1988, then the Central Bank of West African States in 1988-1990, and then re-joined the IMF in the position of Deputy Managing Director. He became the political leader of the country’s Muslim North. He enjoys obvious and active U.S. support.

In the first round of presidential elections in 2010, Gbagbo won 38% of the votes and Ouattara – 33%. After the second round of elections held on November 28th, the Central Election Commission of the country did not manage to count the votes in time – before December 2nd, but declared Ouattara the winner (54.1% of the vote versus 45.9% for Gbagbo).
However, one day later the country’s Constitutional Council annulled the election results in seven of the predominantly Muslim districts of the North as rigged and announced Gbagbo the winner (51.45% of the vote versus 48.55% for Ouattara)\(^\text{421}\).

As a result, both candidates declared themselves president and took the oath; moreover, the country’s armed forces declared their allegiance to Gbagbo. However, the U.S.A. and France, for whom Gbagbo was inherently unacceptable, immediately (despite the decision of the Constitutional Council) recognized Ouattara as the legitimate president of Côte d’Ivoire. Following them, the EU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the UN also declared Ouattara president and demanded Gbagbo renounce his claims\(^\text{422}\).

A new round of civil war began in the country, in which the Ivorian army (predominantly Christians and animists from the tribes of the South) emerged on the side of Gbagbo, and on the side of Ouattara – the North’s armed groups of Muslim tribes.

France, which has held a peacekeeping force in Côte d’Ivoire for many years, and UN peacekeepers immediately demonstrated unequivocal support for Ouattara. His armed forces began a successful offensive against Gbagbo’s forces, taking town after town. Moreover, according data from the International Red Cross, by the beginning of April 2011, about a thousand people had been killed, about 1 million people had left their homes and fled to other parts of the country, and more than 100 thousand people had fled to neighboring Liberia\(^\text{423}\).

On March 30\(^\text{th}\), 2011, Ouattara’s militants seized the country’s capital, Yamoussoukro. On March 31\(^\text{st}\), the UN Security Council adopted resolution \(^\text{1975}\), which imposed sanctions against Gbagbo and forbade him, his family, and his close associates from departing the country, as well as urged Gbagbo to immediately resign from the government. Against the backdrop of the well-known resolution \(^\text{1973}\) against Gaddafi, very few people noticed this event, although this resolution, like the previous Libyan one, essentially cut the head of Côte d’Ivoire off from any path for retreat or compromise and forced him to fight to the last.

From that moment, French and UN forces initiated “all-out” war against Gbagbo. On April 1\(^{\text{st}}\), 2011, French troops (the peacekeeping mission Licorne) landed in Abidjan, and UN peacekeepers seized the Abidjan airport. On April 4\(^{\text{th}}\), UN helicopters and the French Air Force bombed the palace and Gbagbo’s residence in Abidjan – the largest city, port and
economic capital of the country, as well as the Ivorian army base. After this, Gbagbo announced in a telephone interview: “Before this, we fought a war against the rebels, but not against France. Yesterday, Monday, France entered directly into a war against us. French forces attacked the residence and the palace. The building of the TV channel RTI was destroyed... The French deployed rebel detachments and their technology, and gave them ammunition. This was the direct involvement of France in the conflict”.

Another week of fighting in Abidjan and its surroundings occurred with varying success, despite the support of peacekeepers, armored vehicles, and French and UN aircraft for Ouattara’s forces. But on April 11th, French special forces penetrated a bunker under the palace through a tunnel from the Embassy of France, captured Gbagbo there, and handed him over to Ouattara. Nonetheless, on May 1st, isolated detachments of Gbagbo’s troops still engaged in fighting in Abidjan and several other parts of the country.

There is no doubt that Gbagbo, as any other ruler in this region, was a rather savage dictator (with a certain electoral-democratic accompaniment). If Ouattara intends to preserve the state’s integrity and political order in Côte d’Ivoire at least in some way, he will be forced to rule by approximately the same methods, forcefully suppressing the resistance of “disloyal” tribal and religious groups.

Moreover, it is possible that Ouattara (because he had to rely on power reserves of undisciplined Islamic militants who have “tasted blood”, instead of on the regular army) will soon be faced with a choice: either to begin to exhibit even more demonstrative ferocity than his predecessor, or to be very quickly overthrown by the most radical forces from within his Islamic “electoral and political base”.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated (a population of about 160 million people) and poor (per capita annual income is around $500) countries. In addition, due to poor health services and high birth rates, about 60% of the population constitutes young people under the age of 25 years. Moreover, the youth, in connection with the incessant political struggle in the country, predominantly are very socially and politically active. 90% of the citizens are Muslim, almost all Sunni.

After a bloody period of war for independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh became a secular parliamentary republic. However, at the
same time two main political forces have struggled for power (and obtained it in turns) for many years: the secular party Awami League, with its anti-clerical and leftist allies, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which formed a bloc with the officially registered Islamic parties Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Oikya Jote, and others. At the last general elections in December 2008, Awami League, headed by the daughter of one of the “fathers” of the country’s independence, Sheikh Hasina, won a landslide victory.

Alongside this, radical Islamic terrorist groups are active in the country (in particular, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh), which have been outlawed and operating illegally since 2005.

The specifics of the deeply Islamized majority of the population has led to the fact that in the formally secular country, the majority of the social lower classes actually live according to the norms of the sharia. The Supreme Court has to intervene regularly in legal proceedings at the local level in order to prevent the most flagrant violations of the written law (in particular, in regards to women’s rights).

Bangladesh is not in a position to feed itself on its own and is one of the world’s largest importers of food (mainly rice). Therefore, the sharp rise in world food prices that has occurred over the last year could not fail to have an impact on the living standards of the general population. In addition, until recently very many Bangladeshi citizens worked in the Arab countries of the Middle East and the Maghreb, including Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc. Now in the course of the “revolutionary incidents” occurring in this region, many of them have either stopped sending money home, or have returned home to poverty. This has preordained aggravation of the socio-economic situation in the country.

The first protest incidents of this winter began in Bangladesh on January 11th, after the catastrophic collapse of the stock market and the halt of trading. In the capital, Dhaka, disgruntled investors initiated riots in the streets, demanding the government compensate their losses, and they were joined by large groups of youth. The police dispersed crowds of thousands of protesters with tear gas and water cannons, and there were causalities.

On January 31st, major demonstrations took place on the outskirts of Dhaka by local farmers protesting against the seizure of their land for the construction of the new airport in exchange for monetary
compensation. During the police’s dispersal of the riots with tear gas and rubber bullets, one person was killed and more than 50 wounded\textsuperscript{427}.

In February, several large demonstrations occurred in various provinces of the country, the participants of which were outraged by the rising food prices. In March, protests associated with the discussion in the parliament of a new act for women’s equality began throughout the entire country; moreover, their organizers were representatives of Islamist parties.

On April 3\textsuperscript{rd} in the city Jessore in the south-west of the country, demonstrations by Islamists against the law on the equality of women grew into major confrontations with the police, in the course of which one of the protesters was killed and about 25 people were injured, including policemen and journalists\textsuperscript{428}. The protesters’ main indignation was provoked by articles of the law according to which all children in Bangladesh, irrespective of gender, are entitled to equal shares of their parents’ inheritance: the demonstrators announced that such a law was contrary to Islamic norms.

According to expert reports, the leadership of Bangladesh fears that the current wave of Islamic protests, against the backdrop of the deteriorating socio-economic situation, may once again (as has repeatedly occurred in the country) result in bloody mass street clashes between Islamists and supporters of the secular government.

And then it could turn into a protracted and acute political crisis.

\textbf{Chapter 3. In Which Details “Lies the Devil”: the General, Specific, and Mega-Project Prospects}

The entire vast region of the current “Islamic revolutions” is characterized by relatively strong and persistent ethno-sectarian, tribal, clan, or territorial and community identities, both at the level of the elite and at the level of the broader masses.

In these circumstances, justice is most often understood not as a democracy in the classical Western sense of the word, but as the high governmental, economic, and social status of their own community identity. For all community identities that are “not in power”, this status appears to be insufficient.

Accordingly, in each of the countries – potential candidates for the next “Islamic revolution” – there is a ready protest potential in all clans and
other community identities, which at the given time are not represented or are underrepresented in government. Moreover, the army and security services, as a rule (with the exception of the hired foreign “guards” of some rulers) are the “flesh of the flesh” of rival clans. Therefore, they are almost always riven by the same contradictions in identity.

A characteristic feature of virtually the entire Islamic world is a high density of informal personal communications after the sermon in the mosque, as well as at the bazaar, on the street, at work, (in Russia it is called “word of mouth”), thanks to which any rumor that appears at all reliable instantaneously becomes public domain and frequently acquires the status of truth.

The debates of “wise men” — mullahs in the mosques, elders, and scholars (this is why “Islamic revolution” has never been complete without the leaders of the educated intelligentsia) have always served as a “primary source” of word of mouth information in the Islamic world. In the current epoch, to these “primary sources” are added radio and television, as well as (primarily for the younger generation) the Internet. There has arisen the triad of “reputable media and the Internet plus the mosque plus word of mouth”, which is ready at any moment to almost instantaneously organize the Islamic street for protest actions.

Moreover, in the majority of Islamic countries the socio-cultural characteristics of a high birth rate with successive reduction of child mortality and increase in the level of education has led to a very high proportion of educated youth in the population.

On the one hand, these youth are ambitious and dream to occupy the high status positions in the social and governmental system that until now have been securely occupied by the older generation (and most often from other clans and community identities). On the other hand, these youth are quite deeply imbued with both the “information permissiveness” of the Internet (as opposed to a rigid framework of limitations of rigorous Islamic culture and the authorities’ police regimes) and the high “Western” consumer demands as perceived through the media and the Internet. In addition, a large part of these youth day-dream, having naive ideological associations between prosperity and wealth (that is, the satisfaction of their consumer demands) and Western-style democracy, as perceived through the same media and Internet.

It is all precisely these aforementioned “devils”, as we see from what has been presented above, that have been at play in the work of the “international community”, and above all the work of the U.S.A. and a
number of European countries, in the course of the current wave of “Islamic revolutions”.

Involved how?

By mobilization of the “democratic transformation in the direction of prosperity” (that is, rebellion and riots) via the Internet and educated youth, as well as through mosques — the “Islamic street” (as in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and so on)...

By blocking (via threat of disclosure of incriminating material, including secret “corrupt” bank accounts and defamatory communications, or simply a direct bribe of commanding personnel) the brutal suppression of the rebellion by the army and security forces of the clan in power (again as in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia)...

By organizing a global campaign of disinformation about the events occurring in the country with a concurrent informational blockade of the ruling clan’s media, thus creating a “black” world public opinion about the ruling regime... and then pushing resolutions through the UN Security Council that destroy the international legitimacy of the ruling clan (as in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire)...

By recognizing the leaders of the organized rebellion against the governments as the only lawful representatives of the “people fighting for democracy” (again as in Libya, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire)...

By supporting the “ informational warfare” and propaganda of opposition clans against the clans in power (as in Libya, Syria, and many other countries). Furthermore, the possible expansion of support for the opposition to the provision of intelligence information, training personnel, supply of arms and direct involvement in the war on the side of the opposition (as in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire)...

All in all, by helping to overthrow the “hateful dictatorial regime” and supposedly establish democracy (of course, initially conditional and imperfect) in the country...

In light of the aforementioned, this “democracy” will always be of a very specific character and based on its interpretation by the community identities newly coming to power, as headed by its clan leaders. Moreover, this “democracy” will emerge as most ferocious in countries where there is an approximate balance in the demographics and power of the primary competing community identities (as in Libya, Jordan, Yemen, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire). In these countries, “democratic reforms” of the described type will almost 100% guarantee long-term massacre, chaos and degradation.
Moreover, it is necessary once again to recall that in the majority of these countries, rather strict and radical Islam is the only sufficiently organized force able to take the place of slaughter and chaos, to curb it to at least some degree, and to provide the general masses with a minimally tolerable existence.

This Islam will come to power with its invariable slogans “Islam is the solution”, “Away from the temptations of Western devil” and “Way out for recreation of the correct world order – the righteous Caliphate”.

In connection with these, we also recall whom the West (above all the U.S.A. and Great Britain) has supported in suppression, no matter how brutally, of the opposition’s “revolutionary protests”. It has supported the suppression of these protests precisely and solely in the most radical Islamic oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf. This occurred most vividly and clearly in Bahrain, which the U.S. President, Obama called “a model for democratic reform” a month before the ferocious suppression of the protests by the army and two months before the entry of Saudi and Emirati troops into the country.

Having accomplished detailed review of the roots of the “revolutions” in the beginning of 2011, we have to go back to Chapter 12 (Part I of the book), to the hypotheses and models explaining current trends in the region.

Whatever the outcome of majority of the “Islamic revolutions” is (manageable or uncontrolled chaos of intertribal and interconfessional wars; relative order of life based on the strict Medieval sharia laws enforced in the newly emerged emirates and sultanates) – the most probable consequence will be plunging of the vast territories and human masses into non-development.

In connection with this, it is necessary to stress the following.

The above-mentioned “details” of events in countries of the current “revolutions” provide many strong arguments in favor of the hypothesis that there is a general project, in the framework of which these “revolutions” were initiated: “dismantling of the Modern”, or in other words, the “globalization of non-development”. It was the implementation of this project that most likely made the transnationalized elites of Europe readily agree to participate actively in the organization of these “revolutions” (moreover, we can already see that it was clearly to the detriment of European interests).

Further, much of the data presented favors the hypothesis that two more purely American (or more precisely, the Anglo-Saxon) major projects are placed within the specified “general project”, as if within a nesting doll.
The first – fully strategic – one is designed so that the wave of “revolutions” launched will enrage the Islamic “southern underbelly” of Eurasia for a long time and thus halt (or even push far back) key current and future U.S. competitors in the race for the world leadership – China, the EU, India and Russia.

It is obvious that Islamic radicalization and destabilization in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh cannot fail to elicit Islamic destabilization in Chinese Xinjiang and a new surge of separatism in Tibet. This is especially true in the case if, with the beginning of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, “liberated” militants from Central Asian republics, now fighting in the ranks of the Taliban begin attacks on the Fergana Valley.

It is no less obvious that the incidents of Islamic radicalization in Pakistan and Bangladesh cannot fail to affect India, with its giant Muslim population and the separatist and terrorist tendencies in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal.

Even more obvious is that both the internal wave of Islamic radicalization and the flow of refugees from the Maghreb countries (in which, as EU law enforcement officials say, a very significant proportion is made up of purely criminal elements), will seriously destabilize the socio-economic and political situation in Europe for a long time, above all, in the primary “locomotive countries” of the EU: France and Germany, with their already very large and politically active Islamic diaspora. The first sign of this process is the actual suspension (of course, it is stipulated as an interim measure) of the Schengen agreement to waive passport control at internal EU borders.

In regard to Russia, the consequences of the on-going “revolutions” are also evident and, moreover, accelerating (and it is difficult to believe this is purely by chance).

Thus, military experts have reported that the leaders of the radical caliphate Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have already expressed their determination to intensify their activities in the Fergana Valley in the near future, as the coalition troops from Afghanistan withdraw.

In addition, at the end of April 2011 there appeared in the press the “preliminary conclusions” of the international commission headed by the Special Representative for Central Asia of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Kimmo Kiljunen on the investigation of major incidents in the Fergana Valley in May 2010. The commission places the primary blame for these incidents on the interim government of Kyrgyzstan of Roza Otunbayeva.
This will necessarily cause a destabilization of the government in Kyrgyzstan (which already is in deep crisis), as well as an “explosive” escalation in political tensions in Uzbekistan and in Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations; that is, it will open up opportunities for the “active steps” in the region promised by the IMU.

Since Russia is linked with the countries of the region through binding agreements within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), if there is transition of conflict in the Fergana Valley to the military-terrorist level (moreover, in the case of its extension to neighboring Tajikistan and Kazakhstan), military intervention by Moscow would be virtually inevitable.

It is not possible to exclude that these events will be “synchronized” in a non-random manner with the intensification of radical Islamic terrorism in the North Caucasus and the Volga region (military analysts believe such a “synchronization” highly probable).

In addition, it is worth recalling that in early April 2010 (during the “revolution in Bishkek” aimed at overthrowing President Kurmanbek Bakiyev), Islamists from the IMU predicted the inevitability of civil war and Russia’s intervention into the conflict because of its CSTO commitments. They promised that in case Moscow indeed intervenes, it would get a “second Afghanistan” in the Fergana Valley.

Thus, it is no accident that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had already called for Bakiyev to resign on April 14th, 2010, “to prevent the country from becoming a second Afghanistan.”

Finally, according to our hypothesis, the second U.S. project included in the “nesting doll project” apparently has the goal of being an “economic brake” on the U.S.A.’s global competitors.

Thus, another quite obvious result of the “revolutions” occurring now is a halt to the economic expansion of China, India, Europe, and Russia, which has been growing in recent years in respect to the undeveloped resources (especially raw materials) of African countries.

The “tsunami of revolutions” quite obviously greatly increase the risks of opportunistic investments not only in the “revolutionary” mega-region itself, but also in all the countries of the world that are indirectly affected by the crisis incidents. Correspondingly, this initiates a new influx of “free” world money into government bonds and exchange-traded U.S. assets, which in crises have routinely been considered a minimal risk “safe haven” of capital. This, accordingly, will allow the U.S.A. to continue to finance with this influx of foreign money the huge trade and budget deficits in its national economy, which is in deep crisis.
Finally, from the dynamics of the current balance of energy resources among the leading countries of the world, it can be seen who is most in need of oil and gas imports that are predominantly from those regions of the Maghreb and the Greater Middle East that are undergoing “revolution”. This is the majority of EU countries (including Germany, Italy, and partially France), as well as China, India, and Japan. The U.S.A. and Britain are far less dependent on energy imports from these “revolutionary” regions.

Accordingly, the chaos of the “Islamic revolutions” have had the most painful impact on the sustainability of the “energy basis” of economic development and the cost of energy imports precisely in the aforementioned alliances and countries – the U.S.A.’s global competitors: the EU, China, and India, but not America. This can be judged at least by the fact that from the very beginning of these “revolutions”, the price per barrel on the New York Stock Exchange was on average 12-15 dollars lower than on the London Stock Exchange.

Moreover, it must be noted that the supply of oil to world markets as a result of these “revolutions” fell very slightly (the halt of exports from Libya is less than 2% of the world oil market), and a sharp jump in oil prices (followed closely by natural gas prices) was largely the result of a speculative boom and the “surcharges for political risk”. It is clear that possible incidents within the key suppliers of oil to world markets – the Gulf monarchies, Iraq, and Iran – would create much more burdensome energy, currency and general economic problems for the world’s major oil importers. But the development of the situation in the “revolutionary” mega-region so far provides no guarantee against such a scenario.

In addition, the whole world is extremely interested in the question of how the current and future “revolutionary incidents” will end in terms of the configuration of the global energy market. Namely, who, where, under whose supervision, and for whose benefit will export oil and gas from the “post-revolutionary” countries. Already there are increasing voices in the world which claim that these issues will soon inevitably be the subject of acute political, and, quite possible, military conflicts as well.

It cannot be excluded that the U.S.A., Britain, and France, which have taken the most active, multilateral and vigorous part in the initiation of the “Islamic revolutions”, will expect the “favor” of the Muslim elites they are helping to bring to power in the solution of this issue of energy resources, and that they will feel entitled to consider them at least conditional “allies”.

However at the same time, firstly, it should not be assumed that the
global political ambitions held by the afore-mentioned Islamic elites (ranging from the Islamic emirates to a worldwide caliphate), which have been clearly “heated up” by the on-going “revolutions”, will suddenly disappear overnight.

Secondly, it must be considered that these afore-mentioned Islamic elites do not only have terrorist resources for the realization of these ambitions. These resources today include a very strong and elaborate system of Islamic propaganda – through mosques, well-organized print and electronic media, and the Internet.

We already see how this propaganda all the more and more clearly exposes the existential and generally the world view polarization of positions (which are very significant not only for believers). Islam declares itself a global leader in the holy war for the PRESERVATION OF NORMS (which the leading Islamic preachers fully consciously extend far beyond a strict understanding of the sharia norms) against the strong postmodernist DENIAL OF EVERY AND ALL NORMS, which the West brings the world under the guise of “democratization”.

Current events in the “zone of the Islamic revolutions”, including false excuses for the escalation of the military intervention in Libya, an array of apparent lies and subsequent clumsy denials and excuses from the U.S. administration in connection with the killing of Osama bin Laden, and so on, provide very rich and compelling material for this Islamic propaganda.

Thirdly, if we talk about the ambitions of radical Islam, the historically very “fresh” experience of the U.S.A., which first created the Taliban and bin Laden with al-Qaida as a “devil for the dirty work” against the U.S.S.R., should again not be forgotten. And then according to various estimates, had to spend up to 1.5 trillion U.S dollars in total on fighting this “devil”.

In connection with this, it is impossible not to recall the acknowledgement by one of the creators of this very “devil for the dirty work”, the former head of CIA operations in Afghanistan, Charles Cogan, in an interview with The New York Times in 1995 after the first major terrorist attacks by Islamists in the U.S.A.: “Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets.... The hypothesis that the mujahideen would come to the United States and commit terrorist actions did not enter into our universe of thinking at the time”.

May, 2011
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On April 7th, the chief of the U.S. African Command General Carter Ham admitted to the U.S. Congress that the military situation in Libya was a “dead-lock” (ITAR-TASS. 08.04.2011).


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As the head of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso announced on BBC news on May 2, 2011, passport may return to the internal borders separating the countries of the EU. The EU is considering a qualification to Article 32 of the Schengen agreement which would envisage the temporary shutting down of a state’s borders if its leadership were to see a threat to social security coming from outside its country.
In 1954, Jordan enacted a law granting the right to citizenship to all who had Palestinian citizenship (except Jews) before May 15, 1948, and were permanently residing in Jordan be-
between December 1949 and February 1954.

In the opinion of the Jordanian majority, Queen Rania not only behaves too “uninhibitedly” from the perspective of Islamic norms, but also too actively “helps” her tribesmen from Jordan’s West Bank, especially her close relatives, as a result of which she essentially heads the largest “oligarchic” group in the country. This is particularly alarms “indigenous” Jordanian clans for the reason that the Palestinians in Jordan, partially restricted from occupying government and administrative posts, occupy all the strongest positions in all business sectors according to the market-oriented economic reforms of King Abdullah II. Therefore, indigenous Jordanians accused Queen Rania of corruption and plunder of the national economy, and the Palestinians defend her as a “victim of Jordanian nationalism.”

Realizing the threat to country’s political stability from the ethnic majority of Palestinian Arabs, the king long ago introduced legislation to “gerrymander” electoral districts, in which representation in the lower house of parliament from the provincial “indigenous” and sparsely populated Jordanian territories significantly exceeds the representation from the cities, including the capital, where the majority of Palestinians live.

This was especially apparent in the 1980s in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

We note that this kind of protest and accusations of the TV channel’s biased informational policy have been voiced regularly to the Emir by Islamic countries for many years, but he invariably replies that he could not interfere in the editorial policy of Al-Jazeera, specially created as a fully independent global Islamic TV channel.